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CASE COMMENTS
Administrative Law -PASSPORTS MAY NOT BE REVOKED FOR NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY REASONS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORI-
ZATION-Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980)*
Judicial recognition of a constitutional right to travel abroad is a relatively
recent development. Not until 1958 did the Supreme Court of the United States
indicate that an individual's freedom to travel abroad was a cognizable liberty
interest protected by the fifth amendment.' Since that time federal courts have
struggled to determine the limits of the government's power to regulate interna-
tional travel. Although the issue has arisen in a variety of settings, 2 the conflict is
most clearly presented in cases involving the validity of passport regulations.
In Agee v. Muskie, 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the Secretary of State lacked authority to revoke the passport
of an individual who had been determined to be causing or likely to cause serious
damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. 4 The
court reasoned that since the right to travel was protected by the Constitution,
any restrictions on this right must be made by the legislative rather than the
executive branch of the federal government. Thus, according to the court, only
those State Department passport regulations explicitly or implicitly approved by
Congress are valid. Since the regulation used to revoke passports for national
security and foreign policy reasons had not received this necessary congressional
approval, the court held the regulation invalid.
Philip Agee is a self-proclaimed critic of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and has announced his intention to expose American intelligence activities
throughout the world.5 In December 1979, the Secretary of State revoked Agee's
passport6 under the authority of 22 C.F.R. Section 51.70(b) (4) (1979), which pro-
* Cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980).
1 In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), Justice Douglas wrote: "The right to travel is part of the
'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."
Id. at 125. See also Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475
(1967); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
2 &e, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978) (Social Security restrictions on recipients
travelling abroad); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (State Department regulation restricting travel to
certain areas); Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (parolees restricted from travelling
abroad); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (submission to airport search as condition of
foreign travel). See generaly Annot., 58 L.Ed.2d 904 (1978).
3 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980).
4 629 F.2d at 87.
5 See P. AGEE & L. WOLF, DIRTY WoRx: CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (1978).
6 The State Department letter to Agee reads:
The Department's actions are predicated upon a determination made by the Secretary under
the provisions of Section 51.70(b) (4) that your activities are causing or are likely to cause serious
damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the
Secretary's determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970s it has been your
stated intention to disrupt the intelligence operations of the United States. In carrying out that
campaign you have travelled in various countries (including, among others, Mexico, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and your activities in those countries have
caused serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Your
stated intention to continue such activities threatens additional damage of the same kind.
629 F.2d at 82.
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vides that "[a] passport may be refused in any case in which. . . [t]he Secretary
determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or likely to cause seri-
ous damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States."'7
Agee rejected the opportunity for an administrative hearing on the passport
revocation 8 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court.9
On a motion for summary judgment, Agee conceded that his activities had
caused serious damage to the nation's security, but argued that the passport revo-
cation should be enjoined because the regulation had not been authorized by
Congress.' 0 Persuaded by this argument, the district court ordered Agee's pass-
port restored." The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed on the same basis,
leaving unresolved Agee's constitutional arguments regarding the right to travel
and procedural due process. 12
The majority opinion, written by Judge Robb,13 derived the test of a pass-
port regulation's validity from two Supreme Court cases, Kent v. Dulles 14 and
Zemel v. Rusk 5 The court extracted from Kent the principle that freedom to
travel abroad is protected by the fifth amendment and that such liberty could be
regulated only pursuant to the law-making functions of Congress.' 6 The court
thus held that passport regulations must be explicitly or implicitly authorized by
Congress and that the Secretary of State does not have unlimited discretion to
deny or revoke passports.1
7
The Agee court derived its test for determining the existence of implicit con-
gressional authorization of passport regulations from Zemel. Zemel held that a
passport regulation was valid if an administrative practice existed sufficiently
substantial and consistent to warrant the finding that Congress had implicitly
approved it.18 Applying the Kent-Zemd test, the court determined that the Pass-
7 Since the Secretary's action was a revocation and not a refusal, 22 C.F.R. § 51.71(a) (1979) was also
invoked. This regulation provides that a "passport may be revoked, restricted, or limited where: (a) The
national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under § 51.70." For purposes of this com-
ment, passport refusals and passport revocations will be treated alike.
8 The procedures developed by the State Department for such a hearing are contained in 22 C.F.R.
§§ 51.80-.105 (1979).
9 Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).
10 Agee also argued that (1) 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1979) is impermissibly vague and overbroad; (2)
the revocation prior to a hearing violated his fifth amendment right to procedural due process; (3) the
revocation violated his fifth amendment right to travel; and (4) the revocation was intended to suppress his
criticism of government policy in violation of the first amendment. 629 F.2d at 82.
11 Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).
12 629 F.2d at 87 n.9.
13 Judge Wald also voted to restore Agee's passport.
14 357 U.S. 116 (1958). At issue in Kent was the validity of State Department regulations prohibiting
the issuance ofpassports to Communist Party members and persons believed to be going abroad to support
the Communist movement. The Court held the regulations to be invalid because they lacked congres-
sional authorization.
15 381 U.S. 1 (1965). At issue in Zmel was the validity of a State Department restriction on all travel
to Cuba. The Court upheld such area restrictions as having been implicitly approved by Congress in light
of the prior administrative practice of imposing such area restrictions.
16 629 F.2d at 83 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 125, 129).
17 629 F.2d at 83 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 127-28). The Agee court also noted that the power
to restrict an individual's freedom to travel is not part of the President's inherent foreign affairs powers.
629 F.2d at 85-86. The court also construed Kent as indicating the only grounds for passport refusals which
Congress had implicitly approved involved questions of citizenship or allegiance or of criminal or unlawful
conduct. 629 F.2d at 83 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 127).
18 629 F.2d at 84 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 8-12). The District of Columbia Circuit had
previously applied the Kent-Zne test in two other cases. In Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
the court held that Congress had not authorized a passport refusal based on the applicant's failure to
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port Act of 1926'9 did not explicitly authorize passport revocations for national
security reasons. 20 The court also noted that Congress had previously declined to
confer upon the Secretary of State explicit authority to revoke passports for na-
tional security reasons.
2 1
Having found no explicit authorization for national security passport revo-
cations, the court next addressed the question whether Congress had approved
the regulation implicitly. The majority found no substantial and consistent ad-
ministrative practice of denying passports for national security reasons.2 2 The
court conceded that various statutes, regulations, proclamations, orders and advi-
sory opinions purported to give the Secretary of State power to refuse or revoke
passports for national security reasons. It nevertheless found that, while some of
these laws might be applicable in wartime or emergency situations, most were
mere unexercised assertions of power.23 The majority concluded that, because
the regulation lacked congressional approval, it was invalid and could not be
invoked by the Secretary of State to revoke Agee's passport.
24
In his lengthy dissent, Judge MacKinnon argued that revocation of Agee's
passport was justifiable on numerous grounds. He contended that Agee's rela-
tionship to the Iranian hostage crisis2 5 was such that the Secretary of State could
properly revoke Agee's passport under the authority of the Hostage Law.
26
Judge MacKinnon also maintained that Agee's passport could be revoked be-
cause his activities were criminal.27 Disputing the majority's finding, the dissent
argued that there existed a 150-year precedent of national security passport refus-
als, and that the Supreme Court had authorized such refusals in Kent and
assure the State Department he would not travel to restricted areas. In Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp.
974 (D.D.C. 1972),aJ'dmem., 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court affirmed the district court's finding
that there was no explicit or implicit congressional authorization for a passport refusal to an applicant who
declined to sign an oath of allegiance. See 629 F.2d at 8-10.
19 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) (as amended in 1978) provides in part:
The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports. . . under such rules as the President
shall designate. . . Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for
travel to or for use in any country other than a country with which the United States is at war,
where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health
or the physical safety of United States travellers.
20 629 F.2d at 85.
21 Id. at 85 n.4. Such legislation was introduced in apparent reaction to the Kent and Zemel decisions.
22 Id. at 86. The court found only one previous use of the regulation and only five passport refusals
even "tenuously related" to national security and foreign policy concerns. Id. at 86 and nn.6 & 7.
23 Id. at 86-87.
24 Id. at 87.
25 Id. at 89-91 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
26 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) provides in part:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been
unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government. . . . the
President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper to obtain or effectuate the release.
27 629 F.2d at 104-07, 110-18 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Noting that passport refusals for criminal
activities were approved in Kent, the dissent offered draft indictments of Agee on the following charges:
(1) transmitting injurious defense information in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1976);
(2) having unlawful intercourse with a foreign government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 953
(1976);
(3) committing treason in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976);
(4) aiding and abetting the kidnap of the American hostages in Iran in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (1976); and




The vehemence of Judge MacKinnon's dissenting opinion indicates the con-
troversial nature of the issues involved in this case. The conflict of individual
liberties and national security concerns usually arouses strong emotional reac-
tions.29 Many will find it outrageous that Philip Agee, an avowed opponent of
American intelligence activities, cannot be denied a passport for national security
reasons, even after he has admitted the damage he has done.30 However, a close
analysis of Agee indicates that the case was properly decided. By limiting its
decision to the issue of congressional authorization for passport regulations, the
Agee majority avoided the overbreadth of analysis found in the dissent. How-
ever, the majority's analysis of the prior practice of denials for national security
reasons is brief (consisting of a single textual paragraph) 3 1 and is not altogether
convincing.
The dissent amassed an impressive amount of precedent purporting to au-
thorize passport refusals for national security reasons. This authority can be
grouped into three categories: (1) wartime and emergency legislation;3 2 (2) State
Department regulations, instructions, proclamations and opinions; 33 and (3) sta-
tistics and individual cases of alleged national security passport refusals. 34
The majority termed the first category of wartime and emergency legislation
"inapposite" to the question of peacetime restrictions on the right to travel
abroad.35 The dissent would not distinguish between wartime and peacetime
restrictions, arguing that national security is always a matter of major govern-
mental concern. 36
The majority was correct in distinguishing between wartime and peacetime
travel limitations. Travel restrictions necessitated by the exigencies of war should
not be considered in determining the validity of a peacetime restriction. The war
power of the executive is extremely broad, and permits restrictions on individual
liberties which would be "wholly inadmissible in time of peace." 3 7 In Kent, the
Supreme Court refused to equate the government's power to deny passports to
Communists during peacetime with its powers during wartime.3 8 Although the
Agee dissent correctly noted that the Supreme Court considered both wartime
and peacetime travel restrictions in Zemel v. Rusk, 39 the Zemel decision was chiefly
supported by precedents involving peacetime restrictions.4°
28 Id. at 95-102 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
29 For a comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in such situations, see Developments in the Lau--
The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1130 (1972).
30 Even the Agee majority was not altogether pleased with its decision. The court pointed out that
had Agee been charged with a crime his passport could have been validly revoked. 629 F.2d at 87. There
seems to be a trace of regret in the court's conclusion: "We are bound by the law as we find it." Id.
31 Id. at 86 and nn.6 & 7.
32 Id. at 98-99 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 99-101 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 86-87.
36 Id. at 99 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
37 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931). Even restrictions necessitated by war have
long been held subject to constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware-
house Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
38 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 127.
39 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
40 Id. at 7-11. It is important to note that the specific restriction at issue in Zemel involved travel to
Cuba, and that the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the appellant's complaint by less than
[Vol. 56:508]
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The majority in Agee was not persuaded by the dissent's second category of
authority-the numerous State Department regulations, proclamations, orders
and advisory opinions which purport to authorize passport refusals on national
security grounds. These it considered "mere assertions of power"' 4 1 which should
not be considered in determining the validity of the power asserted. The court
noted that the Supreme Court, in verifying implicit congressional authorization
of a passport regulation, has demanded specific instances of restrictions being
imposed, and not mere claims of the authority to impose such restrictions.
42
The cornerstone of the Agee decision is the analysis of the dissent's third
category of authority-actual passport refusals allegedly based on national secur-
ity grounds. The majority opinion cursorily dismissed these refusals as "only ten-
uously related" 43 to concern for the national security and foreign policy of the
United States. This dismissal is unfortunately supported by only scant analysis
of the passport cases presented by the dissent.4 4 Nevertheless, more thorough
analysis reveals no substantial or consistent history of passport refusals to individ-
uals determined to be causing or likely to cause serious damage to national secur-
ity.
The first case cited by the dissent involved a 1906 passport refusal to a noto-
rious promoter of gambling and prostitution.45 The State Department justified
this refusal on the ground that the applicant was "likely to embarrass the United
States."'46 There is no evidence indicating the threatened embarrassment was
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the
United States.
A second case cited by the dissent involved a 1907 refusal to a blackmailer
who was "disturbing or endeavoring to disturb, the relations of this country with
representatives of foreign countries."' 47 Although this refusal seems to be based
on foreign policy considerations, it has elsewhere been treated as based on "un-
lawful activities,"'48 which has been held to justify passport refusals. 49
two months. Id. at 16. The Supreme Court may have been more willing to consider wartime restrictions
in light of the situation existing between Cuba and the United States.
41 629 F.2d at 87.
42 Id. The Zmel Court did mention that the executive had openly asserted the power to impose such
restrictions, but its decision turned on the finding of specific examples of area restrictions that had been
imposed. In Kent, the Court wrote: "[Tihe key ...is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion
was exercised, not in the bare fact that he had discretion." 357 U.S. at 125.
43 629 F.2d at 86 n.7.
44 In the other two decisions in which the District of Columbia Circuit applied the Kent-Zemel test for
passport regulation validity, the absence of prior administrative practice was found without an examina-
tion of specific cases. See Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp.
974 (D.D.C. 1972), af'dmem 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This failure to analyze specific cases may be
partly due to the paucity of official State Department records concerning passport practices in the early
part of this century. The most comprehensive attempts to list specific individuals whose passport applica-
tions were denied are found in Note, Passport Refiusal for Political Reasons.- Constitutional Issues andJudicial
Review, 61 YALE L. J. 170 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Passport Refusals); 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 498 (1942); 3 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 919 (1906). In Passport
Refusals, the difficulties faced by modern researchers of past passport practices are made evident.
45 629 F.2d at 99 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing 3 G. HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 498-99 (1942)).
46 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 498-99 (1942).
47 629 F.2d at 99 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing 1907Foreign Relations of the United States, Part 2 at
1076, 1080, 1082-83).
48 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 500-01 (1942).
49 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 127. Another of the cases cited by the dissent, in which a Col. Hubert
Julian was denied a passport for gun-running, appears to fall into this illegal activity category. 629 F.2d at
[February 1981]
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The dissent also offered several passport denials to individuals whose acts
were considered inimical to the interests of the United States.50 Three of these
individuals were denied passports because of their affiliation with the Communist
movement,5 1 a practice invalidated in Kent v. Dulles5 2 and Aptheker v. Secretag of
State.53 A fourth individual was denied a passport because he had been con-
victed in a Swiss court of having spied for Senator Joseph McCarthy on Commu-
nists and American diplomatic personel. 54  A fifth individual was denied a
passport for allegedly discussing confidential information with a Soviet official.5 5
Of these five cases, only the last supports the contention that passports have been
denied for legitimate national security reasons. 56
The State Department's sporadic history of denying passports on alleged
national security grounds cannot be characterized as a substantial and consistent
practice. Indeed, the cases cited are most accurately categorized as four refusals
based on unlawful activities, three refusals based on political beliefs and associa-
tions, and only three refusals based on national security considerations.
The statistical authority presented by the dissent is similarly unconvincing.
In 1955, six passports were denied to "participants in political affairs abroad
whose activities were deemed harmful to good relations." 5 7 Although the stan-
dards used to define this category are unclear, a 1955 State Department memo-
randum listed persons planning to fight in the Spanish Civil War as examples of
previous use of this category.58 The memorandum continued:
Formerly there were many cases in which Americans residing abroad took part in
political activities in foreign countries without losing their American citizenship.
These were denied the protection of this Government while carrying on such activi-
101 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing Developments in the Law--The National Securiy Interest and Civil Liber-
ties, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 1130, 1150 n.76 (1972)).
50 629 F.2d at 101 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing Passport Refra4, supra note 44, at 174-77).
51 The first, one Isaacson, was a member of the American Labor Party who was refused a passport to
attend a Paris conference as an observer for the American Council for Aid to Democratic Greece. Passport
Ref/usal, supra note 44, at 176. The second, Paul Robeson, was a noted Black statesman, athlete and
entertainer whose political beliefs were well-known, and whose association with the Communist Party
made him infamous in America. Robeson later challenged the passport refusal in federal court, but his
case was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Robeson v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 895 (1956). The third, one Lamont, was a left-wing writer whose passport
was refused as not in the "best interest" of the United States. Passport Refaisa, supra note 44, at 177.
52 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
53 378 U.S. 500 (1964). In Aptheker, the Supreme Court held that § 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 785 was unconstitutionally overbroad in its attempt to prohibit the
issuance of passports to Communists and Communist sympathizers.
54 Passport ReSrsal, supra note 44, at 178. Again, this case falls into the category of passport restrictions
validly based on criminal activities.
55 This individual, an atomic scientist named Kamen, was accused of passing secret information un-
wittingly to the Soviets. It is interesting to note that Kamen was issued a passport by the State Depart-
ment in 1955. See Passport Legislation, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 193 (1958).
56 The final case cited by the dissent involved the single previous use of the regulation. In September
1970, the passports of attorney C. Luke McKissack and his assistant were revoked under § 51.70(b)(4). 629
F.2d at 101 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Mr. McKissack was attempting to escort the mother of Sirhan
Sirhan to Jordan to seek the release of 180 airline passengers held hostage by Palestinian terrorists. See
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1970, § 1, at 10, col. 3. Attempts to enjoin the revocations failed. Sirhan v. Rogers,
No. 70-3965 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1970), afd, No. 35364 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 1970). The passports were restored
when the crisis passed.
57 629 F.2d at 100 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing Hearings on H.A 99-91, Subcommittee No. 1, House
Judiciag Committee 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1956)).
58 Hearings on the Right to Travel, Part 2 Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate judiciag Committee
85th Cong., Ist Sess. 266 (1957) (hereinafter cited as 1957 Senate Hearings).
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ties, rather than denied passports to go abroad.59
One committee studying passport procedures characterized this "political af-
fairs" criterion for passport refusals as "nebulous," 60 noting that no passport de-
nials had been "based specifically upon the danger that an individual applicant's
travel would interfere with foreign relations.
61
The State Department's inconsistency concerning passport refusals is evi-
dent in other statistical authority cited by the dissent. A 1957 State Department
report stated that passports had been denied to "participants in political affairs
abroad whose activities were deemed harmful to good relations and persons
whose previous conduct abroad has been such as to bring discredit on the United
States and cause difficulty for other Americans (gave bad checks, left unpaid
debts, had difficulty with police, etc.)." 62 The grouping of these apparently dis-
parate classes of refusals does not support the contention that the State Depart-
ment has consistently denied passports for national security reasons. To place
such different types of cases within a single category indicates little concern for
consistent administration of passport restrictions for national security reasons.
The Burger Court has never passed on the validity of a passport regulation
or, indeed, of the Kent-Zemel test itself. If this test is the proper one for determin-
ing the validity of national security passport revocations, the Agee case was de-
cided correctly. Although there is no case law defining the terms "substantial
and consistent," the history of administrative passport restrictions on national
security grounds does not clearly indicate that Congress has implicitly authorized
such passport controls.
The law, as the District of Columbia Circuit found it in Agee, is designed to
protect an individual's liberty against unauthorized governmental restrictions.
Whether State Department regulations should be used to implement foreign pol-
icy objectives is an issue not addressed by the majority opinion in Agee. 63 Yet,
implicit in Agee is the determination that the often nebulous national security
rationale should not be used by the executive branch to restrict an individual's
freedom to travel abroad.
Thomas A. Teny
59 Id.
60 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES 45 (1958).
61 Id. at 47.
62 1957 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 129.
63 A number of commentators have urged that the passport regulatory process should not be used to
implement foreign policy objectives. The basic rationale of such arguments is that because freedom to
travel is constitutionally protected, and because there exist other means to control individuals who might
damage national security, the State Department should not be allowed to restrict travel on any grounds
other than citizenship or nationality. See, e.g., Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REV. 129 (1966); Comment,
Judicial Review of the Right to Travel- 4 Proposal, 42 WASH. L. REV. 873 (1967). But see Comment, Executive
Restriction on Travel- The Passport Cases, 5 Hous. L. REv. 499 (1968); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE




Administrative Law-SUBPOENA POWER-DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NEEDS No
EXPRESS GRANT OF SUBPOENA POWER TO STUDY OIL COMPANY FUEL SALES
SUBSIDIZATION-United States v. Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1980)*
Title III of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA)I directs the Sec-
retary of Energy to conduct a study of motor fuel sales subsidization by vertically
integrated oil companies. 2 The Secretary is instructed to give interested parties
an opportunity to present data and opinions concerning the subject but is not
expressly provided subpoena power to compel parties to do so. 3 However, when
Congress passed the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOEOA) in
1977,4 the Secretary of Energy was given the same subpoena power as the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC).5 The FTC's subpoena power is subject only to
the requirements of definiteness and relevancy to the agency's legitimate pur-
pose.6 The DOEOA explicitly provided subpoena power with respect to "all
functions vested in, or transferred or delegated to, the Secretary" by that Act.
7
The tension between the broad subpoena power granted by the DOEOA
and the PMPA's silence on subpoena power left the exact scope of the Depart-
ment of Energy's (DOE) power uncertain. In United States v. Exxon Corp.,8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia approved the en-
forcement of subpoenas issued as part of the study required by Title III. 9 The
court's per curiam opinion upheld the district court's decision that the DOE's
subpoena power under the DOEOA extended to the subsidization study.' 0
On January 22, 1979, subpoenas duces tecum were served on Exxon Corpo-
* Cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980).
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (Supp. 1978).
2 The study was conducted in consultation with the FTC, the Department of Justice and other agen-
cies designated by the Secretary and covered: (1) the role of vertically integrated operations in the subsidi-
zation of wholesale or retail motor fuel sales; (2) the effect of subsidization on competition; (3) the
profitability of various segments of the petroleum industry; and (4) the impact of prohibiting subsidization
on competition, consumer prices and the health of the industry. Id § 2841(b).
3 Id. § 2841(c).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 1978).
5 Id. § 7255 states:
For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this . . . [Act], the Secretary, or his duly
authorized agent or agents, shall have the same powers and authorities as the Federal Trade
Commission under § 49 of Title 15 with respect to all functions vested in, or transferred or
delegated to, the Secretary or such agents by this ... [Act].
The FTC's subpoena power is granted by 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976):
For the purposes of... this [Act, the FTC] shall at all reasonable times have access to ... any
documentary evidence of any person, partnership, or corporation being investigated or pro-
ceeded against; and ... shall have power to require by subpoena ... the production of all
such documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation.
6 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); accord, Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861 (8th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1961); FTC v. Rockefeller, 441 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd,
591 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1977); FTC v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educ. Center, 433 F. Supp. 989 (D. Mass. 1977).
In Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court ordered the defendant to
produce all records not plainly irrelevant to the FTC's charges. The Rockefeller court held compliance
necessary where the specific requests "may be relevant" to the FTC's legitimate inquiry, provided the
request does not unduly burden the respondents. 441 F. Supp. at 241.
7 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b) (Supp. 1978). The oil companies contended that the Title III study could not
be considered a function vested in the Secretary by the DOEOA and that as a result the DOEOA's general
subpoena power was not available.
8 628 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
9 The court also issued an order protecting the confidentiality of information released by the compa-
nies. Id. at 78-80.
10 Id. at 73.
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ration, Shell Oil Company and Marathon Oil Company for various documents
related to the subsidization study."I When the oil companies refused to produce
the requested documents, the DOE sought enforcement in the District Court for
the District of Columbia. That court held that the subpoenas were within the
DOE's authority and were not burdensome or unreasonable.
12
The oil companies raised five principal contentions on appeal:
(1) The DOE's subpoena power for the subsidization study could de-
rive only from Title III of the PMPA, the legislative history of
which showed an implied congressional decision to withhold that
power from the Title III study.
(2) The DOE could not rely on the DOEOA's general subpoena power
since the study stood outside of and was mandated after that Act. 13
(3) Even if the DOE's general subpoena power could apply to later-
mandated agency functions, it applied only to investigations of spe-
cific legal violations, not general studies.14
(4) The subpoenas should not be enforced because the DOE violated its
own regulations, 15 the Administrative Procedure Act 16 and the due
process clause 17 by denying administrative review of the subpoenas.
(5) The subpoenas required overly broad and burdensome disclosure.18
The District of Columbia Circuit began by analyzing Congress's purposes in
creating the DOE. The court stated that Congress sought effective energy re-
source management, ample and reasonably priced supplies of energy, and the
economic health of small businesses engaged in energy production. ' 9 These goals
were to be achieved in part by promoting, and regulating, competition in the
energy industry.
The DOEOA required the Secretary of Energy to create the Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA) within the DOE to collect, evaluate and dissemi-
nate data relevant to energy reserves, production, demand and technology.
20
The EIA also maintains information on "the institutional structure of the energy
supply system, including patterns of ownership and control of mineral fuel and
... the production, distribution and marketing of mineral fuels. '"2 1 The
11 Subpoenas were also served on six other oil companies, all of which agreed to produce the docu-
ments sought by the DOE. 628 F.2d at 77.
12 United States v. Exxon Corp., 487 F. Supp. 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1980).
13 See notes 5 and 7 supra and accompanying text.
14 The oil companies contended that the language "any person, partnership or corporation being
investigated or proceeded against" of 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) limited the FTC's subpoena power to cases of
specifically alleged violations. 628 F.2d at 73.
15 10 C.F.R. § 205.8 (1980) sets forth DOE regulations for review of agency subpoenas.
16 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1976).
17 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
18 Marathon contended that a subpoena's reasonableness should be tested by balancing the DOE's
need for information against the company's burden in producing it. Brief for Appellant Marathon Oil Co.
at 31, United States v. Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
19 628 F.2d at 73. The DOEOA's stated purposes also included "improv[ing] the effectiveness of a
central energy data collection and analysis program within the DOE." 42 U.S.C. § 7112 (Supp. 1978).
20 42 U.S.C. § 7135(a) (Supp. 1978).
21 15 U.S.C. § 790a(b)(1) (1976). This function, formerly performed by the Office of Energy Informa-
tion under the Federal Energy Administration Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-790h (1976), was transferred by the
DOEOA to the EIA. 42 U.S.C. § 7135(c) (Supp. 1978). The EIA is independent of the DOE with regard
to this function. Id. § 7135(d). The DOEOA also delegates to the EIA Administrator responsibility for
gathering, analyzing and disseminating energy information formerly held by the Federal Energy Adminis-
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DOEOA delegates subpoena power to the EIA for obtaining this information.22
The court thus concluded that the subsidization study fell within the range of
administrative inquiry already permitted by the DOEOA. 23
The court was not persuaded by the oil companies' contention that Congress
had impliedly withheld subpoena power, reasoning that the PMPA only rein-
forced the DOE's existing power to conduct the study.24 Title III's silence on
subpoena power was found inconsequential. 25 Similarly, the court found that
the PMPA's status as a later act did not affect the availability of subpoena power
since "Title III specifically instructs [the] DOE to conduct a study which the
agency would in any event be permitted to conduct under its broad general
DOEOA mandate." 26
The court dealt only briefly with the oil companies' other contentions. It
held that: (1) the verb "investigate" in the statute creating the FTC's subpoena
power describes broad administrative functions, including "studies" such as that
required by Title III; (2) the companies' administrative review argument was
without merit; and (3) the spbpoenas were reasonably relevant to the DOE's pur-
pose.2 7
Judge Wilkey dissented. Without elaborating on his reasoning, he accepted
the oil companies' main contentions and concluded that subpoena power was not
available.28 The contrast between the majority's and the dissent's analysis points
out the dilemma posed by United States v. Exxon Corp. The majority assumed that
the broad DOEOA mandate allowed the DOE to conduct the subsidization
study without the PMPA and decided that subpoena power was available for the
study. The dissent emphasized the language and legislative history of Title III
and found the subpoena power unavailable.
Nothing in the PMPA's legislative history explicitly demonstrates Congress's
intention to provide subpoena power for the Title III study.29 Rather, the Senate
debate indicates that the PMPA's sponsor, Senator Bumpers, believed that the
power would not exist. He stated:
The Justice Department has subpoena powers. If they are sure that something is
going on that is wrong among major oil companies, they can subpoena the informa-
tion. They do not have to ask for ... [the oil companies'] cooperation. Here we do. . . . I
believe there will be enough cooperation to get the information to determine whether
or not the practice we are trying to cure here is going on.30
trator under 15 U.S.C. § 796(a) (1976), and transferred to the Secretary of Energy by 42 U.S.C. § 7151(a)
(Supp. 1978). Id. § 7135(b).
22 The functions delegated by 42 U.S.C. § 7135(b) (Supp. 1978) include the power to issue subpoenas
to gather information. 15 U.S.C. § 796(b)(1) (1976).
23 628 F.2d at 74.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 72 (emphasis in original).
27 628 F.2d at 76-77.
28 628 F.2d at 80 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey stated:
On the face of the statute there is no subpoena power under Title III, there is admittedly not
one word in the legislative history implying there is such a power, and there are words from two
of the legislators most active. . . saying flatly that no subpoena power exists . . . a repeated
assertion which was. . . uncontradicted.
Id.
29 See 124 CoNG. REc. S7149-56 (1978). Since Title III was added to the PMPA on the Senate floor
there are no relevant committee reports.
30 124 CONG. REc. S7155 (1978) (emphasis added).
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Later, in response to a proposed amendment, the Senator stated that the DOE
''will get no more information under . . . [this] amendment than under mine.
They will not have the right to get the information under subpoena powers either
way. . . . [The amendment] does not require the oil companies to divulge one
iota of information they do not want to give."' 3 1 But the court discounted Sena-
tor Bumpers's statements, 32 citing the Supreme Court's remark in Chiysler Corp. v.
Brown 3 that "the remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not control-
ling in analyzing legislative history."'34 The Exxon court, however, did not quote
the next sentence in Brown: "Congressman Moss's statement must be considered
with the reports of both Houses and the statements of other Congressmen. '35
Since Senator Bumpers's statements on subpoena power for the Title III study
are the only ones found in the PMPA's legislative history, 36 Brown's language is
thus misapplied by the Exxon court. The legislative history's lack of any assertion
of subpoena power for the study is conspicuous, and the court's dismissal of Sena-
tor Bumpers's statements as "unnecessary to his argument" is speculative at best.
The District of Columbia Circuit found that a comparison of Title III's fail-
ure to mention subpoena power with the express grant of such authority in Title
II of the same Act provided "some evidence" of congressional intent, but was
"hardly decisive."137 Comparisons with other legislation were equally unreveal-
ing.38 The court distinguished Title II from Title III on the ground that the
former was primarily a directive to private parties, while the latter was directed
to a government agency. The court stated that since Title II only secondarily
established the FTC as the enforcing agency, Congress "may have felt a need to
spell out the FTC's enforcement powers in some detail."' 39 In contrast, it found
that "Congress may reasonably have understood" Title III to incorporate the
DOE's enforcement powers under the DOEOA.40 Yet Title III's lack of an ex-
press grant of subpoena power together with its legislative history indicates that
the court's interpretation of what Congress intended stands on a weak founda-
tion.
The court's attempt to distinguish other legislation cited by the oil compa-
nies is also suspect. For example, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act 4"
and the Emergency Energy Conservation Act4 2 both direct the DOE to gather
energy-related information, and expressly provide subpoena power for those ac-
tivities.4 3 Citing National Refiners Assocation v. FTC,44 the court stated that such
31 Id. The proposed amendment would have made information acquired by the Title III study avail-
able to other federal agencies.
32 628 F.2d at 74.
33 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
34 Id. at 311.
35 Id.
36 See 124 CONG. REc. S7149-56 (1980).
37 628 F.2d at 75.
38 Invoking the principle exprtssio unius est exd/usio altun'us, the oil companies contrasted Title III's fail-
ure to mention subpoena power with Title II's express grant of such power. The companies also argued




41 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8438 (Supp. 1978).
42 Pub. L. No. 96-102, 93 Stat. 768 (1979)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 8501-8541).
43 The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 sought to reduce U.S. petroleum imports by
encouraging the use of coal as a primary energy source. 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b) (Supp. 1978). The Secretary
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express grants "may well have been the product of uncertainty, understandable
caution, and a desire to avoid litigation. '45 But the National Refners Association
decision recognized that this theory was speculative. 46 Thus, the distinction
made by the Exxon court between Title III and similar legislation is not compel-
ling.
The majority stated that to accept the oil companies' arguments would be to
find an implied partial repeal of the DOEOA.4 7 The court reasoned that the rule
disfavoring implied repeals as applied by the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill4 8 was
especially appropriate in this instance, since the inference "would be based not
on any language in Title III itself, but on a stray remark in the legislative history
and questionable references to other statutes. '49 Yet without the prior assump-
tion that the study was within the DOEOA's mandate, Senator Bumpers's state-
ments and a comparison with Title II and other legislation would strongly
indicate a contrary congressional intent.
The Exxon court could have made use of another argument supporting a
broad interpretation of the DOEOA's language providing subpoena power with
respect to "all functions vested in, or transferred or delegated to, the Secre-
tary."'50 In Menzies v. FTC,5 t the Fourth Circuit held that the Federal Trade
Commission Act did not preclude the use of subpoena power granted "for the
purpose of"52 that Act in proceedings under the Clayton Act. The court stated
that finding such a preclusion would require
an unreasonable and forced construction of the language used, the manifest purpose
of which was to give the Commission the power of subpoena and examination in
connection with any investigation or proceeding which it was authorized by law to
conduct .... When duties of investigation or enforcement are imposed ... by an-
other act or acts, the reasonable intendment is that it shall exercise the power con-
ferred upon it by law in the discharge of such duties.
5 3
The Fourth Circuit emphasized the similarity in purpose of the Clayton and Fed-
eral Trade Commission Acts.5 4 Its reasoning is useful in determining the scope of
of Energy was authorized to require submission of information necessary to implement the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 842 1(a) (Supp. 1978). The Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979 required that a study of com-
mercial and industrial gasoline storage be undertaken. Pub. L. No. 96-102, §§ 241, 242, 93 Stat. 768
(1979). Enforcement powers are delegated by the Act in § 251.
44 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45 628 F.2d at 75.
46 482 F.2d at 696. The court in National Refners supported its "understandable caution" theory with
references to specific statutes and their legislative histories. The Exxon court made no comparable analysis.
47 628 F.2d at 75.
48 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In Hill, the Supreme Court stated that "the intention of the legislature to
repeal must be clear and manifest," and that "in the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention
to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable." 437 U.S. at 190. See also Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Finch, 419 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1969), and
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). Finch held that a court cannot impute to Congress an
intent to make basic changes in regulatory procedures unless Congress has used plain language or clearly
manifested such intent. In Callanan, the Supreme Court attributed to Congress, in the absence of any
inconsistent expression, an intent to maintain an established judicial distinction between substantive crimi-
nal offenses and conspiracy.
49 628 F.2d at 75. Compare the dissent's emphasis on the same facts, note 28 supra.
50 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b) (Supp. 1978).
51 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
52 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
53 242 F.2d at 83.
54 Id. It is well established that statutes pertaining to the same general subject matter are in par
materia and should be construed together. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556 (1845); accord,
[Vol. 56:515]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the DOE's subpoena power, since the DOE's and the FTC's powers are coexten-
sive. Menzies indicates by analogy that the most reasonable construction of Title
III's language would allow the use of enforcement powers provided by the
DOEOA in the discharge of duties imposed by the PMPA, due to the close con-
nection between the purposes of those two acts. 55 This analysis allows enforce-
ment of the subpoenas even if the Title III study stands outside the DOEOA's
original mandate.
United States v. Exxon Corp. clarifies the extent of the DOE's subpoena power
and may have significant implications for any agency whose subpoena power
incorporates that of the DOE or the FTC. Even when this broad power is not
used, its availability should engender greater levels of voluntary compliance with
DOE information requests. When energy is among the nation's important con-
cerns and suspicions of oil industry activities are high, the accuracy of DOE stud-
ies is critical. But without subpoena power, their chances for accuracy are small.
Since the Supreme Court has held that a construction should not be adopted
which defeats an act's stated purposes, 56 there are both legal and policy argu-
ments favoring effective implementation of the subsidization study. Thus, de-
spite the weaknesses of the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis, the Exxon
holding is a sound one.
Bruce D. Peterson
Administrative Law--TITLE VII-A CONSENT ORDER Is NOT A "WRITTEN IN-
TERPRETATION OR OPINION" OF THE EEOC-Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,
616 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1980)*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was enacted by Congress to elimi-
nate employment practices that discriminate on the basis of an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 Section 713 (b)(1) 3 of Title VII immunizes
from liability any employer who has established an employment practice in reli-
ance on a "written interpretation or opinion" of the Equal Employment Oppor-
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972); Selfway, Inc. v. Travelers Petroleum, Inc., 579 F.2d 75
(C.C.P.A. 1978). Title III and the DOEOA seem to be in pari materia. Both Acts, passed by the same
Congress within a one year period, concern the same general subject matter.
55 Compare note 2 with notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
56 New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). The subsidization study's
purpose was to provide information to Congress. 15 U.S.C. § 2841(d) (Supp. 1978). Statistical data that is
inaccurate due to the DOE's inability to compel the production of necessary information would defeat the
purpose of Title III.
* Cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 93 (1980).
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1978) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII].
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1976) (section 713(b) of Title VII). The section provides in relevant part:
(b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful employment practice, no person
shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of (1) the commission by such
person of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the act or omission
complained of was in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written interpreta-
tion or opinion of the Commission . ...
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tunity Commission (EEOC). In Eirhart v. Libbqy-Owens-Ford Co., 4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a consent order is not a
written interpretation or opinion of the EEOC within the meaning of section713(b) (1).5
In 1968, the EEOC received a complaint charging Libbey-Owens-Ford
Company (LOF) with discriminatory employment practices at one of its plants
in Toledo, Ohio. The charges focused on LOF's seniority and transfer practices
but did not deal with hiring standards. After investigating the complaint, the
EEOC issued a reasonable cause letter and attempted to negotiate a settlement
with LOF. When negotiations failed the EEOC referred the matter to the Justice
Department.6 After making its own investigation, the Department filed suit
against LOF, alleging inter alia that the plant's hiring standards were discrimina-
tory. Negotiations between LOF and the Department produced a settlement and
the district court entered a consent order in February, 1971 embodying the terms
of this settlement. 7 In addition to changing seniority and transfer practices in the
Toledo plants, the order reduced the minimum weight requirement for employ-
ees to 110 pounds and retained the minimum height requirement of 5 feet 4
inches.
In December 1970, an LOF plant located in Ottawa, Illinois instituted hir-
ing standards which included a minimum weight requirement of 110 pounds and
a minimum height requirement of 5 feet 4 inches. These requirements were chal-
lenged in separate suits filed by Sherry Eirhart in 1976 and the EEOC in 1978.
After the suits were consolidated, the district court granted LOF's motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the Ohio consent order qualified as a
''written interpretation or opinion of the Commission" within the meaning of
section 713(b) (1), and that while the consent order was binding only on the To-
ledo plants, it could properly be relied upon by the Ottawa plant.8
The Seventh Circuit reversed. Noting that the Supreme Court of the
United States had characterized a consent decree as an agreement normally em-
bodying a compromise, 9 the court rejected the contention that a consent order
constituted an opinion of the EEOC.' 0 The court referred to EEOC regulation
1601.33,11 which defines "written interpretation or opinion of the Commission,"
4 616 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 93 (1980).
5 616 F.2d at 280-82.
6 Before the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was enacted, the EEOC lacked authority
to file suit. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 78 Stat. 259-60 (1964). Instead, the Attorney General filed the
suit. Id. § 707, 78 Stat. 261-62 (1964). See 616 F.2d at 280 n.l.
7 United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8052 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
8 Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F. Supp. 357, 361-63 (N.D. Il1. 1979), re'd, 616 F.2d 278
(7th Cir. 1980).
9 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971): "Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a
purpose; rather thepardies have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embod-
ies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to
achieve." Id. at 681-82 (emphasis in original).
10 616 F.2d at 281.
11 29 C.F.R. § 1601.33 (1979). The regulation states:
Only the following may be relied upon as a "written interpretation or opinion of the Com-
mission" within the meaning of Section 713 of Title VII:
(a) A letter entitled "opinion letter" and signed by the General Counsel on behalf of the
Commission, or
(b) Matter published and specifically designated as such in the Federal Register, includ-
ing the Commission's Guidelines on Affirmative Action. ...
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and concluded that the consent order did not meet the regulation's require-
ments. 
1 2
What constitutes a "written interpretation or opinion" is often the central
issue in section 713(b)(1) litigation. 13 Invariably, the issue then becomes whether
to apply EEOC regulation 1601.33.14 EEOC regulations generally do not have
the force of law, ' 5 and courts are not required to follow them. 16 The weight to be
accorded a regulation depends upon "the thoroughness evident in its considera-
tion, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."'1
7
Some district courts have questioned regulation 1601.33, stating that the
EEOC cannot promulgate written interpretations and then restrict their legal
effect when they are relied on by the public. 8 Three appellate courts, however,
including the Seventh Circuit, have relied upon regulation 1601.33 in interpret-
ing section 713(b)(1). In Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers V. United
States, '9 the First Circuit declared that regulation 1601.33 gave "reasonable
scope" to section 713 (b)(1), and that a broader reading of the statute might bind
the EEOC to informal or unapproved opinions volunteered by EEOC staff mem-
bers.20 In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 21 the Fourth Circuit stated that application
of regulation 1601.33 would insure that all EEOC opinions are based upon either
a solid factual foundation or the most thorough consideration of the potential
12 616 F.2d at 282.
13 Courts have found the following to be written interpretations or opinions: an opinion letter signed
by the General Counsel on behalf of the EEOC, Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 341 F. Supp.
613, 615-16 (E.D. La. 1972) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.33); guidelines published in the Federal Register,
Vogel v. Trans World Airlines, 346 F. Supp. 805, 817 (W.D. Mo. 1971); a consent decree accompanied by
opinion letters of the EEOC, EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1055 n.34 (E.D. Pa.
1975), aft'd, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977); and a letter from the Acting General Counsel which was released
for publication, Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (Supplemen-
tary Opinion), ad on other grounds, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
Courts have denied status as written interpretations to: a statement by the Chairman of the EEOC,
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 997 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); a letter from the EEOC Executive Director, Id.; an EEOC internal agency
memorandum from the General Counsel to the Director of Compliance, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); and a "no reasonable cause" determina-
tion, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
14 Williams, Local 189, Sprogis, and Robinson applied regulation 1601.33. The Yott court said it applied
the regulation using "objective standards;" however, it really appears to have refused to strictly apply the
language of 1601.33. See 428 F. Supp. at 768. Vogel questions the ability of the EEOC to restrict what is a
"written interpretation" when the EEOC publishes an interpretation which is relied upon by the public.
346 F. Supp. at 817. AT&T made no mention of regulation 1601.33. 419 F. Supp. at 1055 n.34.
15 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (Title VII does not confer upon the
EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations).
16 See id at 141-43. The Court in General Electric noted that a regulation may be considered in deter-
mining legislative intent, but less weight may be accorded to it then to one carrying the force of law. In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan suggested that the majority failed to give the EEOC guideline the
"great deference" it was entitled to under the holdings of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
431 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1970).
17 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), quoted in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. at 141-42.
18 See Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 429 F. Supp. at 768 ("Standing to assert the defense is
granted by § 2000e-12(b), and the EEOC cannot by regulation or otherwise put a limitation on who can
claim the section's benefits"); Vogel v. Trans World Airlines, 346 F. Supp. at 817; Air Transport Ass'n of
America v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
19 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
20 416 F.2d at 997.
21 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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factual situations. 22 In Sprogis v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc. ,23 the Seventh Circuit ap-
plied regulation 1601.33 in rejecting United Air Lines' attempt to assert section
713(b) (1) immunity by claiming reliance on an EEOC opinion letter. The court
noted that the letter lacked the EEOC letterhead, did not reveal the addressee,
was not entitled "opinion letter," and was not signed by the EEOC's General
Counsel.2 4 Because regulation 1601.33 confines reliance justified under section
713(b) (1) to official expressions of opinion taking one of two specifically defined
forms25 and because this letter fit neither form, the court rejected the airline's
defense.
The Seventh Circuit in Eirhart relied upon Sprogir in following regulation
1601.33. Because the consent order was not entitled "opinion letter," signed by
the EEOC's General Counsel, or published in the Federal Register, the court
found that the order did not satisfy the regulation's requirements and therefore
was not a "written interpretation or opinion" under section 713(b)(1).
Until Eirhar, no case had presented the precise situation of a minority em-
ployee attacking the provisions of a consent order. In a series of cases involving
the telephone industry, however, courts had to decide whether a defendant who
had complied with a consent decree was entitled to section 713(b) (1) immunity.
In 1973, American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), representing
itself and associated telephone companies in the Bell System, entered into a con-
sent decree with the EEOC under which AT&T agreed to create an affirmative
action program to eliminate discriminatory employment practices. 26 On the day
the decree was entered, the EEOC's General Counsel sent a letter to AT&T and
the associated Bell companies stating that the decree and letter could be consid-
ered a "written interpretation or opinion" of the EEOC. 2 7 In EEOC v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T),28 the EEOC and AT&T sought a supplemen-
tal court order to correct deficiencies in the original decree. Three labor unions
intervened in the proceeding, objecting to the decree and proposed supplemental
order on the grounds that they conflicted with prior collective bargaining agree-
ments between the unions and AT&T and amounted to a program of reverse
discrimination. The court nevertheless entered the supplemental order and up-
held the decree.29 In so doing, the court declared that the decree and its "accom-
panying documents" constituted a "written interpretation or opinion" within the
meaning of section 713(b)(1). 30 The EEOC's General Counsel later confirmed
22 444 F.2d at 801 (EEOC interpretation termed "eminently reasonable"). See also Beverly v. Lone
Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1141 (5th Cir. 1971) (EEOC finding of no reasonable cause held
not a complete defense to an action, in part because of the EEOC's inability to conduct "in depth" investi-
gations in every case).
23 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
24 444 F.2d at 1200.
25 The prior version of the regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.30 (1977), confined a "written interpretation
or opinion" to either an opinion letter or matter published in the Federal Register designated as an EEOC
opinion. The regulation now appears at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.33 (1979), and includes in the definition the
Commission's Guidelines on Affirmative Action.
26 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:73 (1973).
27 Letter from William A. Carey, General Counsel, EEOC, to Thompson Powers, counsel for AT&T
and the associated Bell Companies (January 18, 1973), cited in Belfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14423, 14426 n.5 (D.D.C. 1980).
28 See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1976), af'd, 556 F.2d 167
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
29 419 F. Supp. at 1053-56, 1060.
30 Id. at 1055 n.34.
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by letter that the decree and supplemental order constituted a written opinion of
the EEOC. 3 1 Since then, several suits involving various Bell companies have
arisen.
In Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,32 female employees
brought a class action against Southern Bell, alleging discriminatory practices.
Because it had acted pursuant to the AT&T decree, Southern Bell raised section
713(b)(1) as a defense. The court rejected the defense on the ground that the
employees sought recovery not for acts done in compliance with the AT&T de-
cree, but for employment practices not remedied by the decree. The court also
stated that the AT&T decree did not constitute a "written interpretation or opin-
ion," apparently overlooking the opinion letters from the EEOC's General Coun-
sel which confirmed that the decree was indeed a written opinion.
In Telephone Workers Union v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 33 a labor union
and an employee who had been passed over for promotion due to hiring quotas
established in the AT&T decree brought suit against New Jersey Bell, seeking
specific performance of an arbitration award granted pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement. Among its defenses, New Jersey Bell asserted the section
713(b) (1) immunity and argued that the AT&T decree took precedence over any
conflicting arbitration award. 34 The court treated the AT&T decree as "a fully
litigated decree" which had priority over a collective bargaining agreement. The
court found for New Jersey Bell and vacated the arbitration award but did not
mention the section 713(b)(1) immunity in its holding.
The most recent case concerning section 713(b)(1) and a consent decree is
Be/field v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. 35 In Be/field, a non-minority em-
ployee brought suit against Chesapeake & Potomac (C&P), claiming that the
promotion standards in the company's affirmative action program were discrimi-
natory and therefore prohibited by Title VII. One of C&P's defenses was that it
enjoyed a section 713(b)(1) immunity based on the AT&T decree. The court
upheld the immunity defense and, in dicta, suggested that the AT&T decree
might have barred plaintiffs action even without the opinion letters. However,
the court found it unnecessary to reach this "somewhat more difficult issue."' 36
The plaintiffs in AT&T, Befleld, and New Jersey Bell represented non-minor-
ity employee interests37 and attacked the provisions of the consent decree. The
plaintiffs in Stastny represented minority employee interests and did not attack
the consent decree; instead, they sought relief not adequately rendered through
the decree's affirmative action program. Eirhart differs from both situations. The
EEOC in Eirhart did not ratify the Ohio consent order with opinion letters as it
had in AT&T's situation-a circumstance the Eirhart court cited as distinguish-
ing A T&T 38 The plaintiff in Eirhart represented minority employee interests and
31 See Belfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. at 14426 n.5.
32 458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
33 450 F. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1977).
34 The EEOC intervened as a party defendant to protect its interest in the AT&T decree.
35 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14423 (D.D.C. 1980).
36 Id. at 14426.
37 Although the plaintiff in NewJers.7 Bell was a female representing minority interests, the quota she
challenged called for additional males in her particular department. Plaintiff was thus in the position of a
non-minority employee, and males were in the position of minority employees. 450 F. Supp. at 293-94.
38 616 F.2d at 282.
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attacked provisions of the consent order-a circumstance distinguishing Eirharl
from Stasny. A claimant may seek relief not adequately rendered in a consent
decree regardless of whether he represents minority or non-minority interests. 39
Where the claimant attacks the provisions of the consent decree, however, the
type of interest represented by the claimant becomes important. If the claimant
is a non-minority employee he loses, since his claim is controlled by the "make
whole" policy of Title VII-eradication of the discriminatory practice and place-
ment of the aggrieved individual in a position he would have been in but for the
discrimination.40 But if the claimant is a minority employee, as in Eirhart, his
interest is one the decree presumably seeks to protect, and new considerations
emerge.
One difficulty lies in determining what employment practices discriminate
against minorities. The minority claimant in Sirhart attempted to define discrim-
inatory practice differently than had the parties and the court involved in the
consent order. Arguably, in such a case an employer who faithfully follows the
decree's provisions should not thereafter be liable for retroactive relief. On the
other hand, a subsequent suit for prospective relief might well be appropriate
since the passage of time might reveal that a practice created by the consent
order is discriminatory. The data available at the time an order is entered can be
insufficient to form an infallible prospective employment practice.
When a consent decree fails to eradicate discriminatory practices, one solu-
tion is to modify the consent decree. In AT&T, the EEOC and AT&T agreed to
modify the original consent decree with a supplemental order after several years
of experience had uncovered deficiencies in the decree. In Eirhart, the EEOC had
little to do with negotiating the Ohio consent order 4 and never ratified the order
with opinion letters. While the EEOC admitted it was bound by the order
within Ohio,4 2 it refused to recognize any binding effect outside that state. Indis-
putably, regulation 1601.33 renders section 713(b) (1) immunity unavailable in
this situation. Title VII immunity, however, is not the only defense available to
an employer.
The Seventh Circuit suggested in Eirhart that if the consent order were to
have any legal effect on LOF's Ottawa plant, it would not be that provided by
section 713(b) (1). The only conceivable effect would be res judicata or collateral
estoppel. 43 Consent orders, however, are not generally given res judicata or col-
lateral estoppel effect when the court has made no determination on questions of
law or fact,44 or when to give such effect would violate important public policy.45
39 For example, if employment practices other than those covered in the decree prove discriminatory,
section 713(b)(1) is clearly inapplicable to them. The EEOC recently issued a regulation which provided:
"[These Guidelines] do not apply to, and the section 713(b)(1) defense is not available for the purpose of,
determining the adequacy of an affirmative action plan or program to eliminate discrimination." 29
C.F.R. § 1608.11 (1979).
40 Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976).
41 See 482 F. Supp. at 362; 616 F.2d at 283. Although the EEOC performed the initial investigation of
LOF, the Justice Department negotiated the consent order's provisions. In light of this, Judge Castle
questioned whether the order could be considered a "written interpretation or opinion of the Cormision
616 F.2d at 282 (emphasis added).
42 482 F. Supp. at 362 n.8.
43 616 F.2d at 282-83. LOF argued that the consent order operated as an adjudication on the merits
and thus was binding on both the EEOC and Eirhart.
44 See United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953); Lawlor v. National Screen
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The decree in AT&T was given res judicata effect only because all parties had
been provided full opportunity to intervene in the litigation, the decree's provi-
sions had been the product of extensive negotiation, government agencies had
approved the settlement, and judicial sanction had been given the decree. In
light of these circumstances, the court's overriding interest in "the finality and
repose of judgments" demanded that the consent decree be considered a final
adjudication. 46
The Eirhart court ruled out the possibility that the EEOC was bound by a
consent order, both because the order was geographically limited and because
the order's height and weight provisions did not appear to have been carefully
considered in the negotiations. The court stated that Sherry Eirhart also was not
bound since she was not a party to the original consent order.
4 7
Eirharl makes clear that an employer subject to Title VII obtains very lim-
ited protection from suit by following the provisions of a consent order. An em-
ployer who on his own initiative changes his employment practices to improve
employment opportunities and eliminate discriminatory practices does not
thereby remove the possibility that he will be sued for discriminatory practices.
Minority employees may still bring suit if they feel the employment practices
continue to discriminate, and non-minority employees may still bring suit if they
feel the affirmative action plan has a "reverse discrimination" effect.
In January 1979, the EEOC issued a new procedural regulation to deal with
this problem.48 Regulation 1608 encourages employers subject to Title VII to
examine their employment practices in light of EEOC guidelines and modify
them to the extent necessary to effect compliance. In return for good faith com-
pliance, the EEOC will extend section 713(b)(1) immunity to the employer.4 9
Under the new regulation, an employer who follows an approved affirmative
action program will be immune from suits by employees adversely affected by
the program. The employer is, however, still subject to suits by employees claim-
ing that the program has not remedied the employment discrimination. 50
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1954) (discusses the distinction between res judicata and collateral
estoppel). See generaly Developments in the Law: ResJudicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 835-36 (1952).
In Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co., 137 U.S. 48, 55-56 (1890), the Supreme Court stated that
where a state trial court merely performed an administrative function in binding the parties to a consent
order, the state supreme court may determine that the validity of a provision in the order was not in
controversy or passed upon in the original action. No res judicata or collateral estoppel effect was given to
the consent judgment in Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330 (10th Cir. 1948), where the
judgment was the product of a compromise and was not based on findings of fact or any determination on
the merits.
45 See Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 60 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 (D.C.N.Y. 1945), afd,
156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Langsam, Resjudicata Efcts of ConsentJudgments in Patent In/ngement
Litigation, 36 FED. B.J. 171 (1977).
46 450 F. Supp. at 293 (citing Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1164 (3d Cir. 1977)). The Bleld
court adopted this approach when it suggested that an employer's compliance with a consent decree might
bar a later action by an employee. 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 14426. The court found unpersuasive the
employee's argument that the consent decree could not bar his action in light of McAleer v. AT&T, 416 F.
Supp. 435 (D.D.C.), vacated, 13 EMPL. PRAc. DEc. 7336 (1976), where a claim by a non-party employee of
the non-minority class was allowed even though AT&T properly followed the provisions of a consent
order. The Belfeld court found McAleer undercut by EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977). 22
Empl. Prac. Dec. at 14427 n.8. See Note, Remedies For Nonminoriy Emplgees Under Title VII, 46 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 251, 268-70 (1978).
47 616 F.2d at 283.
48 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1979).
49 Id. § 1608.1(a)-(d).
50 Id. § 1608.11(a).
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Recognizing the importance of court orders in Title VII cases, the EEOC
has included in regulation 1608 a section dealing with issues arising from such
orders, including orders issued by consent.5 1 With respect to adherence to a
court order, "[t]he Commission interprets Title VII to mean that action taken
pursuant to the direction of.a Court Order cannot give rise to liability under
Title VII."'5 2 The question remains, however, whether a company in LOF's posi-
tion acts "pursuant to the direction of a Court Order." Certainly, LOF's Ottawa
plant relied upon the consent order issued against the Toledo plants, but it was
not bound by it. While the first sentence of section 1608 uses the term "[p]arties
are entitled to rely," the phrase "action taken pursuant to" seems not to include
plants located outside the geographical reach of the consent order.
It appears, then, that employers in LOF's position may avail themselves of
neither the section 713(b)(1) immunity nor the res judicata defense. Possibly,
courts will begin to take into account such factors as employers' good faith reli-
ance upon prior consent orders at the remedial stage of Title VII litigation. By
considering good faith, courts can mitigate the "all or nothing" nature of section
713(b)(1) immunity.
As the Supreme Court has noted, section 713(b) (1) is "a complete, but very
narrow, immunity. '5 3 The defense is complete in that it protects qualifying em-
ployers from all liability, including back pay and other damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and court costs and attorneys' fees.5 4 The defense is narrow in
that good faith by itself does not entitle employers to the immunity. In fact, the
Supreme Court has said that equitable considerations such as an employer's good
faith should never be considered in determining the relief to be granted ag-
grieved employees. The "make whole" purpose of Title VII prevails despite the
employer's good faith or absence of discriminatory intent.5 5
Justice Rehnquist, however, has suggested that while a court may not ex-
pand the section 713(b)(1) defense beyond the bounds intended by Congress, it
may take ameliorating factors such as good faith into account when fashioning
an equitable remedy.56 This approach seems especially appropriate when the
employer makes a good faith decision to follow a judicially sanctioned employ-
ment practice.57
Employers hoping to avoid LOF's predicament should undertake the sys-
tematic review of present employment practices prescribed by regulation 1608.
51 Id. § 1608.8.
52 Id.
53 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 n.18 (1975).
54 See Vogel v. Trans World Airlines, 346 F. Supp. at 817. But see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519
F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1975) (section 713(b)(1) immunized a qualifying individual only as to liability for
back pay and other damages, but did not bar injunctive and declaratory relief, court costs and attorneys'
fees).
55 422 U.S. at 417-22.
56 Id. at 444-45 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (see cases cited therein). In Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow
Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972), the court applied a "balancing of the equities" test in determin-
ing whether to award back pay where the defendant had relied on a state female protective statute. But see
Stryker v. Register Publ. Co., 423 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Conn. 1976), in which Albemarle Paper was inter-
preted as rejecting any "balancing of the equities" in the statutory reliance situation. Id. at 478-79 nn.2-7.
The Stl,/tr court suggested, however, that section 713(b)(1) immunity would be available to a defendant
who relied upon an EEOC interpretation. Id. at 480.
57 The Stasiny court did not give Southern Bell the 713(b)(1) immunity; nevertheless, it stated: "To
the extent that the defendant has performed pursuant to the Consent Decrees, it is given full credit for
such performance in the Court's formulation of an appropriate remedy." 458 F. Supp. at 336-37.
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When potential discriminatory practices are discovered, the employer should
make modifications in conformity with EEOC guidelines.58 If the employer
desires to implement an employment practice not strictly conforming to the
guidelines, he should follow the procedures set forth in regulation 160159 and
obtain a written interpretation or opinion from the EEOC on the proposed prac-
tice.
Eirhart is the most recent in a line of cases limiting section 713(b)(1) immu-
nity. The court's interpretation of section 1601.33 is sound insofar as it supports
the principle that the immunity should not be used to perpetuate unfair employ-
ment practices. Unfortunately, Eirhart could also be interpreted to mean that an
employer who has relied on a consent order is nevertheless left unprotected. Such
a result would undermine Congress's intent to encourage voluntary affirmative
action. The solution is to allow courts in Title VII cases to consider equitable
factors, including an employer's good faith reliance on a consent decree, in fash-
ioning a remedy.
Jonathan D. Zischkau
Civil Rights-SEx DISCRIMINATION-REGULATIONS UNDER TITLE IX PROHIB-
ITING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION-RELATED EMPLOYMENT HELD
VALID-North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980)*
In recent years, Congress has passed legislation prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion against women.' Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19722 prohibits
sex discrimination in education. The statute, commonly interpreted to protect
student beneficiaries, 3 provides in part, "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal assistance .... -"4 Pursuant to that statute, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)5 issued regulations6 prohibiting discrim-
ination on the basis of sex in education-related programs and activities and in
education-related employment, recruitment, compensation, and job classifica-
58 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c).
59 Id. § 1601.31-.32.
* Cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3596 (U.S. 1981) (No. 80-986).
1 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-15 (1976); Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, § 701, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e
(1976); Women's Educational Equity Act of 1978, § 802, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3348 (Supp. 1978).
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1976).
3 629 F.2d at 776. Bat cf Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980). In
Dougherty, a suit challenging the Title IX regulations, the court held that HEW exceeded its authority by
enacting general regulations prohibiting sex discrimination in employment without limiting their effect to
specific programs that receive federal assistance. 622 F.2d at 738.
4 Id 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
5 HEW's jurisdiction was transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Education on May 4, 1978. The Department of Education has reissued the regulations
enacted by HEW. See note 6 injfa.
6 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1975), now reissued in 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-.61 (1980).
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tion. In North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler,7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the validity of those regulations.
Like the majority of school systems in the United States, the school system of
Trumbull, Connecticut, receives federal financial assistance. As a result, it was
subject to the discrimination regulations promulgated by HEW under Title IX.8
In 1978, a former guidance counselor in the Trumbull public school, Linda
Potz,9 filed an administrative complaint with HEW alleging that she had been
discriminated against because of her sex. HEW determined that the school sys-
tem had violated Title IX by requiring Ms. Potz to perform clercial tasks not
required of male counselors, moving her office to a smaller, poorly heated space,
asking her to misrepresent the number of students she had counseled so as to
appear more in line with the male counselors, and refusing to renew her contract
because of her sex.' 0 On September 20, 1977, HEW notified the Trumbull
Board of Education (the Board) that the school district's treatment of Ms. Potz
violated Title IX and ordered the Board to take corrective action."I The Board
refused to take the requested action and brought suit in federal court for declara-
tory and injunctive relief. The United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, holding that
the regulations allegedly violated exceeded the statutory authority granted HEW
under Title IX.' 2 The court concluded from the legislative history of Title IX
that the statute was intended to protect only students and other direct benefi-
ciaries. In addition, the court considered the statutory remedy of fund termina-
tion too severe when more effective and less costly methods of prohibiting
employment discrimination were available.' 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court, hold-
ing that HEW has authority under Title IX to enact employment discrimination
regulations governing education.' 4 Writing for the unanimous court, Judge
Oakes noted that even though four other courts of appeals and a number of
district courts had held otherwise,' 5 "extreme care and consideration" had con-
vinced the Second Circuit that the HEW regulations did not exceed the statutory
grant of authority.' 6 The court found that the statute was ambiguous as to
7 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
8 Id at 775.
9 The North Haven court heard two cases combined for one appeal. Ms. Potz and the Department of
Education were the defendants-appellants in the second of these cases, Trumbull Bd. of Educ. v. United
States Dep't of Educ.
10 629 F.2d at 775.
11 Id
12 Id See text accompanying notes 47-54 infia.
13 Id at 776.
14 Id at 786. See note 15 infra.
15 Id at 774. Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (1980)
(No. 80-493); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979),
(aj'g Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978)); Grove City College v. Harris,
No. 78-1293 (W.D. Pa. March 10, 1980); Auburn School Dist. v. HEW, No. 78-154 (D.N.H. March 29,
1979), appeal dismirsed, No. 79-1261 (Ist Cir. 1980); Board of Educ. of Bowling Green City Dist. v. HEW
No. C78-177, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 457 (N.D. Ohio March 14, 1979); University of Toledo v. HEW,
464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Contra, Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th
Cir. 1980).
16 629 F.2d at 774.
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whom it applied.1 7 Faced with this ambiguity, the court examined the statute's
legislative history to determine Congressional intent.18
In 1971, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana introduced an amendment to the
Higher Education Act,1 9 stating that its purpose was to prohibit sex discrimina-
tion in employment at certain educational institutions.20 Although the amend-
ment never came to a vote, the remarks demonstrated Senator Bayh's intention
to prohibit discrimination in employment of educators under what later became
Title IX. In 1972, Senator Bayh introduced a new version of his amendment,2 1
and again made statements manifesting his intention to prohibit employment
discrimination in education.2 2 At the same time, the House was considering a
bill similar to the amendment Bayh had proposed in the Senate.2 3 The House
version, however, included an additional section specifically excluding discrimi-
nation in employment from the scope of the amendment.2 4 After the bill went to
the conference committee of the House and Senate, this additional section was
deleted.
The conference committee's deletion convinced the Second Circuit that
Congress had intended Title IX to include a prohibition against employment
discrimination.2 5 The court found its conclusion buttressed by the fact that, after
the passage of Title IX, Congress had failed to disapprove the HEW regula-
tions2 6 or to exclude employment discrimination from the statute's scope when
17 HEW argued in North Haven that the "persons" protected by Title IX were not limited to any
particular class, but instead included both students and employees discriminated against in federally
funded education programs. 629 F.2d at 777. On the other hand, the First Circuit has stated that "per-
son" refers only to students attending institutions receiving federal funds and to teachers engaged in spe-
cial research funded by the United States. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
18 629 F.2d at 778.
19 Amendment No. 398 to S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), recorded in 117 CONG. REc. 30404
(1971).
20 Senator Bayh remarked:
While over 50 percent of our population is female, there is no effective protection for them as
they seek admission and employment in educational facilities. The anti-discrimination provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not deal with sex discrimination by our institutions of higher
learning ...
Today, women seeking employment in higher education face an array of obstacles almost as
insuperable as those which used to face blacks.
629 F.2d at 779 (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 30155-56 (1971) (emphasis added)). The amendment applied to
educational institutions which received federal financial assistance.
21 629 F.2d at 779 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 5802-03 (1972)).
22 Id at 779-83 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 5804-05, 5807, 5812-13 (1972)). See text accompanying
notes 36-38 infra.
23 H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
24 "Section 1004 provides that nothing in this title may be taken to authorize action by any depart-
ment or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor
organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employ-
ment." 629 F.2d at 783 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., repinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2566). This provision parallels § 604 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
statute on which Title IX was modeled.
25 629 F.2d at 783.
26 Id at 784. A special statutory review procedure provided that any regulation would become effec-
tive not less than 45 days after transmission unless the Congress passed a concurrent resolution disapprov-
ing the regulations as inconsistent with the enabling act. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976). Senator Helms
introduced a concurrent resolution to disapprove all HEW regulations issued under 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61
(1975). S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CoNG. REc. 17301 (1975). No action was taken on the
resolution. Representatives Quie and Erlenborn introduced a similar amendment in the House, but it was
never passed. Unpublished Amendment to HR. Con. Res. 330, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Post-&econday
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), on file with that committee.
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presented with an opportunity to do so.2 7 This inactivity, the court declared,
indicated that Congress intended the statute to cover employees as well as stu-
dents in federally funded education-related programs. 28 The court found unper-
suasive two arguments that four other courts of appeals 2 9 had found
compelling-first, that both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and the Department of Labor already had jurisdiction over sex discrimination in
employment; and second, that fund terminations affecting students were an un-
reasonable sanction to apply in cases of sex discrimination against teachers.30
The North Haven ruling is a carefully researched decision. Despite its thor-
ough historical analysis, however, the Second Circuit failed to distinguish be-
tween two closely related questions: 1) Was Title IX intended to apply equally
to employees and to students? 2) If so, were HEW's sex discrimination regula-
tions consistent with the enabling statute of Title IX, section 902? Although the
first question may be answered in the affirmative, the second question requires a
negative response.
The Second Circuit in North Haven analyzed the validity of the Title IX
regulations more thoroughly than had any previous court. 3 1 Romeo Communi
Schools v. HEW32 and Brunswick School Board v. Califano ,3 the most comprehensive
of the prior decisions, failed to examine Senator Bayh's remarks concerning his
initial proposed amendment. At this early stage, Senator Bayh had included ed-
ucation-related employment as an area in which the amendment would prohibit
sex discrimination.3 4 His early remarks are significant: They make clear that
what was eventually to become Title IX had always included a prohibition
against sex discrimination in employment. Although later additions to the
amendment more explicitly prohibited discrimination in employment,3 5 they
served only to reinforce the original intent of Senator Bayh's proposal.
Furthermore, preceding cases, which relied heavily on the analyses of Romeo
and Brunswick, failed to consider the entirety of Senator Bayh's prepared remarks
accompanying his second proposed amendment:
Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in existing legisla-
tion relating to general education programs and employment resulting from those pro-
grams .... More specifically, the heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex
discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment
would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, scholarships, andfaculty
employment .... Other important provisions would extend the equal employment op-
27 In 1975 Senator Helms introduced S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), proposing to amend § 901
of Title IX to exclude employees of educational institutions. 121 CONG. Rac. 23845-47 (1975). His bill
was not adopted. In 1976 Senator McClure offered another amendment to limit the coverage of§ 901 to
graduation requirements of the institutions receiving federal aid. 122 CONG. Rac. 28136 (1976). The
amendment was not adopted either. Id at 28147.
28 629 F.2d at 784.
29 e, e.g., the cases at note 15 supra.
30 629 F.2d at 786.
31 See note 15 supra.
32 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aj'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
33 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978), afdsub noa. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
34 See note 19 supra.
35 Later additions to Senator Bayh's amendment were designed to amend Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-15 (1976), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1976), to prohibit sex discrimination in employment.
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portunities provisions of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institu-
tions, and extend the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive,
administrative and professional women.
3 6
As the Second Circuit noted, Senator Bayh's remarks distinguished the "heart of
the amendment," dealing in part with faculty employment, from "other provi-
sions," relating to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.3 7 In later formal remarks
summarizing the various portions of his proposed amendment, Senator Bayh ex-
plained again that the first part of his amendment (sections 901 and 902) in-
cluded employment: "This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in
all areas where abuse has been mentioned-employment practices for faculty
and administrators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to programs within the
institution such as vocational educational classes, and so forth."138 Previous deci-
sions construing Title IX had ignored the importance of these remarks which
highlighted Senator Bayh's intent to prohibit employment discrimination
through his amendment.
The Second Circuit in North Haven concluded its analysis of the history of
Title IX by examining the floor debates concerning sections of Senator Bayh's
proposed amendment which exempted religious and military institutions from
compliance. 39 Since the debate makes clear that these exclusions related to the
employment aspect of these organizations, the Second Circuit concluded that
"the exclusions . . . would make no sense if employment practices were not in-
cluded. . . to begin with."
'40
The reasoning used by the Second Circuit has been criticized in other con-
texts. 4 1 Those opposed to the HEW regulations point out that sufficient remedies
already exist for education-related employees confronted with sex discrimina-
tion.42 Indeed, such remedies appear elsewhere in Title IX itself: section 906 of
that statute amended Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to include coverage for
education employees.43
These critics fail to realize, however, that the remedy of fund termination
provided in Title IX presents a unique means for combating sex discrimination.
That remedy is especially effective, for example, in cases of sex discrimination on
a large scale. Instead of many suits brought by aggrieved individuals, all of
whom would receive merely individual remedies, Title IX allows agency-insti-
tuted sanctions to correct some instances of institution-wide sex discrimination.
44
The Second Circuit's application of Title IX to employees as well as to stu-
dent beneficiaries takes on even greater significance when considered in light of
the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Canon v. Univer-
36 118 CONG. RFc. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added).
37 See note 35 supra.
38 118 CONG. REc. 5807.
39 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(3) and (4) (1976) state that the sex discrimination prohibitions of§ 1681(a) do
not apply to educational institutions of religious organizations and of the military services. See the debate
between Senators Bayh and Pell, 629 F.2d at 781-82.
40 629 F.2d at 781-82.
41 HEW advocated a similar position in the cases cited at note 15 supra.
42 See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. at 1034; Kuhn, Title IX Employment and
Athletics Are Outside HE W.'s Jursdiction , 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 60-61 (1976).
43 See note 35 supra.
44 The Title IX remedy offers an additional advantage over that of Title VII: its speed of implemen-
tation. Title IX has fewer administrative steps than Title VII has. Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 1682-1683 (1976)
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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sioy of Chicago .4 5 In Canon, the Supreme Court held that a student in a federally
assisted program had a private cause of action under Title IX. Arguably, North
Haven extends this class of potential private plaintiffs to include teachers and
administrators as well as students: Under Canon each beneficiary has a cause of
action, and under North Haven "beneficiary" includes some teachers; therefore,
some teachers have a private cause of action under Title IX. This new cause of
action for employment discrimination is distinct from those already existing
under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Such overlapping jurisdiction for em-
ployment discrimination is well recognized 46 and insures that the aggrieved
plaintiff will have a suitable remedy.
Although the Second Circuit was correct in determining that Title IX ap-
plies to education-related employees who benefit from federal money, the court
appears to have been mistaken in upholding the validity of HEW's employment
discrimination regulations. Despite its thorough analysis of the statutory history,
the court gave only superficial consideration to the language of the regulations at
issue.
In authorizing an administrative agency to promulgate rules and regula-
tions, Congress exercises its power to delegate authority. The agency itself lacks
legislative powers; its function is limited to drafting regulations subordinate to
and consistent with the statute under which the regulations are promulgated.
4 7
The agency may neither enlarge its powers beyond those intended by the legisla-
ture nor create substantive rights or duties not otherwise existing.48
The validity of regulations will be sustained if the regulations are "reason-
ably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation."'49 In considering the
purpose of enabling legislation, courts are required to show "great deference" to
the interpretation of the act by the agency charged with its enforcement. 50 The
agency may not, however, so overextend its regulations as to "bootstrap itself into
an area in which it has no jurisdiction."'5 1
These interpretive guidelines are helpful in evaluating the regulations at is-
sue in North Haven:
(1) No person shall, on the basis of sex, be ... subjected to discrimination in em-
ployment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefor ... under any educa-
tion program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefitsfrom Federalfancial
assistance.
(2) A recipient shall make all employment decisions in any education program or
activity operated by such recipient in a non-discriminatory manner. .... 52
Thus, the regulations prohibit sex discrimination by an educational institution
against any employee in any education program, regardless of whether the par-
ticular program receives federal money, if any program at the institution receives
45 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
46 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (Title VII remedies consistent
with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) remedies); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974)
(Title VII remedy not intended to be exclusive).
47 See, e.g., Duncan v. A.R. Krull Co., 57 Ariz. 472, 114 P.2d 888 (1941).
48 See, e.g., NLRB v. John S. Barnes Corp., 178 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1949).
49 Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969).
50 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
51 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973).
52 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (1980) (emphasis added). See notes 5-6 supra.
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federal financial aid. These regulations clearly exceed the limitations of the en-
abling legislation for three reasons.
First, section 901 of Title IX limits its coverage by specifying that "[n]o per-
son . . . shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receivingfederalfnancial assistance . . . ,,s3 The statute
prohibits sex discrimination only in programs receiving federal aid. The statute
makes no provision for discrimination in other, non-federally funded programs
that are part of the same institution.
Second, section 902 directs HEW to effectuate the provisions of Title IX
"with respect to such program or activity [ie., ones receiving federal assistance]
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders. . .. -54 The statute specifically limits
fund termination "to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such non-
compliance has been found. . . -55 The regulations enacted by HEW, embrac-
ing all persons affected under any program, exceed these bounds.
Finally, the portion of the regulations providing for sanctions similarly ex-
ceeds legislative authority. Title IX regulations56 refer to the Title VI regula-
tions5 7 for the procedure to be used in enforcing Title IX. The Title VI
regulations, like section 902 of Title IX, state that termination shall be limited in
its effect to the particular discriminatory program involved. Thus, HEW's own
regulations do not permit the agency to terminate aid in some of the situations it
purports to regulate-where the employment discrimination occurs in a non-fed-
erally aided program.
In addition, Title IX's legislative history makes clear that Congress consid-
ered an amendment similar to the broad, institution-wide regulations of HEW,
but opted instead for the more limited version which became sections 901 and
902 of the statute. In 1971, Senator Bayh's proposed amendment prohibited sex
discrimination "under any program or activity conducted by a public institution
of higher education . . . which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance for
any program or activity .... *"58 Under this proposal, HEW could terminate
aid for any violation in any program and would thus have power over all educa-
tion programs, whether or not federally funded. Congress, however, did not pass
this amendment. The termination provision in the enacted statute was instead
limited to the specific programs in which discrimination had been shown.
The anti-discrimination language of section 901 is parallel to similar lan-
guage in other statutes dealing with federal appropriations. Regulations have
been enacted under two such statutes involving volunteer services59 and the en-
ergy commission. 6° Interpreting language virtually identical to that of Title IX,
these two sets of regulations specifically address discrimination under programs
receiving federal aid. These regulations, which could have been drafted like the
53 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (emphasis added).
54 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
55 20 U.S.C. § 1682(1) (1976).
56 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (1980).
57 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-.11 (1980).
58 See note 19 supra.
59 Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, § 417, 42 U.S.C. § 5057 (1976). The relevant regulations
begin at 45 C.F.R. § 1203.1 (1979).
60 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, § 401, 42 U.S.C. §-6891 (1976). The relevant regulations begin
at 10 C.F.R. § 4.11 (1979).
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Title IX regulations to include all employees of institutions receiving such aid,
include only employees of federally assisted programs. These narrow interpreta-
tions of phrases more widely construed in the Title IX regulations suggest that
the Title IX regulations are excessively broad.
The language of another statute addressing sex discrimination further
strengthens the argument that Congress distinguished between "program-spe-
cific" statutes and broader, institution-wide statutes. A federal statute dealing
with fiscal aid to state and local governments6 1 prohibits sex discrimination
"under any program or activity of a State government or unit of local govern-
ment, which government or unit receives funds made available under subchapter
I of this chapter." The statute suggests that aid may be terminated for sex dis-
crimination in any program, regardless of whether the particular program re-
ceives federal aid. Under such a statute, regulations as broad as those
promulgated under Title IX would be appropriate. Congress has not, however,
legislated as expansively in Title IX.
The North Haven court, in upholding the validity of the Title IX regulations,
circumvented the program-specificity requirement by suggesting that in some sit-
uations an entire educational system could be considered one "program" for pur-
poses of Title IX. Although it is possible that all of an institution's programs
could be tainted with sex discrimination, any termination of funds must still oc-
cur on a program-by-program basis. Contrary to the court's suggestion, the pro-
grams and activities of an entire school system may not collectively be referred to
as one "program." 62 When the words "program" and "activity" are used at
other places within Title 20 of the United States Code,63 they invariably refer to
particular programs and projects, such as remedial instruction, school health pro-
grams, vocational guidance, and the like. Similarly, when Title VI, the act on
which Title IX was based, was adopted, Congress made clear which programs
were to be included in the Title VI termination provision.6 4 As these examples
illustrate, "program or activity" is never used in the United States Code to refer
to entire school systems.
A case dealing with racial discrimination under Title VI, Board of Public In-
struction v. Finch,65 elaborated on the statutory meaning of "program or activity."
The Fifth Circuit in Finch emphasized that the phrase did not include "the col-
61 State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, § 122, 31 U.S.C. § 1242, as amended by State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976, § 8(a), 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (1976).
62 629 F.2d at 785.
63 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 241d-I (1976) (programs designed to meet special needs of "educationally
deprived" children); 20 U.S.C. § 843(b)(3) (1976) (numerous programs listed for education centers); 20
U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1976) (list of programs); 20 U.S.C. § 1866(d) (1976) (grants for various educational
activities).
64 The Minority Report of H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2470-73, contains lists of included programs; see a/so Title VI regulations
at 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.13 (1979). Among the programs mentioned in the Title VI regulations are the
following: grants for training in librarianship (20 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1033 (1976)); higher education students
loan program (20 U.S.C. §§ 421-429 (1976)); college work-study program (42 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2756 (1976));
grant programs for advanced and undergraduate international studies (20 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1176 (1976));
bilingual educational programs (20 U.S.C. §§ 880b to 880b-5 (1976)); grants to agencies and organizations
for Cuban refugees (22 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (1976)); grants for construction and initial staff of treatment
facilities for narcotic addicts (42 U.S.C. § 2688m (1976)).
65 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). The Board had implemented a "freedom of choice" desegregation
plan, but HEW was not satisfied with the Board's progress. HEW thus terminated payment of federal
funds to the school district. The court of appeals reversed HEW's decision.
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lectivization of all school subventions under the single rubric, 'program or part
thereof.' "66 The court observed that Congress did not intend for the unaffected
programs to "suffer for the sins of others."' 67 It is in this "condemning by associa-
tion" 68 that the regulations enacted under Title IX by HEW and at issue in North
Haven exceed statutory authority.
The North Haven decision significantly extends the class of protected persons
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Through its in-depth
survey of the relevant legislative history, the Second Circuit correctly concluded
that Title IX protects teachers whose pay is subsidized with federal funds. The
court went astray, however, in upholding regulations purporting to give HEW
authority over employment discrimination in all education-related programs,
whether or not federally funded. Future decisions should limit HEW's regula-
tory power to situations in which the employee discriminated against is paid with
federal money.
Jonathan W Anderson
Constitutional Law-FOURTH AMENDMENT--CONSENT TO SEARCH IS NOT VI-
TIATED BECAUSE IT IS GRANTED SUBSEQUENT TO SERVICE OF A SUBPOENA DU-
CES TECUM-United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1980).
In reviewing search and seizure situations, courts must often decide whether
slight deviations from the established procedure amount to an unconstitutional
practice.I In United States v. Allison,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit addressed the appropriateness of gaining consent for a search and
seizure subsequent to service of a subpoena duces tecum. 3 The Eighth Circuit
recognized that the average person could easily confuse a subpoena duces tecum
with a search warrant, and assume as a result that the agent who served the
subpoena had the authority to conduct a lawful search. 4 Nevertheless, the court
ruled that the agent who served the subpoena duces tecum need not inform the
recipient of his legal rights regarding the subpoena, 5 and that the agent's appar-
ent but not actual authority to conduct a search did not itself vitiate consent.
6
Rather, the court held that an effective consent to search, after service of a sub-
poena duces tecum, was to be judged by a totality of the circumstances test.7
66 Id at 1077.
67 Id at 1078.
68 Id "Condemning by association" refers to HEW's attempt to regulate all education programs
because of federal financial assistance to some.
I Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2 619 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1980).
3 A subpoena duces tecum is a writ by which the court requires the production before it of docu-
ments, papers, or tangible things. Vaughn v. Broadfort, 267 N.C. 691, 149 S.E.2d 37 (1966); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 17(c).
4 619 F.2d at 1264.
5 Id. at 1260.
6 Id. at 1264.
7 Id. at 1260.
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In Allson, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agents investigated
the possible embezzlement and misappropriation of funds of the Laborers Inter-
national Union of North America, Local 1282.8 The agents requested the United
States Attorney to issue a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for the production of
certain records of the local.9 There was some doubt as to whether a proper show-
ing of probable cause for a search warrant could have been made at this time. 10
The subpoena was addressed to Allison, a union official who was the sup-
posed custodian of the records. It directed him to appear before the grand jury
at 9:30 a.m. on February 10, 1978, and to bring with him the local's files contain-
ing certain records and documents which pertained to the investigation." The
agents were aware that the local had ignored a previous state subpoena which
had been served 24 hours prior to a fire that destroyed some of the records. 12
Determined to secure the documents, they arranged for evidence boxes to be
brought to the local's headquarters.1 3 The U.S. Attorney had advised them to
gain permission to box the records and to remain at the local until the boxes
could be transported to the Federal Building.1 4 Upon arrival at the union head-
quarters on the morning of the tenth, the FBI agents were informed that Allison
was not there; nevertheless, they served the subpoena shortly after 8:00 a.m. to
defendant Greer, the actual custodian of the records.15
The agents told Greer that they were there to pick up the records requested
in the subpoena. Greer gave permission to box the records, saying, "[F]ine. We
do not have anything to hide."' 6 Uncertain whether he could gather all the
records himself, Greer led the agents to the records room, where the agents
searched through the files with Greer helping them to identify the pertinent
records. The agents gathered the records and placed them in the evidence boxes.
Greer acquiesced when the agents offered to transport the boxed documents.17
During the search, Allison arrived, read the subpoena, indicated Greer to be in
charge of the records, and left.18
Allison, Greer and defendants Spires and Robinson 19 were indicted by a
federal grand jury on October 2, 1978, eight months after the records were se-
cured.20 At their trial, the defendants moved to suppress the admission into evi-
dence of the union records. 2 1 After a hearing, the motion was denied but a
mistrial was declared on other grounds. At a subsequent hearing, prior to the
new trial, the district court reversed its previous ruling and granted the motion to
suppress.22
The court first found that the defendants had standing to assert their fourth








16 Id. at 1257.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1257 n.2.
19 See text accompanying note 33 infra.
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amendment rights.23 The court then decided the consent to search was invalid as
a matter of law, on the following grounds: (1) there was improper service of the
subpoena 24 and (2) the voluntariness of Greer's consent was negated because the
consent was not "knowing and informed. ' 25 The court found Greer to have con-
sented to the search. The court speculated that the consent would have been
given even if Greer had known his rights.26 The court found, however, that
neither Allision nor Greer knew of their rights when served with a subpoena
duces tecum, specifically their right to object to a search by the agents.2 7 The
court concluded, therefore, the search and seizure subsequent to service of the
subpoena duces tecum was unreasonable and an abuse of the grand jury proc-
ess.28 The United States appealed. 29 The court of appeals reversed.30
Judge Ross, writing for the unanimous panel of the Eighth Circuit, first ad-
dressed the issue of the defendants' standing to attack the search.3 1 Relying on
the reasoning in Mancsi v. DeForte,32 the court determined that only Allison and
Greer could expect fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures in the union office. Accordingly, only Allison and Greer had stand-
ing to object to the evidence at trial.33
While acknowledging that the issue of consent is usually factual, the court
was concerned with the finding of the district court that, as a matter of law, the
government should have proved a knowing and informed consent.3 4 The district
court felt that without such proof, there was no legally sufficient consent.3 5
The appellate court rejected the district court's conclusion that where a sub-
poena duces tecum is used to gain consent to search by law enforcement officers,
the knowing and informed standard of consent is applicable.3 6 The appellate
court determined there was no need for the government to show that the con-
senting party was informed by the officers, or that he was otherwise aware of his
rights with respect to a subpoena duces tecum.3 7
The court held that the voluntariness or coerced nature of consent should be
judged in accordance to the totality of circumstances test adopted in Schneckloth v.
23 Id. at 1258.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
24 619 F.2d at 1258.
25 Id. at 1257.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1255.
29 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
30 619 F.2d at 1258.
31 Id. The court followed Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), limiting its inquiry to those defend-
ants whose expectation of privacy had been infringed upon. The court recognized a labor union's lowered
expectation of privacy with respect to labor department investigations but rejected the government's asser-
tion that the union was a federally regulated business similar to a firearms dealer. 619 F.2d at 1259 n.3.
32 392 U.S. 364 (1968). In that case, the Court determined a Teamster Union Local vice president,
who shared an office with other officials, nevertheless had a reasonable expectation of freedom from gov-
ernmental intrusion with respect to his custody of certain union records. Id. at 368-69.
33 619 F.2d at 1260.
34 Id. at 1262.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1260, 1262.
37 Id. at 1261.
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Bustamonte. 38 The court reasoned that the government need not prove knowing
and informed consent just because the consent followed the service of a subpoena
duces tecum. 39 The knowing and informed consent doctrine was based on the
waiver of trial rights and not the right of a person to be free from unreasonable
invasions of privacy.4° The court, in rejecting any specific requirement for assur-
ing that the recipient knows his rights after he has been served a subpoena duces
tecum, concluded that "a mechanistic approach which involves a reading of
fourth amendment rights or which places an undue burden on the government at
trial is not only cumbersome, but also offers an incomplete guarantee of protec-
tion against coercion. '41
The court also rejected the district court's comparison of the consent to
search, gained pursuant to service of a subpoena duces tecum, to consent given
after law enforcement officers claim to have a search warrant or where they pos-
sess an invalid search warrant. The consent in the latter situations, the appellate
court conceded, was mere acquiescence and not voluntary, and there could be no
effective consent to search after such false presentation of lawful authority.4 2 But
38 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The issue before the Court was what must be proven to demonstrate that a
"consent" to search was voluntarily given. The case arose when the defendant moved to suppress evidence
taken from his car which he had given police permission to search. The police did not inform the defend-
ant, who was not in custody, that he had a right to refuse the search. The Court held that the "voluntari-
ness" of a consent search is a question of fact from the totality of circumstances. The determination is
whether a consent to search is in fact "voluntary" or was the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied. Although a defendant's knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be considered,
the government is not required to show such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. Id. at
226-27. For a further discussion of the Court's decision, see the text accompanying note 91 infia.
39 619 F.2d at 1262.
40 For it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed
requirements of an effective warning. Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory
techniques of law enforcement agencies. . . .The circumstances that prompt the initial request
to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning.
Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been
applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order
to preserve a fair trial.
412 U.S. at 231, 231, 237. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (unconstitutional for trial judge to
accept guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966) (warnings prior to custodial interrogation); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (standard of knowing and intelligent waiver applied to right to counsel at each critical stage of a
criminal proceeding); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (knowing and intelligent waiver of right to
counsel at a federal criminal trial).
41 619 F.2d at 1262.
42 Id. at 1264. This principle was affirmed in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). In that
case the government sought tojustify a search based upon consent given after the officers falsely stated that
they had a warrant. The prosecution relied not on the untested validity of the warrant but on the consent
given to search. Id. at 548-49. For a further discussion of Buamper, see text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
See also Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (implied coercion invalidating consent).
The cases offered by Allison and Greer in support of the district court's conclusion likening this case to
Bumper were readily distinguished. In In re Nwamu, 421 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the district court
rejected the government's claim of a consented-to search and held that the "consent" was actually mere
acquiescence to apparent lawful authority as a result of the service of a "forthwith" subpoena duces tecum
coupled with enforcement of the subpoena, over the objection of'the recipient, by threats of contempt.
The subsequent search and seizure was determined to be unreasonable because of a non-effectual consent
to search. For a further discussion of the court's reasoning, see text accompanying notes 75-78 infra. In
Consumer Credit Ins. Agency v. United States, 599 F.2d 770 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903
(1980), the evidence removed by FBI agents from the defendant's office building after service of a "forth-
with" subpoena duces tecum was not suppressed. The court determined the consent to search was volun-
tarily given after the recipients of the writ consulted with an attorney. But see text accompanying note 71
inJfa. Each of these cases, the appellate court in Allison reasoned, depended solely upon a factual
determinaion of consent and not on the presumed authority of the subpoena duces tecum and its affect on
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the appellate court determined:
[T]here is a great difference in the degree of coercion involved in serving a subpoena
duces tecum as opposed to asserting the possession of a search warrant. A search
warrant indicates. . . no right to object to a search. A subpoena duces tecum re-
quires only that certain records must be produced and brought before the grand jury
issuing the subpoena.
4 3
The appellate court further distinguished the present case from the implied
coercion cases. There was no misrepresentation of legal authority, they noted,
but only a misunderstanding of the legal compulsion attached to a subpoena
duces tecum. 4 4 They dismissed the argument of the district court which con-
tended that law enforcement officers used unlawful coercion by serving the sub-
poena duces tecum to gain permission to search.45 The court did not believe the
officers had surrounded themselves with the "authority of the grand jury" or had
given the impression of there being "no right to refuse the search."'46
The court also decided that because the search was not conducted upon the
authority of the subpoena, but rather by consent, it was immaterial whose name
appeared on the subpoena so long as the consenting party was the legal custodian
of the records.4
7
The opinion in United States v. Allison leaves unanswered the question of
whether a subpoena duces tecum with "forthwith" qualities48 may be served
when there is some doubt as to the availability of a search warrant and it is likely
that the recipient of the subpoena duces tecum will as a result give consent for a
search and seizure which goes beyond the authority provided by the subpoena.
The appellate court based its judgment on two determinations: (1) the consent
to search the union records was given after a misunderstanding of the legal au-
thority of the subpoena duces tecum 49 and (2) the subpoena is considerably less
coercive than a false claim of possessing a search warrant. 50 Neither of these
determinations, the court concluded, was sufficient to vitiate consent. 5 1 The
court failed to address the threshold inquiry, however, concerning the propriety
of even requesting permission to search following service of a subpoena duces
that consent. 619 F.2d at 1263. The appellate court found support in United States v. Re, 313 F. Supp.
442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). That case compared an accountant's consent to deliver records, after the "forth-
with" nature of the subpoena duces tecum was excused, to a voluntary compliance to the subpoena in light
of the compelling awareness of the severe penalties which may be imposed for willful resistance. Id. That
case does not seem particularly apposite to the present situation since the "forthwith" quality of the sub-
poena was not used and the accountant himself delivered the subpoenaed papers, to the office of the SEC
agent who had served the subpoena, during the evening following the morning service of the writ. Id. at
446.
43 619 F.2d at 1264 n.5.
44 Id. at 1264. See text accompanying notes 60-69 infra.
45 Id. at 1262.
46 Id. at 1263.
47 Id. at 1265. Since Greer had mutual control over the records with Allison, the consent was a valid
third party consent to search. Id. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
48 Although the subpoena duces tecum in this case was not designated as requiring "forthwith" pro-
duction, nevertheless Greer was given only an hour and a half to comply and the agents specifically stated
the documents were to be immediately produced. In effect the writ demanded "forthwith" production.
See notes 12-16 supra.
49 See note 44 supra.
50 See note 43 supra.
51 619 F.2d at 1265.
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tecum. The opinion does not give adequate weight to the possible violations of
the right to privacy secured by the fourth amendment.
The basic judicial interpretation of the fourth amendment is that "except in
certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant.152 For enforcement, the courts have adhered to the "exclusionary rule"
making the illegally seized evidence inadmissible as to the guilt of the wronged
defendant. 53 The purpose of the rule is to deter law enforcement officers from
making illegal searches and seizures and to maintain the imperative of judicial
integrity.54 In reversing the district court, the appellate court neglects this judi-
cial interpretation and blurs the distinction between a non-coercive consent to
search, and consent granted pursuant to service of a "forthwith" subpoena duces
tecum. By failing to make this distinction, the court has effectively approved a
non-exigent search and seizure, undertaken without the authorization of a search
warrant. The Allison decision allows an officer in the field to use a "forthwith"
subpoena duces tecum to gain a consent to search he might not have obtained
without the writ. 55 By approving this method, the court affords the officer who
serves the writ an opportunity to avoid having to establish probable cause for the
search.
The subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of the union records
could, under no circumstances, qualify as a valid search warrant, within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 56 A subpoena lacks the requirement of a
warrant that it "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."' 57 A search warrant may not properly be issued to a federal officer or
government attorney unless a showing of probable cause can be made from the
facts and circumstances presented to the court under oath or affirmation. 58
There must be probable cause that the property to be seized constitutes evidence
of the commission of a criminal offense, or contraband, or fruits of a crime, or
property intended for use to commit a criminal offense.59
A subpoena, however, is issued to an officer of the court by the court clerk
without a court order, and without passing upon the materiality of the desired
evidence.6° As in this case, it is the prosecutor who has the initiative and power
52 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). See also Stoner v. California, 367 U.S.
483 (1964); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). But stee Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (search incident to an arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (mobile vehicle); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (imminent
destruction of evidence).
53 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). There is every indication in Al4iron that the evidence
contributed to the conviction of the defendants. Therefore any error from admitting evidence obtained
through an illegal search and seizure would probably not be harmless. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 275 U.S.
85 (1963).
54 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
55 The appellate court acknowledged the district court's conclusion that Greer believed the subpoena
duces tecum empowered the agents to obtain and to take the records. 619 F.2d at 1263.
56 See Mancusi v. DeForte, 329 U.S. at 371; accord, In re Nwamu, 421 F. Supp. at 1365. Compare FED.
R. CRIM. P. 17 with 41.
57 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
58 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
60 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a); Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 206, 100 P.2d 302. Cf.
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by subpoena to bring proof before the grand jury.6 1 The subpoena duces tecum,
appropriately used, is valuable in assisting the grand jury in its essential func-
tion-ascertaining probable cause upon which to base an indictment. 62 How-
ever, unlike a search warrant where probable cause is previously determined and
a seizure authorized, the records to be produced under subpoena are not subject
to seizure. The recipient of the writ, by right, prior to compliance, can subject
the subpoena to judicial scrutiny in a post-service test of "reasonableness. ' 63 The
search warrant, on the other hand, necessitates compliance prior to any face
value test of its validity. 64
The appellate court acknowledges the compelling nature of a subpoena du-
ces tecum.65 Although it does not authorize any seizure, failure to comply with
its terms, if found to be reasonable, subjects the offender to the possibility of a
contempt charge.66
The ease of issuance, apparent judicial authority commanding production,
breadth of material to be produced, and the sanction for enforcement necessitate
a continuing scrutiny of the procedural use of a subpoena.6 7 Appropriate service
by FBI agents is completed by delivering a copy to the person named in the
subpoena. 68 However, the power to quash, alter, or enforce the subpoena is not
entrusted to any government agent but to the court, so that all rights of the
witness prior to any indictment will be scrupulously upheld.69
Yet the potential for the misuse of a subpoena, especially one with "forth-
with" qualities, has caused an undercurrent of discontent in two other Circuits.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973) (comparison of criteria for issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum and a search warrant).
61 See United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920).
62 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919); Hendricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178, 184
(1912).
63 "The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be
unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). The requirement of "reasonableness" with respect
to books and records is stated as: (1) there must not be too much indefiniteness or breadth in the descrip-
tion of the matter sought; (2) the inquiry must be which the demanding agency is authorized by the law to
make; (3) the material specified must be pertinent; (4) the request is adequate but not excessive for the
relevant inquiry. See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 372 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); accord, Hale v. Hen-
kel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) dsapproved on other grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1973).
64 See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1979).
65 United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d at 1264.
66 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (g). The judicially approved breadth of a reasonable grand jury subpoena
duces tecum proscribes a union's record custodian, called upon to personally produce the union records, to
assert any constitutional privilege protecting production. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
Despite the Court's ruling in White, it does not necessarily follow that there would be inevitiable discovery
of the records. Cf. United States v. Ternullo, 407 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (seizure of copies of
mechanics liens even if unreasonable would not be an unconstitutional intrusion since original liens were
on file and would have been discovered by investigators). In Allison, the appropriate officials, ohce proper
service had been made, would still have had a choice to comply, challenge, or risk a civil contempt charge
while lawfully refusing to answer questions regarding the whereabouts of the subpoenaed records. See
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See generaly Vaira, Use ofthe GrandJug
, 
to Obtain Business
Records, 59 CHI. B. REC. 32 (1977).
If there were a successful motion to vacate or modify the subpoena duces tecum at a proceeding
subsequent to their initial exclusion because of an unreasonable search and seizure, a warrant to seize the
remaining records might be inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
67 Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 633-35 (grand jury may not compel a person to produce his
own strictly private books and papers that would incriminate him).
68 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(d).
69 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). See Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); accord, United States v.
Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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Judge Weick of the Sixth Circuit, in his dissenting opinion in Consumer Credit In-
surance Agency v. United States ,70 commented upon the government agents remain-
ing to supervise collection of subpoenaed documents:
The obvious purpose of their remaining at the plaintiff's place of business was for
duress and coercion, to enforce compliance with the forthwith subpoenas. This was
not their function, and they had no lawful right to engage in such activity. In this
context the use of the forthwith command itself became coercive. 71
The Third Circuit also has expressed concern on this issue in a case involv-
ing a forthwith grand jury subpoena duces tecum, issued when in fact, no grand
jury was presently sitting.72 Although the court determined that the defendant
lacked the appropriate standing to object, it nevertheless commented:
[W]e must express grave disquietude with respect to ...the issuance and "forth-
with" production provisions of the subpoena.
.... Under these circumstances, the grand jury subpoena is no substitute for a
proper application before a judicial officer for a search warrant. It was this egregious
circumvention of Fourth Amendment procedures that probably led the district court,
in denying ... [defendant's] suppression motion-solely on the issue of standing-to
observe, that "in doing so we do not rid ourselves of a chill at the base of the spine.
We are old enough to remember how other democratic constitutional systems were
brought to destruction by the use of their own legal processes."
73
Although the appellate court distinguished the Allison decision from the
cases involving a lack of factual consent, one such case, In Re Nwamu, 74 did not
limit its discussion to that determination:
The circumstances surrounding the employee's surrender of documents and
other objects to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, upon service of "forth-
with" subpoenas upon them, raise substantial questions of unlawful search and
seizure, as well as frustration of the power of the court ...to modify or quash a
subpoena. .... 75
The Nwamu court reasoned, prior to its determination of non-effecutal consent,
that the agents had no authority by virtue of the subpoena to "execute" its provi-
sions. 7 6 It determined that the methods used to obtain possession precluded the
witness's protection by the court, "including the right to challenge the subpoena
.. .by compelling instant surrender by threats of contempt and claim or color,
of authority. '7 7 This was an unlawful search and seizure, "however broad the
subpoena power of the grand jury. '78
The appellate court in Allison, however, uses the government's argument in
Nwamu by asserting the search was not conducted on the authority of the sub-
70 599 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
71 Id. at 776 (Weick, J., dissenting). Judge Weick tempers his remark in circumstances where there is
imminent danger of the destruction of the documents. "Forthwith" return is then justified. However, he
limits this exception to voluntary compliance commenting that "[R]eviewing courts should be cautious
where it appears that the forthwith requirement may have been used to preclude any review." Id. at 776-
77 n.1.
72 United States v. Hilton, 534 F.2d 556 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
73 Id. at 565.
74 421 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See note 42 supra.
75 421 F. Supp. at 1362.
76 Id. at 1365.
77 Id. at 1365-66.
78 Id. at 1366.
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poena. 79 Rather, the court relies upon the consent of Allison and Greer. That
consent, says the court, need only meet the totality of circumstances test decided
upon in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte .80 The court might better have focused on the
effect on the average person of being served with a "forthwith" subpoena duces
tecum. This analysis would have served to highlight a profitable comparison
between the use of a subpoena duces tecum under these circumstances and the
claimed possession of a search warrant in Bumper v. North Carolina.,,' The court
dismissed this latter comparison by noting the differences in the degree of coer-
cion between a search warrant and a subpoena duces tecum. 82 To the average
person, however, the subpoena duces tecum has, to a significant degree, the same
coercive characteristics as a search warrant.8 3 The "forthwith" subpoena is
served by a government agent, it is under the seal of the court, and it commands
the immediate production of documents to be brought before the grand jury.8 4
Service of this type of subpoena, coupled with words of authority to obtain the
records, surrounds the law enforcement agent with the color of authority.8 5 But
the subpoena is not a search warrant, and gives no more authority to search than
a false claim of possessing a warrant or serving an improper warrant. 86 As the
court noted in Bumper: "[T]he situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colora-
bly lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."' 87 The
Court came to this determination despite the factual finding that the words and
actions of the consenting party in Bumper indicated voluntary consent. The na-
ture of the consent was remarkably similar to the words and actions of Allison
and Greer.88
Bumper survived the Court's later decision in Schneckloth because the earlier
case was not decided upon any mention of the words knowing or informed con-
sent. The mere procedural use of an improper warrant or a claim of a warrant
tainted the subsequent consent regardless of the recipient's knowledge of his
rights.89 Analogously, the initial misrepresentation of apparent court authority
to gather evidence in All'on improperly influenced Greer's consent, and a better
result would have been to exclude the seized records and documents from the
trial in accordance with the decision in Bumper.90
This is not inconsistent with the view in Schneckloth. The appellate court in
Alh'son, adhering to the principles of the Schneckloth decision, ignores the effect of
79 619 F.2d at 1265.
80 See notes 38-40 supra.
81 391 U.S. 543 (1968). See note 42 supra.
82 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
83 Cf. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 44 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (members of the public
treat their appearance before a grand jury to be as compelling as being brought to the police station as
part of a criminal investigation; the former because of its gravity is usually more damaging).
84 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
85 Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 548-49.
86 Id. at 548.
87 Id. at 550.
88 Id. at 547 n.8.
89 391 U.S. at 548. See generally Note, Consent and the Constitution After Bumper v. North Carolina, 6
CAL. W. L. REV. 316 (1970).
90 Compare "The legal effect is that consent is on the basis of such a warrant and his permission is
construed as an intention to abide by the law and not resist the search under the warrant, rather than an
invitation to search," 391 U.S. at 549 n.14 (quoting Bull v. Armstrong, 254 Ala. 390, 394, 48 So. 2d 467,
470 (1950)), with "Greer, upon being handed the subpoena under the circumstances stated, believed that
the subpoena empowered the agents to obtain and take the records," 619 F.2d at 1263.
[February 1981]
COMMENTS
its own determination that the coercion of a subpoena differs from that of a
search warrant. That coercive effect of the subpoena, albeit different, nonetheless
shifts the determination of consent from a post-search examination of the totality
of the circumstances to the threshold inquiry into the misuse of the procedural
process regarding issuance and service of a subpoena duces tecum. The
Schneckloth Court balanced these perspectives by noting:
The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with
the requirement that they befreefrom any aspect of ofjiial coercion cannot be resolved by any
infallible touchstone. To approve such searches without the most careful scrutiny
would sanction the possibility of official coercion; to place artificial restrictions upon
such searches would jeopardize their basic validity. 9 t
The inherent coercive effect of serving a subpoena duces tecum under the
circumstances in Allision is more appropriately viewed as being beyond the scope
of authority delegated to the subpoena process despite any ultimate right of the
court to enforce production.92 In balancing the desire for an effective investiga-
tion with the expectations of the average person, mere efficiency cannot justify
disregarding the fourth amendment and the requirement of establishing proba--
ble cause.93 Moreover, precisely because of the necessarily broad personal sub-
poena powers of the grand jury, it is necessary that this power be exercised only
in a reasonable fashion.9 4 The agents in Allison had legitimate concerns that
their investigative efforts would be thwarted by some action of the local. The
court recognizing these concerns, however, must necessarily weigh them against
the Bill of Rights so that "minor seemingly innocuous intrusions don't over the
course of time result in significant erosion of those rights."' 95 Nothing would have
prevented the agents from appearing at the union headquarters and asking to
search through the records. As the court noted, Greer "was in a consenting frame
of mind." 96
Nor did the court authorize the search on the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to the search warrant requirement, despite the previous destruction of some
records. That exception remains limited to situations where there is probable
cause to search and but for the exigency a warrant could be obtained.9 7 This was
not the case in Allison. Nonetheless, if the records were destroyed after service of
the subpoena, there would have been some recourse in the normal judicial proc-
ess by bringing an action for obstruction of justice.98 Perhaps that alternative
91 412 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added). The Court further stated:
But the fourth and fourteenth amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by ex-
plicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coer-
cion was applied, the resulting "consent" would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified
police intrusion against which the fourth amendment is directed.
Id. at 228.
92 See In re Nwamu, 421 F. Supp. at 1365. Cf. United States v. Biswa Overseas Co., No. 78 Cr. 937
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1979) (customs officials sought to enforce a citation requiring that defendant appear to
testify and produce documents, by demanding the files, threatening penalties, and conducting a search;
the court held the officials were acting outside their authority).
93 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1977).
94 See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 421 F. Supp. at 1366; accord, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. at 44.
96 619 F.2d at 1257.
97 Compare United States v. Pino, 431 F.2d 1943 (2d Cir. 1970) with Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d
535 (Ist Cir. 1968).
98 Set United States v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1978); accord, United States v. Solow, 138
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would not result in a penalty comparable to the eventual convictions obtained in
this case. 99 But "if the government breaks the law to obtain evidence of private
wrongdoing and the courts permit such evidence to be used in judicial proceed-
ings, the courts themselves become accomplices in willful disobedience of the
law."' 0 0
The court's decision in Allison encourages prosecutors to exploit the grand
jury process by disregarding an individual's constitutional expectation of privacy
and the traditional neutrality of the grand jury. The principle established in this
case would allow a law enforcement officer to conduct a search and seizure un-
hindered by the requirement of showing probable cause to obtain a warrant or
by the fear that the suspect might obtain a protective order quashing the sub-
poena. A better rule would be to proscribe the procedural use of a "forthwith"
subpoena duces tecum to gain consent for a search. This would preserve judicial
integrity by not sanctioning official coercion. It would deter inappropriate law
enforcement expediency at the expense of an individual's rights without restrict-
ing the use of truly voluntary consensual searches to support effective law en-
forcement investigations.
Edward B. Koehler
Constitutional Law-STANDING-VOLUNTARY MEMBERSHIP ASSOCIATION HAS
STANDING TO SUE SOLELY IN ITS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF ITS
HARMED MEMBERS-NCAA V. Ca4lano, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980).
A litigant seeking to bring suit in federal court must meet certain threshold
requirements before the court will hear the-case on its merits. Although these
requirements arise independently from three distinct sources,' they act collec-
tively to ensure that only litigants deemed proper to bring the lawsuit 2 may in-
voke a court's jurisdiction. The various constitutional, statutory, and
discretionary limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction have been dis-
cussed in legal treatises and judicial opinions under the general rubric of stand-
ing.3
F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Seegenerally Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention andDensruction." Practi-
cal Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME. LAw. 7 (1980).
99 The penalty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 153 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) is S5,000 and/or 5 years in
prison. The defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (S25,000 and/or 20 years) and (d)
(S25,000 and/or 20 years); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1622 ($2,000 and/or 5 years) and 1623 ($10,000 and/or 5 years);
and 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) ($10,000 and/or 5 years).
100 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
1 The three sources are the United States Constitution, legislative enactments, and the Supreme
Court of the United States. Article III of the Constitution requires a "case or controversy" for federal
jurisdiction over a claim. Federal statutes, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(1976), grant a right ofjudicial review to certain individuals. Prudential limitations, a collection of rules
established by the Supreme Court, deal with questions of justiciability: mootness, ripeness, standing and
political question. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE & PROCEDURE,Jurisdic-
tion § 3531 (1975).
2 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 G975).
3 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnaoysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645 (1973). See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
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For many years one standing limitation has been that a litigant is not ordi-
narily permitted to assert the rights of absent third parties.4 This rule, however,
has not been imposed on third-party litigants as a strict constitutional restriction
on their access to the federal courts. Instead, the Supreme Court of the United
States has viewed the rule as a discretionary or policy restraint on the exercise of
jurisdiction.5 The Court has thus been free in recent years to loosen the bonds of
representational standing.6 The effect has been a warmer reception of third-
party litigants in the federal courts.
In NCAA v. Cal/ano,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that a voluntary membership association has standing to sue solely in its
capacity as the representative of its harmed members.8 In granting standing to a
litigant that had demonstrated "interest" 9 but no direct injury to itself, the court
liberally construed the various policy limitations which delineate the scope of
representational standing.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197210 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in educational programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. "
The regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW)' 2 under Title IX interpret "educational programs" to include ath-
letic programs, and require equal treatment of the sexes in intercollegiate
sports. 13 Many colleges and universities, fearing that their athletic programs
would be adversely affected by HEW's regulations, criticized the regulations and
contemplated legal recourse.14
With hundreds of educational institutions affected by the controversial regu-
lations, the adequacy of the litigant attempting to represent the rights of others
became most important. As a bona fide athletic organization with decades of
experience and great public recognition, the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation (NCAA) would appear to satisfy the primary standing requirement that a
litigant be "entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute."' 5 In
seeking injunctive relief from regulations which in no way directly touched it,
(1952); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1923). The Supreme Court's use of the term "standing" as a
"shorthand expression for all the various elements ofjusticiability," Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Ms-
use of "Standing", 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 453 (1962), has at times "caused policy considerations to blend
into constitutional limitations," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). Consequently, standing has been
called one of "the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of public law." Hearings on S 2097 Before
the Subcommr on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiia7p Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 465, 498. (1966).
4 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 n.20. The Article III case or controversy requirement forms the
basis of this restriction on federal court jurisdiction.
5 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1953).
6 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Hunt v. Wash-
ington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
7 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980).
8 Id. at 1385.
9 "Interest" in this sense means a genuine desire to resolve a particular dispute. The desire must be
consistent with the association's stated goals and purpose. Interest as it relates to standing takes on definite
connotations of litigating expertise and adequacy of representation.
10 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
11 Id.; [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2462, 2671-79.
12 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was renamed the Department of Health and
Human Services on October 17, 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 601.
13 45 C.F.R. § 86(d) (1979).
14 Title IX has spawned extensive litigation in other areas as well. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (sex discrimination in the admission policies of educational institutions).
15 622 F.2d at 1385 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498 (1975)).
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however, the association met procedural obstacles which demonstrate the per-
plexities of the modern law of standing.16
The NCAA, an organization dedicated to the improvement of intercollegi-
ate athletic programs, consists of several hundred voluntarily affiliated colleges
and universities. 1 7 One of its stated purposes is to "uphold the principle of insti-
tutional control of, and responsibility for, all intercollegiate sports.""' The
NCAA brought suit on behalf of itself and its members, alleging that the HEW
regulations relating to sex discrimination in athletics were arbitrary and capri-
ciois under the Administrative Procedure Act,' 9 violated the Fifth Amend-
ment 20 and Title IX, 2 ' and were unconstitutionally vague.22 The district court
refused to hear the case on the merits, holding that the NCAA did not establish
standing either on its own behalf or as a representative of its member colleges
and universities. 23 On appeal the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the com-
plaint did allege facts which conferred standing on the NCAA as representative
of its harmed members.2 4
The requirements of standing apply to associations, such as the NCAA, as
well as to individuals. 25 In general, a plaintiff must have "such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues .... -26 Normally, mere "interest" is not
enough to confer standing. In Sierra Club v. Morton ,27 the Supreme Court denied
standing to an association which had not alleged harm either to itself or to its
members from the challenged conduct, even though the association had shown
sufficient concern for the dispute's disposition as well as its adequacy as a repre-
sentative in court. Later, in Linda R. S v. Richard D. ,28 the Court reiterated the
principle that the complaining party must allege "some threatened or actual in-
jury resulting from the putatively illegal action."'29
This strict requirement was relaxed somewhat in subsequent cases, however.
In Warth v. Se/din30 the Court construed the various standing requirements as
16 For analyses of specific aspects of the standing question, see, e.g., Culp, Standing 1976, 72 Nw. L.
Rav. 69 (1977) (review of 1976 Supreme Court term); Note, Implying Standing to Sue fom Statutog Authority:
Applicability ofa "Fair Reading"Standard, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 102 (1978); Recent Developments, 23 VILL L.
REv. 580 (1977-78) (reviewing standing in tax cases).
17 622 F.2d at 1385.
18 Id.
19 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The Act provides in pertinent part: "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686. Title IX directs agencies to "effectuate" the statute with regulations which
"shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken." 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
22 622 F.2d at 1382.
23 NCAA v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D. Kan. 1978).
24 622 F.2d at 1382.
25 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
26 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
27 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
28 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
29 Id at 617. The invasion of a "legal right" may be considered a "distinct and palpable injury"
sufficient to satisfy one aspect of Article III's requirement. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). A
later case construed "injury in fact" to include a forced compliance with unlawful regulations. Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
30 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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they applied to litigants asserting the rights of absent third parties. The Court
stated:
Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as
the representatiye of its members. . . . The association must allege that its members,
or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members
themselves brought suit.3
1
Two additional requirements for representational standing have recently been
added: a "fairly traceable" causal nexus between the alleged injury and the chal-
lenged conduct,32 and a reasonable certainty that the remedy requested will "in-
ure to the benefit of those actually injured. '3 3
The Tenth Circuit in N6CAA found that although the association itself had
not been directly harmed by the challenged regulations, 34 its member institutions
had incurred a change in the status quo as a result of the "arbitrary demands" 35
imposed by the regulations. According to the court, this constituted "harm in
fact" sufficient, when combined with findings of causation and remedial cer-
tainty, to confer Article III standing upon members if they were to bring suit.
The court next considered the NCAA's representational standing under the
criteria of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission. 3 6 In Hunt, the
Supreme Court devised a test applicable to an association suing on behalf of its
harmed members where the association itself has not sustained direct injury:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit. 3 7
31 Id. at 511. The Court continued:
So long as this can be established and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought
does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolu-
tion of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled
to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Id.
32 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977). This causal connection
has been subsequently construed as a "but for" relationship. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
33 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
34 To satisfy the requirements for harm in fact, an injury must not be speculative. The Tenth Circuit,
following United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973), declared that the only reasonable
possibility of harm to the NCAA itself was indirect (the result of actions taken by members in response to
the regulations) and not certain to happen. Without a "distinct and palpable injury to itself," the NCAA
could assert a claim only as a representative of the harmed members. NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d at 1387.
See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977); cf. Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (members bringing suit along with associa-
tion).
35 622 F.2d at 1388. The court likened athletic program expenditures to business investments. Any
federally mandated control over the investments would be an unwelcome change, thought the court, be-
cause a restrictive investment environment prevents member colleges from "developing intercollegiate
sports programs as they see fit." Id. at 1387-89.
36 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
37 Id. at 343. Hunt does not simply collect previous holdings of the Supreme Court. Rather, it
presents new requirements that an association must satisfy to achieve standing in the federal courts. The
judicial concerns represented in the Hunt test are two-fold: an interest in assuring adequate adversary
representation and a desire for the proper allocation of judicial resources. Comment, A.ssoiational Third-
Parr Standing and FederalJursdiction under Hunt, 64 IowA L. Rav. 121 (1978). The first prong of the test
pirticularly reflects the second of these concerns. The members of an association, having been denied
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The Tenth Circuit found that the NCAA's complaint had shown that the
members were adversely affected by the HEW regulations promulgated under
Title IX, and thus had suffered the requisite "legal wrong."38 The first prong of
the Hunt test was thus satisfied.39
The second requirement of Hunt, that the association seek to protect interests
germane to its purpose, is intended to ensure that the injured members are ade-
quately represented.43 An association established to advance its members' inter-
ests in a given area would, under Hunt, normally be deemed a competent
representative of those specific interests. 4' The complaint in NCAA attacked
"only those regulations that affect or pertain to intercollegiate sports pro-
grams."42 Because these sports programs were a vital part of the NCAA's stated
purpose, the court found that the association satisified the second prong of the
Hunt test.43
The final requirement of Hunt concerns the type of relief sought by an asso-
ciation on behalf of its members. To determine the need for individual members'
participation in the litigation, the court must ascertain whether individualized
showings of proof will be required. 44 The NCAA sought no damages for individ-
ual members, asking instead for declaratory and injunctive relief.45 Since the
case presented issues of law common to all members, the Tenth Circuit held that
the association satisifed the third prong of the Hunt test and should be allowed
standing to assert the claims of its member institutions.4 6
Although NCAA appears to correctly apply the various rules governing rep-
resentational standing, the decision fails to deal adequately with two important
problem areas: the application of the Hunt test to a voluntary membership or-
ganization, and the possibility that an association not truly representative of its
members could be granted standing.47
The Supreme Court in Hunt relied upon five cases48 as authority for the
proposition that a voluntary membership association 49 may attain standing to
sue on behalf of its members without alleging its own injury. Based on that au-
standing through their representative, might bring suits on their own behalf. These suits would effectively
cause a duplication of the judicial effort required in the association's suit. Therefore, no judicial resources
would have been saved by denying the association standing in its representational capacity. Id. at 130.
38 622 F.2d at 1389-91.
39 The first prong of the test was complicated in NCA4.4 because the members had to also satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976). The Act
allows one who has suffered a "legal wrong" from putatively illegal regulations to challenge those regula-
tions.
40 There is danger that a representative with no real interest in the outcome of litigation may not
adequately represent the rights of its constituents. In general, courts have required that a litigant have a
sufficient stake in the outcome of a suit to ensure "adequacy of representation." Comment, supra note 37
at 122 n.ll. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
41 432 U.S. at 344-45.
42 622 F.2d at 1391.
43 Id See text accompanying note 18 supra.
44 432 U.S. at 344-45.
45 622 F.2d at 1385.
46 Id. at 1392.
47 These two problem areas were first discussed in Comment, supra note 37.
48 Simon v. East Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); National Motor
Freight Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam).
49 Voluntary membership associations consist of members united to advance common interests. Al-
though there may be compelling reasons why members would want to join, there can be no mandatory
membership requirement. The "typical trade association" is one example. Hunt v. Washington State
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thority, the Court held that the Washington State Apple Advertising Commis-
sion, an involuntay membership association, 50 had representational standing to
sue without showing its own actual injury. In three of the five cases cited in Hunt,
however, the associations had actually been denied standing.51 In the other two
cases, the Court had not passed on the issue of standing because the associations
were authorized to appear in court by federal statute or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 52 Since Hunt held in favor of an involuntary membership asso-
ciation's standing to sue, its test may apply solely to associations of that type.
Without a specific Supreme.Court holding, the best authority governing repre-
sentational standing of voluntary membership associations is the Court's dicta.
53
The very nature of a voluntary membership association requires that its
members be free to terminate their membership. This freedom creates potential
for abuse and warrants standing requirements more restrictive than those of
Hunt. A member opposed to upcoming litigation may choose to drop out of the
association rather than allow the association to assert his rights in court. By ter-
minating his membership before trial, the member would not be foreclosed by res
judicata should he decide to sue separately. 54 In addition, the member might
have the added benefit of using collateral estoppel offensively.55
A member dissatisfied with his association's plans to bring a lawsuit might
be encouraged by the potential of this tactical advantage to terminate his mem-
bership in the association. Requiring an overwhelming majority of members to
expressly indicate their support of the litigation might help ensure that a volun-
tary membership association truly represents its members' interests in litiga-
tion.56
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 334. Other examples are college fraternities, sororities, and ath-
letic leagues.
50 The Commission has a statutory duty to promote and protect Washington State's apple industry.
The Commission represents the entire apple industry, but, as an agency of the state, it has no members per
se. "Membership" is in effect "compelled," however, in the form of mandatory assessments levied upon
apple growers and dealers. Id. at 344-45. Another example of an involuntary membership association is a
state bar association. Id. at 345.
51 Simon v. East Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
52 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); National Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S.
246 (1963) (per curiam). In Aeek the question of adequacy of representation was not present because the
association was joined with individual members as the plaintiff party. In National Aotor Freight the associa-
tion was authorized under federal statute to represent the interests of its members. Neither M'eek nor
NationalAlotorFreight therefore can provide positive authority that a voluntary membership association has
standing to sue without the additional benefits of an explicit statutory provision or joinder of a member's
claim. Comment, supra note 37 at 129.
53 The Supreme Court has not yet ratified the application of the Hunt criteria to voluntary member-
ship organizations. Although Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978) is enlightening on the law of standing, Duke presents a situation similar to Aeek in that individual
harmed members joined with an association to litigate common claims.
54 Comment, From Net to Sword- Organizational Representatives Litigating their Members" Claims, 1974 ILL.
L. F. 663, 673.
55 In Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld the "offen-
sive" use of collateral estoppel. This ruling raises the possibility that a plaintiffcan estop a defendant from
relitigating issues which the defendant has previously litigated and lost in an action with another party. In
the case of an individual who has terminated his membership in an association prior to the association's
lawsuit, Parklane would apparently allow him to bring suit in his own right and use collateral estoppel
offensively. Application of the Parklane rule is discretionary, however. A court may disallow the offensive
use of collateral estoppel where (1) the plaintiff could easily have been joined in the earlier action, and (2)
its application would result in unfairness'to the defendant. The practical potential for "strategic advan-
tage" would thus turn on the facts of a particular case.
56 In assessing the NCAA's adequacy of representation, the Tenth Circuit required only a simple
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The second problem with the standing test applied in NCAA is that it fails to
give suitable assurance that an "unworthy" association will be denied standing.57
An ad hoc organization could satisfy all aspects of the present test without show-
ing that it would be a sincere advocate of its members' interests.58 To safeguard
against this possibility, the second Hunt requirement, that the interests an organi-
zation seeks to protect be germane to its purpose, 59 should be supplemented by a
requirement that the organization possess "pertinent, bona-fide, and well-recog-
nized attributes and purposes." 6 This criterion was first enunciated in Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton. 6 1 Justice Blackmun thought it impor-
tant to examine the organization qua organization to determine whether it has a
"provable, sincere, dedicated and established status. '62 This proposed fourth
prong of the Hunt test would ensure that only the most genuine and capable
organizations achieve standing.
The Tenth Circuit in NCAA did not expressly consider Justice Blackmun's
criterion. Perhaps the court recognized the NCAA's ability to "speak know-
ingly"6 3 for the values it asserts and its reputation as a competent proponent of
intercollegiate sports programs. The NCAA's prestige as an association charged
with the responsibility of representing hundreds of educational institutions may
have assured the court that it would adequately assert the rights of its members
in litigation. In the case of less established organizations, however, an inquiry
into the organization qua organization is essential. 64
NCAA illustrates several areas of concern resulting from the ease with which
third party litigants may now obtain access to the federal courts. The Tenth
Circuit in NCAA failed to consider that the Supreme Court's present test for
associational standing does not necessarily apply to voluntary membership orga-
nizations. A test stricter than that found in Hunt may be necessary for this type
of association. Judicial inquiries into both the sufficiency of membership support
for proposed court action and the organization's authenticity would ensure that
an association truly represents the interests of its harmed members.
Adoption of these stricter requirements would no doubt slow the liberal
majority of member institutions to support the litigation. Given the controversial nature of Title IX, a
requirement that a more substantial majority favor the litigation would not be unreasonable. A require-
ment of 75% support, for example, would add greater assurance that the NCAA would adequately repre-
sent its members' interests. Such a requirement would also reduce the possibility of a collusive lawsuit.
57 Comment, supra note 37 at 134-37.
58 Id. at 135.
59 See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
60 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 757-58.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 758.
64 For the practicing lawyer preparing a complaint wherein representational standing will be sought,
the Tenth Circuit's decision is instructive. Although the complaint must allege injury to some present or
represented member, too much emphasis on injury and causation may lead the court to embark on a fact-
finding expedition to verify the allegations. Set, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U.S. 59 (1978) (Supreme Court launched inquiry into merits of case to investigate causal nexus of
alleged injury). This approach has been heavily criticized for its "great potential for waste of judicial
resources," The Supreme Court, 1977 Tenn, 92 HARv. L. REv. 257, 262 (1978). To avoid the difficulties
which arise upon judicial scrutiny of injury and causation, the lawyer should describe with precision the
parties involved and the causal chain of harm which links them. Once injury has been clearly shown, the
complaint should accentuate the representative's interest in the litigation as clearly as possible. Set Katz




trend in the area of representational standing. It would, however, add stability
and fairness to the determination of whether an association is fit to go to court on
behalf of its members.
Patik M Joyce
Criminal Procedure-A TRIAL COURT MAY REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WHEN DEFENDANT OFFERS EXCULPATORY
TESTIMONY-United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1980)*
The lesser included offense doctrine provides that a defendant may be con-
victed of a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.1 Although
originally developed to aid prosecutors who had failed to prove every element of
the crime charged in the indictment, 2 the doctrine has long been held to entitle
the defendant to an instruction on a lesser included offense when there is some
evidence to support a conviction of that crime.3
In UnitedStates v. Chapman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that, where the defendant testified that he was not guilty of any
wrongdoing, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on a lesser included of-
fense did not constitute reversible error.4 The court so held despite the existence
of evidence which could have supported a conviction of the lesser offense.5 Only
the Tenth Circuit, in Chapman and in its 1975 holding in United States V. Smith,6
has upheld the refusal to give a lesser included instruction in the face of such
evidence.
Kenneth Rudolph Chapman, an American Indian, was convicted and sen-
tenced to fifty years imprisonment for murdering another Indian, Larry Paquin.
At Chapman's trial, the prosecution presented considerable evidence establishing
the elements of murder. 7 However, other evidence indicated that Chapman may
have acted in the "heat of passion" in shooting Paquin, and thus could have been
guilty of voluntary manslaughter.8 The evidence supporting a manslaughter
* Cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980).
1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) states: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily in-
cluded in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessar-
ily included if the attempt is an offense."
The Model Penal Code's treatment of the lesser included offense doctrine is in MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.07(4) (1962).
2 See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1980); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208(1973).
3 See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. at 2388; Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965);
Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896).
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not held defendants constitutionally entitled to
a lesser included instruction except in capital cases, all states require that such instructions be given when
warranted by the evidence. Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. at 2388.
4 615 F.2d at 1300.
5 Id. at 1295.
6 521 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1975).
7 615 F.2d at 1295-96. This evidence included testimony that for some weeks prior to the shooting,
Chapman had told several people that he was going to "shoot" or "kill" Paquin for stealing his truck and
some money.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1976): "(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
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conviction included testimony that Chapman believed Paquin had previously
stolen his truck and some money and that Paquin had made an obscene gesture
toward Chapman immediately prior to the shooting and dared him to shoot. 9
There was also testimony that Chapman had been drinking prior to the killing. 10
Chapman, however, testified that the shooting was an accident." He further
claimed that he was "happy" and on his way to a picnic when he saw Paquin
and decided to scare him into returning his money.' 2
At the close of the trial the judge refused to give the defendant's proposed
jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter 13 on the ground that the instruction
was not justified by the evidence. 14 Instead, the judge instructed the jury on the
elements of first and second degree murder. Upon conviction of second degree
murder, Chapman appealed on the ground that his request for an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter had been improperly refused.15
In affirming Chapman's conviction, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that, al-
though some evidence supporting a manslaughter conviction existed, this evi-
dence was inconsistent with the defendant's testimony that the shooting was an
accident and, therefore, did not entitle the defendant to an instruction on that
offense. 16 Writing for the majority, Judge Barrett observed that:
[H]ad Chapman opted not to testify, thereby removing from the jury's consideration
his personal account of the events relating to his state of mind, the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to Chapman, vis-a-vis the availability of the instruction,
might have warranted the giving of the requested instruction on manslaughter. 17
The court thus held that, in light of Chapman's testimony, it was impossible for a
jury rationally to convict him of manslaughter.' 8
Judge Holloway, in a vigorous dissent, argued that although the evidence to
support a manslaughter conviction may be weak and unconvincing, the existence
of any such evidence makes an instruction on manslaughter mandatory. 9 The
dissent reasoned that the jury could have rejected the defendant's testimony that
the shooting was accidental, yet still have believed that the defendant acted in
the heat of passion. 20 The dissent concluded that the trial court's action deprived
the defendant of his right to have the jury consider all the testimony, including
his own, in determining whether the evidence supported a conviction of murder,
a conviction of manslaughter, or an acquittal.2 '
Courts considering the availability of a lesser included offense instruction
malice. It is of two kinds: [1] Voluntary-Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. [2] Involuntary-
9 615 F.2d at 1295-97.
10 Id. at 1295.
11 Id. at 1297.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1298.
15 Id. at 1297. Chapman also appealed on the grounds that the use of the words "murder," "crime,"
and "crime scene" by law enforcement officials constituted reversible error. The Tenth Circuit unani-
mously rejected this argument. Id. at 1300.
16 Id. at 1300.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1301. Accord, Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1961).
20 615 F.2d at 1302-03.
21 Id. at 1302.
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have formulated several criteria for determining whether to give such an instruc-
tion.22 From these criteria two questions emerge: (1) Is the offense for which the
instruction is sought in fact a lesser included offense?23 (2) Is the evidence
presented sufficient to support a conviction of the lesser included offense? Be-
cause there was no question in Chapman that manslaughter was a lesser included
offense of murder, the court focused on whether the evidence presented at trial
could have supported a manslaughter conviction.
In Stevenson v. United States,24 the Supreme Court of the United States an-
nounced the federal standard for determining the amount of-evidence sufficient
to require a lesser included instruction. The defendant in Stevenson was convicted
of murder after the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the elements of
manslaughter.25 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating:
The evidence as to manslaughter need not be uncontradicted or in any way conclu-
sive upon the question; so long as there is some evidence upon the subject, the proper
weight to be given it is for the jury to determine. If there were any evidence which
tended to show such a state of facts as might bring the crime within the grade of
manslaughter, it then became a proper question for the jury to say whether the evi-
dence were true and whether it showed that the crime was manslaughter instead of
murder.
2 6
The Court further held that if there was any evidence to support a convic-
tion of a lesser included offense, a requested instruction on that offense was re-
quired even if the evidence supporting a conviction on the greater charge
appeared "simply overwhelming" to the trial court.2 7 Indeed, in setting forth the
facts in Stevenson, the Court noted that it had omitted some of the evidence show-
ing malice because it was merely seeking to determine whether any evidence
presented at trial could have supported a manslaughter conviction. 28 The Court
thus made it clear that when considering the appropriateness of a lesser included
offense instruction, the evidence supporting a conviction of the lesser crime must
be viewed independently of evidence to the contrary. The dissent in Chapman
recognized the Stevenson decision as controlling on this issue. 29
In 1973, the Supreme Court restated the quantum of evidence needed for a
lesser included instruction in Keeble v. United States,30 when it held that an instruc-
22 One highly regarded formulation, cited by the majority in Cha man, appears in United States v.
Thompson, 492 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1974). The court in Thompson held that a defendant is entitled to a
lesser included instruction when the following criteria are met: (1) a proper request is made; (2) the
elements of the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some
evidence that would justify conviction of the lesser offense; (4) the proof on the element or elements differ-
entiating the two crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant
innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense; and (5) there is mutality (ic., a charge may
be demanded by either the defendant or the government). Id. at 362.
23 This question has been the subject of considerable judicial debate. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop,
412 U.S. 346 (1976); United States v. Wallette, 580 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978)(involuntary manslaughter not
a lesser offense of reckless endangerment when the latter is a felony); Virgin Islands v. Carmona, 422 F.2d
95 (3d Cir. 1970) (manslaughter not necessarily an included offense in felony murder). Both Wallette and
Cannona are cited in Chapman. 615 F.2d at 1299.
24 162 U.S. 313 (1896).
25 Id. at 314.
26 Id. (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 315.
28 Id. at 316.
29 615 F.2d at 1302.
30 412 U.S. 205 (1973). The defendant in Keebte was convicted of assault with intent to commit seri-
ous bodily injury on an Indian reservation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153. On appeal, Keeble argued
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tion was required "if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [the
defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater."'3 t
The Chapman court erroneously interpreted Keeble as authorizing the trial
judge to consider evidence contrary to a lesser included conviction in determin-
ing whether an instruction should be given on that offense. Keeble provided no
indication of an intent to alter the "any evidence" standard announced in Steven-
son.32 Instead, Keeble preserved the old rule and merely emphasized that, based
on the evidence favoring the lesser conviction, a jury must rationally be able to
find guilt of the lesser, and not the greater, offense. This simply means that the
support for the lesser conviction must not be fallacious or founded upon wild
conjecture. Keeble did not, however, authorize the trial court to consider evidence
refuting a conviction of the lesser offense in determining what instructions are
proper. In fact, the only issue in Keeble was whether a lesser included instruction
was required where the trial court had jurisdiction over the greater, but not the
lesser, offense. 33 Had it not been for this jurisdictional question, the evidence
presented at trial would undisputedly have been sufficient to require the giving
of the requested instructions.3 4
The rule that there must be a rational basis for a conviction of the lesser
offense ensures that the jury's verdict will be based on the evidence rather than
on mercy or compromise.35 Therefore, although a court may be justified in refus-
ing to give an instruction on the grounds that no evidence presented could ra-
tionally support a conviction of a lesser offense, a court cannot be justified in
refusing an instruction on the grounds that the evidence supporting a conviction
is negated by other evidence. In the latter case the court does not determine
whether any evidence supporting the lesser offense exists for the jury to consider,
but rather it weighs the evidence.
As precedent for its holding that a defendant's exculpatory testimony can
justify refusing a lesser included instruction request, the majority in Chapman
cited United States v. Bevery 36 and United States v. Sinclair.3 7 However, any support
these cases provide the Chapman majority is weak at best.
The defendant in Beverly was convicted of possession with intent to dis-
that the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault constituted
reversible error. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that no error was committed because
simple assault was not one of the offenses enumerated in the statute conferring federal jurisdiction over
crimes committed on an Indian reservation. Accordingly, the matter was held to fall under tribal jurisdic-
tion. 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972). On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the requested instruction
was improperly refused. The Court reasoned that the giving of the instruction would not expand the
violated statutes or permit the federal government to infringe on tribal jurisdiction. 412 U.S. at 214.
31 412 U.S. at 208.
32 In fact, both the majority and the dissenting opinion in Chapman cite Keeble's expression of the
amount of evidence needed for a lesser included instruction as support. 615 F.2d at 1298, 1301.
33 412 U.S. at 206.
34 Id. at 208-09.
35 United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 25 (2d Cir. 1978); Kelly v. United States, 370 F.2d 227, 229
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967); United States v. Trujillo, 497 F.2d 408, 409 (10th Cir.
1974).
In determining when an instruction on a lesser included offense is required, the court must balance
the principle that fact-finding is the sole province of the jury with the principle that the jury is not free to
render a verdict in flagrant disregard of the proof. United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d 1149, 1153 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
36 562 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1977).
37 444 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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tribute cocaine after the trial judge refused his request for an instruction on sim-
ple possession.3s At his trial, Beverly admitted possessing the cocaine but denied
any intent to distribute it, claiming that an informant for the Drug Enforcement
Agency had given him the drugs and had asked him to keep them for a few
hours. 39 The Second Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to give the requested
instructions. The court reasoned that if the jury had believed Beverly's testi-
mony, entrapment would have existed as a matter of law and acquittal of both
simple possession and possession with intent to distribute would have been re-
quired.4° But the court further reasoned that if the jury had not believed Bev-
erly's testimony regarding his intent, he could only have been found guilty of the
greater crime since this testimony was the only evidence which could have sup-
ported a conviction of simple possession and an acquittal of possession with in-
tent to distribute.4 ' It was, therefore, legally impossible for Beverly to be found
guilty of simple possession.
In Chapman, on the other hand, evidence did exist independent of the de-
fendant's testimony which could have supported a conviction of the lesser offense.
Although acquittal would have resulted had the jury believed Chapman's testi-
mony that the shooting was an accident, the jury could conceivably have disbe-
lieved this testimony and nevertheless found that Chapman had acted in heat of
passion.42 Beverly thus fails to provide firm support for the holding in Chapman.
The defendant in Sinclair was convicted of burglary after the trial judge re-
fused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of unlawful entry. Al-
though the defendants in both Sinclair and Chapman gave exculpatory
testimony,43 only in Chapman did evidence exist that the lesser offense had been
committed. 44 Therefore, the Sinclair court did not uphold the refusal of the re-
quested instruction solely because of the defendant's testimony. Instead, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit reasoned:
[T]he refusal to give the lesser-included instruction is not error when defendant's
testimony is completely exculpatory and, if believed, could only lead to acquittal, and
the kind of reconstruction of events needed to support a lesser charge is neither fairly
inferable from the testimony nor pointed out by defense trial counsel.45
Thus, the defendant's testimony in Sinclair, unlike that in Chapman, was not held
to have negated any other evidence.
The crux of the Chapman decision is the Tenth Circuit's belief that the jury
need not consider the manslaughter issue if a conviction of that crime would be
inconsistent with the defendant's testimony. But a defendant's testimony is no
38 562 F.2d at 202-03.
39 Id. at 203.
40 Id. at 204.
41 Id.
42 615 F.2d at 1302 (dissenting opinion).
43 In Sinclair, the defendant testified that while driving during the 1968 Washington, D.C. riots he saw
clothes strewn on the sidewalk outside a clothing store. The defendant claimed that when he got out of the
car and started to pick up some of the clothing, a police officer approached, forced him into the store at
gunpoint and made him lie on the floor. 444 F.2d at 889 n.l.
44 Id. at 890. However, Judge Robinson, dissenting in Sinclair, argued that the evidence on the appel-
lant's intent upon entering the store was not so unequivocal that a finding that no criminal design accom-
panied it would have been "irrational." Id. at 893.
45 Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
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different from the testimony of any other witness: it may be believed in its en-
tirety, in part, or not at all by the jury.
In Belton v. United States,46 the District of Columbia Circuit, citing Stevenson,
held that a manslaughter instruction is required when there is "'any evidence
fairly tending to bear upon the issue of manslaughter,' however weak," and that
this evidence may exist "even though this depends on an inference of a state of
facts that is ascertained by believing defendant as to part of his testimony and
prosecution witnesses on other points in dispute."'47 The court upheld the trial
judge's refusal to give the instruction on the lesser included offense because no
evidence justifying such an instruction had been presented at trial.48
A court confronted with a defendant's exculpatory testimony must consider
whether any evidence exists which could support a lesser conviction if the jury
does not believe all or part of the defendant's claims. If such evidence exists, an
instruction must be made on the lesser offense. In United States v. Comer,4 9 the
defendant was convicted of murder after the trial judge refused to give a re-
quested instruction on manslaughter. Despite Comer's claim that he did not
even know the immediate circumstances surrounding the victim's death, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that a manslaughter instruction was "obviously"
required by the evidence.50 Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Chapman, the Comer
court recognized that a defendant's exculpatory testimony should not adversely
affect his right to a lesser included offense instruction.5 1 Writing for the majority,
Judge Wright stated:
Appellant's theory, of course, was that he did not commit the [fatal] act and,
therefore, he introduced no evidence to show that the act was committed with mal-
ice. It may be, however, that appellant's testimony concerning his wife's lover, the
police testimony of appellant's intoxication, and the autopsy evidence showing that
Mrs. Comer was intoxicated when she died do, in fact, provide "some evidence, how-
ever weak" tending to support a manslaughter charge.
52
Judge Wright further noted that malice is required to convict of second de-
gree murder but not of manslaughter.53 Because malice is a term of art, referring
to the defendant's state of mind at the time he acted, it can rarely be proved by
direct evidence, 54 even defendant's testimony. Instead, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Stevenson, "as no one can look into the heart or mind of another, the
only way to decide upon its condition at the time of the killing is to infer it from
the surrounding facts, and that inference is one of fact for a jury."' 55 Further, it is
not enough for the trial court to determine that no evidence presented explicitly
46 382 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The defendant ia Belton was convicted of first degree murder after
thejudge refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter. The defendant testified that he was not present at
the time the victim was shot. Id. at 155.
47 Id. at 155.
48 Id. at 156. The court noted, however, that "[i]f the trial court had been specifically apprised of the
reconstruction of events now put forward to us by appellate counsel, it would have been well advised to
give the manslaughter instruction." Id. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bazelon argued that a request for
an instruction should not depend on how well the lawyer constructed the facts at trial. Id. at 158.
49 421 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
50 Id. at 1155.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1154.
54 Id.
55 162 U.S. at 320.
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supports a. conviction of the lesser offense. The court must also determine
whether the evidence presented is capable of more than one interpretation.5 6 In
the words of Judge Wright, "[I]n a manslaughter case. . . the inquiry is whether
the evidence bearing on malice was so compelling and unequivocal on the issue
that a jury finding of no malice would be irrational. '5 7
Similarly, evidence raising an issue as to whether a crime was committed
may also raise an issue as to whether the crime that was committed was man-
slaughter or murder. 58 But in Chapman, once the jury disbelieved the defendant's
claim of accidental shooting, it was not able to consider whether the evidence
could justify a conviction of manslaughter because it had not been instructed on
that offense. Instead, the jury effectively had to convict the defendant of murder.
Regardless of what the evidence may have indicated, the jury had but two op-
tions: believe Chapman's testimony and acquit him, or disbelieve it and convict
him of murder. This limitation is inconsistent with the doctrine that the jury be
free to reach the verdict supported by the evidence.59
The trial court's refusal in Chapman to instruct on manslaughter is contrary
to the right of the defendant to an instruction on any theory of his case which is
supported by the evidence.60 The Tenth Circuit itself recognized this right in
1975 when it held: "Even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, incon-
sistent or of doubtful credibility, its presence requires an instruction on any the-
ory of defense. "61 This is true even if the defense theory is inconsistent with the
defendant's own testimony and requires the jury to believe part of the defend-
ant's testimony and part of the testimony of others before being able to accept
the theory as valid.62 The Chapman decision forces the defendant to exercise his
right to testify on his own behalf6 3 at the expense of his right to plead inconsis-
tent defenses.64 Further, under the Chapman rationale, in order to get a lesser
included offense instruction once the government has made a compelling case,
the defendant would be required not only to refute the evidence indicating the
commission of the greater offense, but also to (1) put forward evidence that he
was guilty of the lesser offense, and (2) refrain from presenting any exculpatory
56 United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d at 1154.
57 Id.
58 Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. at 322; Broughman v. United States, 361 F.2d 71, 72 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
59 E.g., United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1287 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. May, 419 F.2d
553, 554 (8th Cir. 1969).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Rabbit, 583 F.2d 1014, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979); Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 828 (10th Cir. 1968).
61 United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514, 523 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845 (1975).
While it may be argued that the defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction was not made
pursuant to a "theory of defense," this argument finds little support in the law. There is no indication that
the courts treat theories based upon lesser offenses any differently from theories which are fully exculpa-
tory. In short, the terms "theory of defense" and "theory of the case" are both used to denote the same
thing- the theory or theories put forward by the defendant at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Swinton, 521
F.2d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 1975)(two cases cited for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on any "theory of defense" finding support in the evidence; one case spoke of "theory of de-
fense" and the other spoke of "theory of his case").
62 E.g., United States v. Grady, 481 F.2d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Belton v. United States, 382
F.2d at 155; Womack v. United States, 336 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
63 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975).
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evidence. The defendant, in short, would be required to incriminate himself,
forgoing his right to argue that he was guilty of no crime at all.
The Tenth Circuit's holding in United States v. Chapman is an aberration in
the law. It lacks any significant statutory or case law support. The undesirability
of permitting a conviction of a lesser crime than is established by the evidence is
slight when compared to the risks involved in permitting the trial court to weigh
this evidence. Accordingly, it has been held that in close situations, the lesser
included offense instruction should be given. 65 In determining what jury instruc-
tions are proper, a court's consideration of inconsistencies between the defend-
ant's testimony and other evidence infringes upon the right of the defendant to
have a jury consider the evidence against him. Such conduct can also severely
inhibit the defendant in the presentation of his defense. In a legal system
designed to accord the criminal defendant every reasonable protection in defend-
ing himself against government prosecution, 66 these consequences are unaccept-
able.
Edward V Sommer
Environmental Law--A FEDERAL COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR Nui-
SANCE Is ALLOWED AGAINST AN IN-STATE POLLUTER OF INTERSTATE OR NAVI-
GABLE WATERS-llinois V. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980)*
In Illinois v. AIilwaukee, Ithe Supreme Court of the United States recognized
a federal common law cause of action to abate a nuisance resulting from the
pollution of interstate waters. The Court held that the State of Illinois was enti-
tled to bring a federal common law cause of action against four Wisconsin cities
to stop the pollution of Lake Michigan. The Court did not, however, establish
precise guidelines for application of this new body of federal common law, prefer-
ring instead to leave this difficult task to the lower courts.
Because the Supreme Court failed to define the limits of the federal common
law of nuisance, lower courts have had to decide whether the nuisance claim
exists in controversies involving (1) the pollution of intrastate waters, and (2) the
pollution of interstate waters by an in-state defendant. In Illinois v. Outboard
Mar'ne Corp. ,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed the second of these questions. The court held that a state has a federal
common law cause of action for nuisance against an in-state polluter "to prevent
the pollution of interstate or navigable waters."'3 The court further stated, how-
ever, that the federal common law also applies to controversies involving purely
intrastate waters. 4 This unnecessary extension of the court's decision has impor-
65 United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d at 1154; Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d at 156.
66 United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d at 985.
* Petition for cert. fl/ed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3043 (U.S. July 28, 1980) (No. 80-126).
1 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
2 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
3 Id at 623-24.
4 See id. at 627.
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tant implications for future suits involving pollution of intrastate waters, and
raises the specter of encroaching federalism.
In Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., the State of Illinois brought suit in a fed-
eral district court against Outboard Marine Corporation (O.M.C.), alleging that
O.M.C. had discharged highly toxic pollutants into the North Ditch,5 a tributary
of Lake Michigan. The complaint alleged that the pollutants impaired the use-
fulness of the lake as a public water supply and place of recreation, and
threatened the health and welfare of Illinois residents. The state sued under the
federal common law of nuisance and the Clean Water Act, 6 and made several
pendent claims based on Illinois law. The state sought injunctive relief re-
straining O.M.C. from discharging pollutants from its Waukegan facility, di-
recting O.M.C. to study removal and disposal methods for the accumulated
contaminated sediments, directing O.M.C. to remove and dispose of the contam-
inated sediments in the North Ditch, Waukegan Habor and Lake Michigan, and
requiring removal of contaminated soil. The state also sought civil penalties.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted O.M.C.'s motion to dismiss. The district court held that because the
case involved a controversy between two Illinois residents and because there was
no allegation of injury to or from another state, Illinois failed to state a claim
under the federal common law upon which relief could be granted. 7 The court
also dismissed the Clean Water Act claim because Illinois had failed to meet the
statute's notice requirements.8 Since the federal claims had been dismissed, the
district court rejected pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims.9
Illinois limited its appeal to the ruling on the federal common law claim.
The Seventh Circuit was asked to decide whether a state could use federal com-
mon law against one of its own citizens to abate the pollution of an interstate
body of water. The court held that a state 10 does have a federal common law
cause of action to prevent the pollution of interstate or navigable waters by in-
state defendants."I It then defined "navigable waters" as including purely intra-
state waters.12 Since Illinois had alleged the pollution of interstate rather than
navigable waters, this definition was superfluous. It is apparent, however, that
the Seventh Circuit was intent on expanding the availability of the federal com-
mon law cause of action well beyond the limits recognized in other circuits. The
5 The North Ditch flows into Waukegan Harbor, a boat harbor of Lake Michigan.
6 The "Clean Water Act" is the popular name of the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976).
7 The district court apparently assumed that the pollution of interstate waters had no extraterritorial
pollution effects.
8 The Clean Water Act requires a plaintiff to give the Environmental Protection Agency sixty days
notice prior to instituting a citizens' suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).
9 The United States also filed a complaint in federal district court against O.M.C., alleging pollution
by the defendant of the North Ditch, Waukegan Harbor, and Lake Michigan. The Attorney General of
Illinois filed a motion for leave to intervene in the federal suit, but the district judge denied the motion.
The intervention issues arising in the consolidated appeals are beyond the scope of this comment.
10 Since Illinois was the plaintiff in the suit, the Seventh Circuit did not have to consider whether a
private plaintiff is entitled to bring an action under the federal common law of nuisance. That issue,
however, will soon be addressed by the Supreme Court. In National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New
York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (1980) (No. 80-12), the Third Circuit
held that even a private plaintiff could bring an action under the federal common law of nuisance.
11 619 F.2d at 623-24.
12 Id at 627.
[Vol. 56:560]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
dictum defining navigable waters is therefore of greater importance than might
otherwise be the case.
Although Milwaukee involved the pollution of an interstate body of water,
the Supreme Court specifically referred to "interstate or navigable waters"
throughout its opinion. 13 The Seventh Circuit in OutboardMarine seized upon the
Supreme Court's use of the term "navigable waters" and expressed the view that
the term included both "territorial seas and purely intrastate waters having no
necessary interstate impact."1 4 In support of this broad definition, the court
noted that the term is also broadly defined in the Clean Water Act' 5 and in the
regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 6 The
EPA regulation, however, seems contrary to the court's definition of navigable
waters, since it defines the term to include only those waters which have some
effect, however attentuated, on interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit, al-
though requiring no "interstate impact," did not dismiss as immaterial the im-
pact on interstate commerce mandated by the regulation. Rather, the court
found nothing in the regulation's definition requiring an impact on the environ-
ment of another state. The court apparently accepted the definitions of naviga-
ble waters found in the EPA regulation' 7 and in the legislative history of the
13 406 U.S. at 99, 102, 104.
14 619 F.2d at 627.
15 The legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress intended that the term "navigable waters"
be given an expansive interpretation: "The conferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes." S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 144, reprnted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3776, 3822.
16 The Environmental Protection Agency promulgated the following definition of "navigable waters":
"Navigable waters" means "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."
This term includes:
(1) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to
use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide;
(2) Interstate waters, including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, and wetlands, the use, degradation or destruction of which would
affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes;
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign
commerce;
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate
commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as navigable waters under this para-
graph;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (t) (1)-(4) of this section, including adja-
cent wetlands; and
(6) Wetlands adjacent to waters identified in paragraphs (t)(1)-(5) of this section ("Wet-
lands" means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a fre-
quency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands gener-
ally included playa lakes, swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas such as sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, prairie river overflows, mudflats, and natural ponds);pnoi&d that waste
treatment systems (other than cooling ponds meeting the criteria of this paragraph) are not
waters of the United States. (Emphasis in original].
40 C.F.R. § 122.3(t) (1979). The term "navigable waters" is no longer used in the EPA regulations. It has
been replaced by the term "waters of the United States" with only minor wording changes in the defini-
tion. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1980).
17 If the EPA's definition of navigable waters were accepted as the guideline for determining when the
federal common law of nuisance could be applied, virtually every body of water in the United States
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Clean Water Act, and concluded that the Supreme Court must have realized the
implications of its use of the phrase "navigable waters."' 8
In Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Ageny 19 and Committee for the
Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train,20 two decisions noted in the
Outboard Marine opinion, two other courts of appeal implicitly rejected a broad
interpretation of the term "navigable waters." The plaintiff in Reserve Mining
alleged that the defendant was discharging asbestos fibers into the air at Silver
Bay, Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit, noting that only the air in Minnesota vil-
lages was affected, held that "federal nuisance law contemplates, at a minimum,
interstate pollution of air or water."'2 1 Similarly, the in-state plaintiffs in Jones
Falls alleged that the City of Baltimore was dumping raw sewage into a stream
flowing into the Patapsco River and from there into Cheasapeake Bay. The
plaintiffs failed, however, to allege any interstate effects of this pollution. The
Fourth Circuit, although recognizing a federal common law cause of action for
the abatement of nuisances which infringe upon another state's environmental
rights, held that no such cause of action existed for purely intrastate nuisances.2 2
The court indicated that the only federal interest in the pollution of intrastate
waters was expressed in the Clean Water Act.23
The Outboard Marine court found these two cases distinguishable from the
factual situation before it.24 The court observed that while the pollution in Re-
serve Mining and Jones Falls was found to have no interstate impact, the pollution
allegedly caused by O.M.C. affected Lake Michigan, an interstate body of water.
The court refused to rely solely on this distinction,2 5 however, and explicitly re-
jected the "extraterritorial pollution effects" requirement of Reserve Mining and
Jones Falls.26
The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee indicated that the federal interest
in preventing pollution of interstate bodies of water was an important factor in
allowing a federal common law claim.27 Recognizing that its decision would
turn on the broad policy considerations of Milwaukee, 28 the Seventh Circuit
stated the test to be "whether the dispute is a matter of federal concern." 29 It
indicated that there is a federal concern in the purity as well as the navigability
would be governed by the federal common law. For example, under 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(t)(3)(i) (1979),
navigable waters include those "which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recrea-
tional or other purposes." Thus, if sufficient damage were alleged, the owner of a small swimming pond
could bring an action under the federal common law of nuisance to abate the pollution of the pond caused
by his neighbor's cattle.
18 619 F.2d at 626. The Supreme Court may well not have realized the implications of its use of the
phrase "navigable waters," since the expanded definition of "navigable waters" did not develop until after
the Milwaukee decision. The Clean Water Act was enacted on October 18, 1972, six months after the
Milwaukee decision. The Environmental Protection Agency regulations were promulgated on July 1, 1973.
19 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
20 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
21 514 F.2d at 520.
22 539 F.2d at 1008-10.
23 Id. at 1009.
24 619 F.2d at 629.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 630.
27 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
28 619 F.2d at 626.
29 Id. at 630.
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of waters.3 0 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the rule of law applicable to the
pollution of interstate or navigable waters should be uniform31 and should not
depend upon whether extraterritorial pollution effects are shown to exist.32 The
court, therefore, went beyond what was necessary to decide the case before it,
involving pollution of interstate waters by an in-state polluter, and found a fed-
eral interest in virtually all waters.
In Erie R.R. . Thompkins ,3 the Supreme Court abolished the "federal gen-
eral common law." The federal courts were no longer to fashion their own sub-
stantive rules of law to apply to controversies over which federal jurisdiction was
based solely on diversity of citizenship. Instead, the federal courts were to apply
the state substantive law. However, in Hinderlider v. La Plata Co. ,34 decided the
same day as Erie, the Court left open the possibility of fashioning a "new federal
common law."' 35 The issue that has arisen since that time is: Under what cir-
cumstances is it proper to formulate this new federal common law?
It has been suggested that this issue be resolved by determining whether the
federal interest involved undermines or overrides the presumption in favor of
applying state law. 36 The presumption can be undermined by Congressional au-
thorization, by the need to remedy the breach of duties created by federal law, or
by matters involving national sovereignty.3 7 In each of these situations the rea-
sons for the presumption are absent. In other situations reasons for applying the
presumption exist, but circumstances justify overriding them. When a federal
common law is necessary to foster federal policies or promote uniformity, the
presumption can be properly overridden. 38
Water pollution disputes fall within one of three categories: (1) interstate
controversies affecting interstate waters; (2) intrastate controversies affecting in-
terstate waters; or (3) intrastate controversies affecting intrastate waters. The
federal interest in each of these categories must be examined to determine
whether the presumption favoring state law is justified.
Illinois v. Milwaukee3 9 is an example of a category one controversy: one state
sued municipalities of another state to prevent the pollution of interstate waters.
The Supreme Court noted that in cases involving the pollution of a body of
water such as Lake Michigan, it was appropriate to apply federal law.4° As the
Tenth Circuit recognized in an early federal nuisance suit, the federal common
law is an appropriate tool to prevent the "conflicting disputds, increasing asser-
30 Id. at 628.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 630.
33 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
34 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
35 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964). In
Hinderlider, the Supreme Court held that the question of apportionment of interstate waters is a question of
"federal common law" upon which state statutes or decisions are not conclusive. 304 U.S. at 110.
36 See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969). The justification for the pre-
sumption lies in (1) the desirability of local experimentation, and (2) the desirability of states providing
solutions closely tailored to local conditions. Id. at 1517. Federal common law might also undermine state
substantive policies or become a body of law in conflict with the surrounding bodies of state law. Id. at
1518.
37 Id. at 1520-23.
38 Id. at 1527-30.
39 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
40 Id. at 105 n.6.
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tions and proliferating contentions" which are more likely to arise when a state's
ecological conditions are impaired by outside sources.41 Because of the possibil-
ity of subjecting polluters to diverse bodies of pollution control laws, the law of
the state whose citizens42 were harmed by the interstate pollution should not be
allowed to govern the conduct of citizens in another state.43 The laws of the
offending state, however, may not adequately protect injured out-of-state citi-
zens.44 Since the reasons behind the presumption favoring state law are absent,
the presumption would be undermined in controversies between citizens of di-
verse states concerning the pollution of an interstate body of water.
Outboard Ma7ine is an example of a category two controversy: a state sued
one of its own, citizens for allegedly discharging pollutants into an interstate body
of water. Because this controversy was intrastate rather than interstate, the pre-
sumption favoring state law should not be undermined. On the other hand, the
federal interest in interstate waters and the need for a uniform rule might be
considered sufficiently important to justify overriding the presumption.
The Outboard Marine court relied on the federal interest in the purity of inter-
state waters in holding the federal common law of nuisance applicable. This
federal interest by itself, however, should not necessarily override the presump-
tion favoring state law. As one commentator has noted, "[o]therwise, the broad
spectrum of areas touched by federal interest would preempt state law so exten-
sively as to render the constraints of federalism meaningless. '45 Federal common
law ordinarily is fashioned where there is an overriding need for a uniform rule.4 6
The national policy favoring uniformity in pollution control matters is expressed
throughout the Clean Water Act.47 Since this statute allows states to adopt and
enforce standards more stringent than those required under the Act, the uniform-
ity envisioned by the statute is a "uniform floor."' 48 There is no reason to con-
clude, however, that the need for a uniform floor is insufficient to override the
presumption favoring state law.
Nevertheless, a uniform rule should not be established for the sake of uni-
formity alone; policy considerations must support adoption of such a rule. One
such policy consideration arises when the federal government is the plaintiff and
41 Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971).
42 The term "citizens" as used above includes states, other political subdivisions, and corporations.
43 See Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d at 1008.
44 Id.
45 Note, Federal Common Law and Intrastate Pollution, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 246, 256 (1977).
46 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964); See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447 (1942).
47 See 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1976) (establishing national goals for the elimination of pollution); 33
U.S.C. § 1316(c) (1976) (allowing state enforcement if the state's standards comply with federal regula-
tion); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2) (1976) (allowing the Administrator to enforce pollution limitations if a state
defaults); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976) (providing that no state standard may be less stringent than the federal
regulations).
48 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). The Act also allows the use of more stringent common law standards by
providing that nothing "shall restrict any right which any person ...may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or to seek any other relief. . . ." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e) (1976). This provision was the principle basis for the Seventh Circuit's holding in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3602 (1980) (No. 79-408), that the federal
common law of nuisance had not been pre-empted by the Clean Water Act. This case, the sequel to the
original Illinois v. Milwaukee case, probably arose because of the Supreme Court's remark that "[i]t may
happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal com-
mon law of nuisance." 406 U.S. at 107.
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is faced with the inconvenience of having to resort to the diverse anti-pollution
laws of the fifty states.49 The federal government should not be required to use
state law to abate pollution of waters in which it has an interest.50 Allowing the
use of the federal common law to abate pollution of interstate waters would also
help achieve some of the practical results listed in OutboardMarine. For example,
it would prevent polluters of interstate waters residing in different states from
hiding behind each other in the state forums.5 1 In addition, application of the
federal common law to all controversies affecting interstate waters would prevent
the anomaly that while other states surrounding a body of interstate water could
use federal law to abate the pollution, the very state in which the polluter resides
could not.52 When a state is suing any defendant for injuries to interstate water,
there is a clear and overriding federal interest in uniformity.53
The third category of water pollution disputes concerns intrastate controver-
sies affecting purely intrastate waters. State law is perfectly adequate for han-
dling these disputes. The application of state law to these situations fosters
legislative experimentation and allows states to forge solutions closely tailored to
local conditions. It would also be consistent with the policy of the federal system
to require state solutions whenever feasible.5 4
The Clean Water Act established federal control over "interstate and navi-
gable waters," and thus lends support to the argument that there is a federal
interest in preventing pollution of navigable intrastate waters.55 This federal in-
terest does not, however, extend beyond that expressed in the Act. 56 It appears
inconsistent to allow the federal government to regulate intrastate waters by stat-
49 Note, supra note 36, at 1530.
50 The federal government is entitled to bring suits under the federal common law of nuisance.
United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975);
United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (D. Vt. 1972), af'dme., 487 F.2d
1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
51 619 F.2d at 629-30. The OutboardMarine court hypothesized a situation in which two plants, lo-
cated in different states, poured the same type of pollutants into an adjacent body of water. If the federal
common law applied only when the pollution emanated from another state, a plaintiff would have to
bring one suit in state court and one in federal court. The Seventh Circuit was concerned that each
polluter would argue that most or all of the pollution harming the plaintiff was coming from the other
plant, and that therefore the plaintiff should be denied an injunction. Bringing a single action in one
forum would prevent the defendants from hiding behind each other in this manner.
52 619 F.2d at 629.
53 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972); National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York,
616 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3rd Cir. 1980); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
It is, however, questionable whether a uniform rule can ever be established using a common law
approach. Commentators have urged that the case-by-case adjudication of the federal common law of
nuisance would be inappropriate for establishing uniform rules. See, e.g., Note, Federal Common Law and
Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1972). The problems making uniformity difficult to achieve
via the common law include the necessity of focusing on the individual litigants, the technical competency
of the court, and the lack of common law actions brought in the environmental field. Note, supra note 45,
at 257-58 (1977). The reasons presented for not using a common law approach, however, arc not persua-
sive. Courts may set forth general rules of law even while considering the particular conflicts of individual
litigants. Federal common law nuisance cases would doubtless be less complex than many antitrust cases
now heard by the courts. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1974). More
environmental cases will likely be brought as a result of the availability of the federal common law nui-
sance remedy in suits by private parties. See National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d
1222 (3rd Cir.), cert granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3281 (1980) (No. 80-12).
54 Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalim: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 545 (1954).
55 See Note, Application of Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance to Intrastate Stream Pollution, 18 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 929 (1977).
56 See 539 F.2d at 1009.
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ute but not to allow the same waters to be governed by federal common law.
Congress can regulate the waterways because of the expansive reach of the com-
merce clause; the federal courts, however, are more limited. They are justified in
using federal common law only because of the interstate nature of the dispute,
not because the matters involve interstate commerce in the constitutional sense. 57
The limited federal interest in disputes involving intrastate waters is conse-
quently insufficient to override the presumption favoring state law.
In its conclusion, the Outboard Marine court set forth the standard for deter-
mining when federal common law should be applied to water pollution contro-
versies. Under the court's standard, common law is to be applied whenever the
dispute is a matter of federal concern.58 Although this standard focuses on the
central issue, it fails to distinguish between a mere federal concern and an over-
riding federal concern. The court's definition of "navigable waters" as including
"both the territorial seas and purely intrastate waters having no necessary inter-
state impact" 59 could lead lower courts to conclude that there is an overriding
federal interest in all pollution cases.
The result reached by the Outboard Marine court was correct. The plaintiff
alleged the pollution of an interstate body of water; the court found that federal
common law of nuisance should apply. The court should, however, have relied
exclusively on the interstate nature of the waters allegedly affected by the defend-
ant's actions and found extraterritorial pollution effects. The groundwork which
the court laid for applying the federal common law of nuisance to all future
water pollution controversies was both unnecessary and unfortunate. Pollution
of purely intrastate waters is exclusively a matter of state concern, and the con-
straints of federalism demand that state law alone apply in addressing that con-
cern.
Ronaldj_ Ehinger
Government Contracts-STATES ARE FREE TO LOOK TO THE SMALL BUSINESS
ACT AS A STANDARD IN DETERMINING WHETHER A SUCCESSFUL BIDDER FOR A
SET-ASIDE CONTRACT COMMITTED FRAUD OR WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT
THE EXPENSE OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL BIDDER-conco .JenSen Construction Co., 622
F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1980).
Congress enacted the Small Business Act (SBA)I to help small businesses
57 Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 n.15 (D. Conn. 1976), a fdsub nor East End Yacht
Club v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977); see Note, The Casefor a Federal Common Law ofAircrafl
Disaster Litigation, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 231, 243 n.84 (1976).
58 619 F.2d at 630.
59 Id. at 627.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-637 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the "SBA" or the "Act"]. The SBA's stated
purpose is to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect ... the interests of small business concerns." Id § 631. The
Small Business Administration was created to carry out the policies of the SBA. Id § 633(a). The Admin-
istrator is authorized to "make such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the authority
vested in him. .. ." Id § 634(b)(6). Pursuant to this authority, the Small Business Administration Reg-
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compete for government contracts. 2 Under the SBA, qualified small businesses
are eligible for contracts set aside specifically for their bidding.3 Because of the
preferential treatment accorded small businesses in awarding set-aside contracts,
disputes often arise concerning a bidder's status as a small business. Although
the regulations implementing the SBA are designed to prevent ineligible bidders
from receiving set-aside contracts, 4 they do not expressly create a cause of action
for unsuccessful bidders against a successful bidder even if the successful bidder is
subsequently ruled ineligible for the contract by the Small Business Administra-
tion.5 Likewise, the federal courts have refused to find an implied cause of action
under the SBA, because allowing such suits could hinder the "expeditious admin-
istration of government contracts." 6 Nevertheless, in Iconco v. Jensen Construction
Co. ,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that despite
the absence of an express or implied federal cause of action, an unsuccessful bid-
der may sue an ineligible successful bidder under state common law doctrines of
fraud and unjust enrichment.8
On December 16, 1974, after accepting at face value Jensen's self-certifica-
tion as a small business, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded Jensen a con-
tract.9 No protests challenging Jensen's small business status were filed before
the contract's award. Several days following the award, however, in connection
with a separate project, Jensen's status as a small business was rejected.' 0 Learn-
ing of Jensen's disqualification, Iconco demanded that the contracting officer ter-
minate Jensen's contract. The contracting officer refused and advised Iconco the
ulations, 13 C.F.R. §§ 101-131 (1980) implement the SBA. The regulations include procedures for han-
dling size disputes among bidders. Id §§ 121.3-5 to 3-6.
2 The legislation noted that competition was the essence of the American economic system and that
expansion of this competition was necessary to ensure the security of the country. By aiding small busi-
nesses in receiving federal contracts, Congress intended to preserve competition and strengthen the over-all
economy of the nation. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976). Furthermore, 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-1(b)(2)(ii) states'that the
principal reason for discrimination in favor of small business is that "there is a segment of each industry
wherein concerns by reason of their size are at a competitive disadvantage."
3 To effectuate the purpose of the SBA, small businesses are given preferential treatment on contracts
determined, by both the Small Business Administration and the contracting government agency, to be
suitable for performance by a small business. These determinations are made for the purpose of assuring
that a fair proportion of government contracts are placed with small businesses. 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1976).
Such contracts are customarily referred to as small business set-aside contracts.
4 The regulations provide that a bidder may challenge the status of any other bidder by filing a
written protest with the government contracting officer within five days of the bid opening. 13 C.F.R.
§ 121.3-5(a) (1980). A late protest will not be considered in awarding the outstanding contract. Id
5 See Tracy, Foni and Remediesfor Disappointed Bidders on Federal 6ovoenrmnt Contracts, 10 PUB. CONT.
LJ. 92 (1978). This article discusses the remedies available to unsuccessful bidders on government con-
tracts. It also provides a listing of forums available to complaintants, including the procurement agencies,
the General Accounting Office, and the federal courts.
6 See, e.g., Savini Constr. Co. v. Crooks Bros. Constr. Co., 540 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1974); Mid-West
Constr., Ltd. v. United States, 387 F.2d 957 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Royal Serv's., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361
F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966); Northland Equities, Inc. v. Gateway Center Corp., 441 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
7 622 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1980).
8 Id at 1295.
9 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-8 (1980) provides that "in the absence of written protest or other information
which would cause him to question the veracity of the self-certifieation, the contracting officer shall accept
the self-certifieation at face value for the particular procurement involved."
10 The Corps received a protest from Orvedahl Construction Co. questioning the status of Jensen as a
small business. The Corps forwarded the protest to the Small Business Administration. Meanwhile, the
contracting officer handling the current procurement did not know of the protest and awarded the con-
tract to Jensen. Two days later the contracting officer was notified of Jensen's ineligibility by the Small
Business Administration. Since it was received after the award was made, the notification had no legal
effect on the procurement involved. 622 F.2d at 1293-94.
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contract was valid since no protest had been filed prior to the award.II Iconco
then wrote Jensen and demanded that Jensen relinquish the contract. Jensen
refused and completed the work. Ignoring an administrative remedy,' 2 Iconco
filed suit against Jensen in federal district court.
Iconco alleged Jensen had fraudulently misrepresented itself as a small busi-
ness, thereby obtaining a contract to which it was not entitled, resulting in Jen-
sen's unjust enrichment at Iconco's expense. Jensen denied Iconco's allegations
arguing the federal courts had established that an unsuccessful bidder for a small
business set-aside contract had no claim against a successful bidder not qualify-
ing as a small business.' 3 The jury awarded Iconco $61,503 on its claim of unjust
enrichment and $40,000 on its claim of fraud. The district court set aside the
award for fraud, finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict. 14 In sus-
taining the unjust enrichment award, the court held the remedy provided under
Iowa common law would neither interfere with the objectives of the SBA nor
obstruct the efficient administration of the federal procurement process.' 5 The
district court reasoned that providing a remedy to protect a bidder not knowing
of another bidder's ineligibility until the protest period had lapsed would only
further the congressional aim of aiding small businesses.' 6 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit unanimously affirmed.'
7
The Eighth Circuit's decision focuses on federal preemption. Because the
SBA does not expressly preempt state remedies, the court had to determine
whether Congress had impliedly prohibited states from looking to the SBA for
guidance in fashioning state common law.' The court stated that without find-
ing a "clear and manifest" congressional purpose to "deny Iowa the right to vin-
dicate its overriding state interest in redressing unjust enrichment and fraud,"
Iowa could not be found to have been prohibited from looking to the SBA. 9
However, although Iowa had "great latitude" in fashioning its common law, it
could not do so in a manner inconsistent with congressional objectives. 20 But the
court found no inconsistency between the lower court's ruling and the SBA's
objectives. The court agreed with the district court that the remedy provided
would promote the achievement of congressional objectives by preventing un-
qualified bidders from benefiting from contracts to which they were never enti-
tled.2 '
A broad federal standard for interpreting the SBA's objectives was first set
out in Savini Construction Co. v. Crooks Brothers Construction Co. 22 In Savini, the Ninth
11 Set note 4 supra.
12 General Accounting Office Regulations, 4 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-.10 (1974) (current version at 4 C.F.R.
§§ 20.1-.10 (1980)), allow parties to protest awards to the General Accounting Office (GAO). If appropri-
ate, the regulations allow the Comptroller General to consider a late protest. A decision by the GAO that
the award was illegal can result in a recommendation the contract be cancelled.
13 Record at 416, Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291 (1980).
14 622 F.2d at 1293.
15 Record at 418-20, Iconco v. Jenson Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291 (1980).
16 Id at 419.
17 622 F.2d 1291, 1304 (8th Cir. 1980). Judge Arnold presided; Judge Heaney and District Judge
Wright, sitting by designation, joined in the opinion.
18 Id at 1296.
19 Id (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
20 Id
21 Id at 1299.
22 540 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1974). The .. avini facts resembled those in Iconco. Savini had challenged
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Circuit held the SBA provides no implied cause of action for lost profits.23 Ac-
cording to the court, Congress did not intend to "benefit small business at any
cost."12 4 Congress' primary purpose for enacting procurement legislation was to
insure the expeditious administration of government contracts. 25 Where award-
ing a contract to a small business facilitates expeditious administration, the set-
aside program insures the award will be made.26 However, where an award ob-
structs expeditious administration, the "by-product" derived from helping small
businesses must yield.2 7 The court reasoned that the possibility of subjecting a
bidder to a suit for profits after the contracting officer determines the public
interest is best served by proceeding with an award, despite a subsequent finding
of ineligibility, would likely cause disruptions and delays inconsistent with con-
gressional objectives. 28
The Iconco court analyzed the congressional purpose from a perspective un-
like the Savin" court's. 29 In Iconco, the Eighth Circuit isolated the SBA from the
general scheme of procurement legislation. Although both courts emphasized
aid to small business and efficient administration of government procurement,
the Iconco court placed a greater emphasis on aid to small business than had the
Savini court. The conco court stated that in enacting the SBA, one of Congress'
primary goals was to insure that small businesses receive a "fair proportion of
government contracts so that they might compete on an equal footing with large
concerns." 30 According to the court, recognizing Iconco's cause of action would
promote the achievement of this congressional goal.3 1 However, like the Savini
court the Iconco court also recognized that Congress intended to insure govern-
ment contracts were performed in a "timely and competent manner."'3 2 But the
court brushed off as "speculative" Jensen's contention that allowing the suit
would thwart congressional objectives in the area. 33 Jensen contended the threat
of legal action would discourage businesses from bidding or would cause a suc-
cessful bidder to delay beginning work knowing he may be deprived of his profits
after performance. 34 According to the court the "mere threat of legal action,
without more, would not be sufficient to discourage either submission of bids or
the acceptance of contracts."3 5 Moreover, the court emphasized that "the legal
action involved here, even when it succeeds, does not interfere with the work
Crooks' status as a small business prior to the contract award, but the Small Business Administration
found Crooks to be a small business. Savini appealed the decision to the Small Business Administration.
But while the appeal was pending, the contracting officer awarded the contract to Crooks because an
emergency procurement was involved. After the valid award was made, the Small Business Administra-
tion ruled that Crooks was ineligible to qualify as a small business. Savini then brought an action against
Crooks for fraud in misrepresenting the company as a small business and for lost profits.
23 Id at 1359.




28 Id at 1359.
29 See note 22 supra.
30 622 F.2d at 1298.
31 Id
32 Id





contracted for" because it takes place after the contract is performed.3 6
konco conflicts with the decisions of other circuits. 3 7 Prior to Iconco, courts
had consistently ruled that allowing an unsuccessful bidder to sue a successful,
though ineligible, bidder would violate federal policy by impairing the efficiency
of the federal procurement system. However, because they dealt with the right to
a private remedy under federal and not state law, the konco court found none of
the previous cases controlling. 38 The Eighth Circuit failed to recognize, however,
that the rationale for disallowing a remedy directly under the SBA applied
equally to a state law remedy. There is little, if any, substantive difference be-
tween a remedy fashioned in district court applying federal law and a remedy
fashioned in a district court diversity action applying state law according to the
same federal standards. Thus, kconcor' true conflict concerns whether a state law
remedy fashioned according to SBA standards comports with Congress' procure-
ment objectives. A satisfactory resolution of such a conflict requires analysis
under the doctrine of preemption.
The United States Constitution and the laws of the United States are the
supreme law of the land.39 When state laws conflict with federal laws, federal
law prevails.40 A state does not have the power to "retard, impede, or burden"
the operation of federal laws.4 1 Furthermore, a state law may not produce a
result which "frustrate[s]" the purpose of the federal law or "impair[s] the effi-
ciency" of federal agencies or the agencies' ability to discharge their duties.4 2
Applying basic preemption principles to the konco decision illustrates how the
decision frustrates the purpose of federal law and impairs the efficiency of the
federal procurement system.
By definition the federal procurement scheme is exclusively federal. The
system must remain exclusively federal to maintain a uniform character.
"[C]onstruction of the procurement provisions is a matter of federal, not state,
law."'43 The kconco decision allows each state to mold the federal procurement
process according to its own common law doctrine. Divergent state adjudica-
tions impeding the efficient administration of federal procurement will result. If
the more than ninety district courts are allowed to interpret different state com-
mon law doctrines according to the SBA's standards, the certainty and uniform-
ity engendered by the present federal procurement scheme will vanish.
Also, the state remedy provided by the Iconco court, much like the remedy
denied in Savini44 and Northland Equities, Inc. v. Gateway Center Corporation5, fur-
36 Id
37 Se note 6 supra.
38 622 F.2d at 1299.
39 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2 provides in part: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme law of the land; and Judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwith-
standing."
40 Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 240 (1967).
41 Id
42 Id
43 Royal Serv's., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86, 91 (5th Cir. 1966).
44 540 F.2d 1355. &e note 22 supra.
45 441 F. Sup. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Northland Equities, an unsuccessful bidder, brought an action
against Gateway, the successful bidder, alleging that Gateway received the government lease under cir-
cumstances which violated federal procurement statutes and regulations. The court held the federal pro-
curement statutes and regulations do not confer a private case of action for damages.
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nishes an "irresistible disincentive" to an unsuccessful bidder's pursuing adminis-
trative remedies in a timely manner.46 The Northland Equities court, relying on
Savini, denied an unsuccessful bidder a remedy under the SBA partly because the
unsuccessful bidder failed to invoke a remedy in a timely manner. 47 The court
stated that providing a remedy would encourage "speculative plaintiffs" to wait
until the contract is performed before attacking the propriety of the initial
award."'4 8 The Iconco decision will encourage such behavior. The Eighth Circuit
held that "the Iowa law of unjust enrichment imposes no prerequisite akin to
exhaustion of administrative remedies."'4 9 Because administrative remedies do
not allow recovery of lost profits, it will be to the economic advantage of unsuc-
cessful bidders to forego the less lucrative administrative remedies and file suit in
federal court. Furthermore, the decision could lead to the generation of windfall
profits for "unsuccessful" bidders. For example, an unsuccessful bidder might
maximize his profits by engaging in other work during the performance of the
challenged contract. Upon the challenged contract's completion, the unsuccess-
ful bidder could then sue for unjust enrichment. The successful plaintiff would
reap not only the profits from the challenged contract, but also the normal profits
obtained from the other work.
The Iconco decision could also obstruct the performance of government con-
tracts. Because prior to Iconco the federal courts had denied unsuccessful bidders
a private remedy against a successful bidder, successful bidders were insulated
from interference by third parties and could rely on the contracting officer's deci-
sions controlling administration of the contract.50 The kconco court, however, dis-
regarded the contracting officer's determination that the contract was valid and
binding between the government and the successful bidder.5 ' Iconco was al-
lowed to recover for unjust enrichment even though the contracting officer had
ruled there was a valid contract. As a result, successful bidders will have to per-
form despite potential conflicts between the authority of contracting officers act-
ing under the procurement regulations and the authority of courts determining
the respective rights of bidders under state common law doctrines. Although a
contracting officer's decision will still be binding between the government and
the successful bidder, it will not protect the successful bidder from an unsuccess-
ful bidder's suit for lost profits. As the Savini court pointed out, if the successful
bidder knows that because of a post-award dispute over qualification he may be
subjected to a suit for his profits, the successful bidder might refuse to continue
work pending the dispute's resolution.5 2 However, even if the successful bidders
do continue performance, the possibility of loss of profits at the conclusion of the
project may affect the quality and promptness of performance.
In conclusion, due regard for uniformity in applying federal regulations re-
46 Id at 263.
47 Id
48 Id The court also stated this remedy would "wreak havoc on procurement. To be compatible with
statutory goals, a remedial scheme must guarantee that the proper bidder can still be selected." Id
49 622 F.2d at 1302.
50 Contracting officers are delegated considerable discretion in settling disputes arising under federal
contracts. Unless appealed, decisions of contracting officers are binding on the parties.
51 622 F.2d at 1302.
52 540 F.2d at 1359.
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quires a finding of preemption when state law conflicts with legitimate congres-
sional objectives. The Iconco decision conflicts with the congressional objective of
ensuring efficient administration of the federal procurement system. Congress
itself has enacted detailed legislation and established administrative agencies to
resolve disputes. Allowing the courts to apply SBA standards in fashioning state
common law remedies would generate all the undesired results the preemption
doctrine was designed to prevent. The basic aim of procurement legislation-
expeditious administration-would be frustrated by the inevitably inconsistent
state decisions which will result from decisions like Iconco. The Eighth Circuit's
decision in Iconco should be reversed.
Craig L. Jones
LOalS-TRUTH IN LENDING--A DE MINIMIs DEFENSE Is NOT AVAILABLE TO A
LENDER FOR A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF REGULATION Z-Villanueva v. Motor
Town, Inc., 619 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Truth in Lending Act1 (the Act) is intended to provide consumers with
information about the cost of consumer credit and to protect consumers against
unfair credit practices. 2 The courts have disagreed as to whether the language of
the Act should be interpreted strictly or liberally. 3 The problem of statutory
interpretation is especially acute in suits involving bona fide, technical errors,
where strict enforcement creates inequitable results. Borrowers bringing suit
under the Act are not motivated solely by a desire to recover out-of-pocket ex-
penses; the Act provides that successful plaintiffs may recover twice the finance
charge, actual damages, attorney's fees and costs of the action.4
In Villanueva v. Motor Town, Inc. ,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit enforced a borrower's claim based on a $1.76 error even though
the lender's error had been made in good faith and was quickly corrected upon
discovery. The court held that it was required to enforce strictly the specific
provisions of the Act, and refused to absolve the lender of its technical, de
minimis6 violation.
In December, 1975, plaintiff Ben Green entered into a retail installment
contract with Deluxe Motors, Inc. (Deluxe) for the purchase of a used automo-
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) provides:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition
among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer
credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results
from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to
assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
3 See text accompanying notes 23-25 infra.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
5 619 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1980).
6 Under the de minimis doctrine the law refuses to take notice of very small or trifling matters. "De
minimis" will be used in this comment to describe a violation of the Truth in Lending Act which results in
a very small difference in the cost of credit to the borrower.
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bile. The financing contract disclosed an annual percentage rate of 30.09% and a
finance charge of $169.44. The first installment payment was due four days after
execution of the contract and the remaining payments were due at weekly inter-
vals. In November, 1976, Deluxe became aware that the short first payment pe-
riod, found in many of its financing contracts, violated Regulation Z,7
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board under the authority of the Act.
Within fifteen days of this discovery, Deluxe mailed one thousand notices to cus-
tomers whose accounts were affected. 8 The notice mailed to Green stated that
"[tihe annual percentage rate stated should have been 30.48% as computed on an
actuarial basis and the finance charge should have been $167.68, instead of
30.09% and $169.44, respectively." 9 Green never received this notice due to a
change of address. 10
When he learned of the changed terms in his financing contract, Green filed
suit against Deluxe and its parent corporation alleging violations of the Truth in
Lending Act, Regulation Z and two corresponding state statutes.I l Green al-
leged that Deluxe misstated the annual percentage rate in the financing contract
and that the method used to compute the annual percentage rate had not met
the statutory requirements. 12 Deluxe answered that its correction of the errors
within the fifteen day statutory grace period absolved it of liability. 13
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found
that Green's suit, based as it was upon a $1.76 error, constituted an abuse of the
Truth in Lending Act. 14 The court stated that the violation asserted by Green
was de minimis and that to allow such a spurious claim would ultimately weaken
the Act. Furthermore, the court found that by correcting its error within the
fifteen day statutory grace period, Deluxe had established a viable defense under
section 1640(b) of the Act.15
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court. 16 Writing for the
court, Judge Dumbauld 17 stated that the district court was without discretion in
adjudicating Truth in Lending violations' 8 and held that the court erred in al-
lowing a de minimis defense. The court also reversed the district court's holding
that defendants had established a section 1640(b) defense. 19 Despite its strict
7 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1980).
8 Brief for Appellant at 8, Villanueva v. Motor Town, Inc., 619 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1980).
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id.
II ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 401, 561 (1967).
12 Green v. Deluxe Motors, Inc., No. 76 C 4538 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1979).
13 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) provides:
A creditor has no liability under this section if within fifteen days after discovering an error,
and prior to the institution of an action under this section or the receipt of written notice of the
error, the creditor notifies the person concerned of the error and makes whatever adjustments in
the appropriate account are necessary to insure that the person will not be required to pay a
finance charge in excess of the amount of percentage rate actually disclosed.
14 The district court stated that the claim constituted "not only an imposition upon the defendants,
but also on the court and the public." Green v. Deluxe Motors, Inc., No. 76 C 4538 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18,
1979).
15 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
16 619 F.2d at 632.
17 Senior District Judge of the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
18 619 F.2d at 634.
19 Although the court acknowledged that § 1640(b) allowed lenders fifteen days to correct errors in
the disclosure of credit terms, it held that the defense was available to a lender only for a "downward"
adjustment of the disclosed terms to the benefit of the borrower. 619 F.2d at 635.
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statutory interpretation, the Seventh Circuit in Villanueva was sympathetic to the
concerns of the district court. The court recognized that, as a practical matter,
the technical error made by Deluxe was not significant enough to cause even a
discriminating borrower to divert his business.20 It also recognized that the pur-
pose of the Truth in Lending legislation was to eradicate the deliberately mis-
leading techniques practiced by some fraudulent creditors.21 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the statute's specific provisions could not be disregarded in
an effort to promote its policies. 2
2
Before Villanueva, five courts of appeals had examined a lender's liability for
minor technical violations of the Truth in Lending Act. Four of these courts
interpreted the Act strictly, imposing liability inflexibly once a violation was
found. 23 One appellate court interpreted the Act liberally, considering the indi-
vidual merits of the plaintiffs claim before imposing liability.24 Several district
courts also employed the liberal approach, criticizing the use of the Truth in
Lending Act as an instrument to harass creditors for harmless mistakes. 25
The Cases. Charles v. Krauss Co. 26 involved the purchase of household furni-
ture through a retail installment contract. Although the defendant Krauss Co.
had made the required disclosures, it had made them on both sides of the con-
tract document in violation of Regulation Z. The Fifth Circuit, interpreting the
Truth in Lending Act as a prophylactic measure, held that liability resulted from
even as minute a deviation from the statutory strictures as this. 27
Barber v. Kimbrels, Inc. 28 also involved a retail installment contract for the
purchase of household furniture. Although the defendant had made the required
disclosures, its disclosure document used the term "Total Time Balance" rather
than "Total of Payments," as required by Regulation Z. The Fourth Circuit
held that the failure to use the Act's prescribed terminology constituted a viola-
tion of the Act for which the defendant could be held liable, even though the
plaintiffs had nowhere claimed that they had not understood the terms of the
credit agreement. 29
20 619 F.2d at 633.
21 Id. at 634.
22 Id.
23 See Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977); Barber v. Kimbrell's,
Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978); Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976); Charles v.
Krauss Co., 572 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1978); McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1978); Pennino v.
Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1976); Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1976); Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1976); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495
F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
24 See Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975).
25 See Jennings v. Edwards, 454 F. Supp. 770 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 452
F. Supp. 465 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1978);
Augusta v. Marshall Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Ivey v. HUD, 428 F. Supp. 1337
(N.D. Ga. 1977); George v. General Fin. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. La. 1976).
26 572 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1978).
27 The Fifth Circuit's holding in Charks was consistent with its reasoning in Truth in Lending actions,
McGowan v. King, Inc., 569 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1978); Pennino v. Morris Kirsehman & Co., 526 F.2d 367
(5th Cir. 1976); Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976); Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 537 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1976), but is not reflective of the discord among the district courts within
the circuit, Ivey v. HUD, 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1977); George v. General Fin. Corp., 414 F. Supp.
33 (E.D. La. 1976); Welmaker v. W. T. Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Buford v. American
Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
28 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978).
29 The dissent in Barber criticized the court's "mechanical and insensitive" application of the Act,
labeling the court's pedantic construction "unrealistic." 577 F.2d at 228.
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In Gennuso v. Commercl Bank and Trust Co. ,30 the Third Circuit addressed the
issue of minor technical violations of the Truth in Lending Act. Gennuso's claim
arose out of a financing contract for the purchase of a new car. Since the con-
tract was contained on two documents, the court held that the lender had failed
to meet the one side document requirement of Regulation Z. The court recog-
nized that the lender had not demonstrated egregious misconduct 3' and ac-
knowledged that imposing liability would be highly inequitable.32 Nevertheless,
the court reasoned that the specific requirements of the Act dictated the imposi-
tion of liability.33
In Eby v. Reb Realy, Inc. ,34 the plaintiff Eby brought suit under the Act after
defaulting on a contract with the defendant for the purchase of residential prop-
erty. Eby claimed that the defendant had failed to disclose her recission rights as
required by the Truth in Lending Act. The Ninth Circuit held that the Act is a
remedial statute designed to permit borrowers to make informed judgments
about the use of credit. To effectuate this congressional purpose, the court rea-
soned that it was required to construe strictly the provisions of the Act. The
plaintiff was consequently allowed to recover from the defendant for a technical
violation even though the plaintiff was the party who had failed to perform the
agreement.
The Tenth Circuit in Redhouse v. Qualioy Ford Sales, Inc. ,35 followed a liberal
approach in its interpretation of the Act. The two plaintiffs, native Indians who
were not fluent in English, contracted to purchase a truck from the defendant car
dealer and brought a class action against the defendant for noncompliance with
the disclosure requirements of the Act. The court held that since the plaintiffs
did not read the contracts prior to their execution, the omission of information
required by the Truth in Lending Act could not have affected their decision to
enter into the credit contract. The court found that the Act should be liberally
construed and should not be enforced so as to constitute a means of harassment,
oppression, or unjust enrichment. This decision emphasized the stated purpose
of the Act rather than the technical requirements of its language.
In addition to the Tenth Circuit, various district courts have indicated sup-
port for the liberal approach by protecting lenders from obscure technical viola-
tions of the Act.3 6 George v. General Finance Corp. 37 and jennings v. Edwards38 are
leading cases in which federal district courts have refused to impose liability on
lenders for de minimis or technical violations of the Act. In George, a two dollar
30 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 440.
33 Id. at 443.
34 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
35 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975).
36 See notes 37 and 38 infra and Sharp v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 452 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (no
violation where manufacturer had been identified as an assignee rather than as a co-creditor); Dzadovsky
v. Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (no violation where defendant failed to use the
prescribed terms of Regulation Z; plaintiff had been fully informed about and completely understood the
credit terms); Ivey v. HUD, 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (no violation where defendant failed to
disclose accurately the total amount of payments; $11.30 error held not material); Augusta v. Marshall
Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (no violation where defendant failed to disclose the identity
of the creditor upon assignment of the contract).
37 414 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. La. 1976).
38 454 F. Supp. 770 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
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charge for official fees and a seventy-five cent charge for notary fees were not
itemized as part of the finance charge disclosed to the plaintiff. The court in
George held that while the Truth in Lending Act was to be interpreted for the
protection of the borrowers, it was not to be read as a maze of obscure technical
pitfalls for lenders. The court reasoned that although the amount set forth on the
disclosure form did not conform precisely to the regulations, Congress had not
intended a violation to result from an omission of a charge of $2.75.
The court inJennings refused to impose liability upon a lender acting in good
faith, holding that charges made by the lender as a cost of doing business were
not required to be disclosed as part of the finance charge. Therefore, the defend-
ants were not liable for failure to itemize the four dollar fee. TheJennings court
found that even if the administrative fees and discount should have been item-
ized, such a violation of the Truth in Lending Act was de minimis and did not
justify the imposition of liability.
The Basis For The Strict Approach. The strict statutory approach adopted by
the Villanueva court and the majority of appellate courts39 finds support in the
language of the Truth in Lending Act. The Act was promulgated to protect
consumers from the confusingly disparate and at times fraudulent practices of
some lenders. 40 The Act places the burden upon lenders to clearly disclose credit
terms to borrowers, and subjects violators to possible criminal and civil penal-
ties. 4 ' The statute gives regulatory power to the Federal Reserve Board which
promulgated Regulation Z, 4 2 currently filling 43 pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations. This single regulation has produced over 1,495 staff rulings and
interpretations. 43 The voluminous provisions, regulations and interpretations as-
sociated with the Truth in Lending Act provide a complex disclosure scheme
which lenders must precisely follow. The courts of appeals following the strict
approach reason that since Congress expressly authorized the Federal Reserve
Board to promulgate detailed procedures, it intended those procedures to be
strictly applied. These courts conclude that even technical violations of the Act
are sufficient to subject the lender to civil liability.
The Basis For The LiberalApproach. Support for the liberal approach, used by
the Tenth Circuit" and by several district courts, 45 is found in the underlying
policy of the Truth in Lending Act-to insure meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that consumers can avoid the uninformed use of credit. The Act focuses
upon promoting accurate disclosure of annual interest rates and total finance
charges. The courts exercising the liberal approach emphasize that the Act's pur-
39 See note 23 supra.
40 In addressing the need for truth in lending legislation, Senator Proxmire stated:
Today the average consumer is faced with a bewildering variety of credit rates and terms. ...
As a result of these confusing practices, some segments of the credit industry have been able to
charge truly exorbitant rates with relative impunity.
Frequently, these high rates are levied upon the low income groups who can least afford to
pay the exorbitant sums.
113 CONG. REC. 18400 (July 11, 1967).
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1640 (1976).
42 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1980).
43 Edmonds, Truth and Consequences, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 367 (1978).
44 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975).
45 See text accompanying notes 36, 37 and 38 supra.
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poses are (1) to protect borrowers by making them more knowledgeable concern-
ing credit transactions they enter into, and (2) to protect lenders by strengthening
their ability to compete in the free market.46 These courts point out that the
original legislative draft of the Act was consciously tolerant of technical, insignifi-
cant errors made by lenders.
4 7
Though supported by case precedent, 48 the decision reached by the Seventh
Circuit in Villanueva did not consider the effect of the recent Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act 49 (Simplification Act), passed by Congress to deal
with de minimis violations. The Simplification Act has four purposes: (1) to
provide consumers with simple, understandable information relating to rates and
charges; (2) to make compliance easier for creditors; (3) to limit civil penalties to
material violations; and (4) to strengthen administrative enforcement. 50 The
Simplification Act is a congressional response to the highly technical scheme that
has distorted the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act. Senator Garn, in address-
ing the Senate on the need for simplification, stated:
[The Act] had been subverted into one of the most monumental monstrosities of
paperwork ever foisted upon the American public. [I]n some Federal courts ... 40
percent of the caseload was Truth in Lending violations, highly technical, super criti-
cal, a comma out of place, a word wrong, . .. creating a big burden .... 51
Villanueva provided the federal appellate courts with their first opportunity
to consider de minimis violations of the Truth in Lending Act in light of the new
legislation. The cases relied on in Villanueva had rejected the de minimis defense
because no such defense was specified in the statutory language, and because the
Act's legislative history appeared to oppose the existence of such a defense. The
new amendment, however, is intended to create a de minimis defense, and its
legislative history indicated Congressional desire that such a defense be allowed.
Section 615 of the Simplification Act "is intended to restrict the scope of creditor
civil liability for statutory penalties to only those disclosures which are of mate-
rial importance in credit shopping. The [Senate] committee believes this will
eliminate litigation based on purely technical violations of the Act."152
The Simplification Act does not take effect until March 31, 1982 and a stat-
ute with a definite future date fixed for its commencement has effect only from
that time.53 For this reason the Seventh Circuit may have felt constrained from
considering it.54 However, the Villanueva decision is based upon a conflicting leg-
46 In his remarks at the congressional debates over the Truth in Lending Act, Senator Young stated:
[T]he truth-in-lending bill before us here today is aimed only at the unscrupulous lender. Its
passage would protect not only the consumer who is uneducated in credit, but the ethical busi-
nessman who faces unfair competition on the part of those who engage in deceiving or fooling or
cheating the public. It is a bill which would greatly strengthen the free competitive system.
113 CONG. REc. 18420 (1967).
47 At the congressional debates Senator Bennett remarked: "iT]his bill has [been] rescued from the
straitjacket of mathematical rigidity and made practical by recognition of the need for mathematical
tolerances. . . ." 113 CONG. REc. 18408 (1967).
48 Mirabal v. GMAC, 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1976).
49 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 180 (1980).
50 124 CONG. REC. S7226 (daily ed. May 10, 1978).
51 124 CONG. REC. S7230 (daily ed. May 10, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Schmitt).
52 S. REP. No. 73, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
53 United States v. Casson, 434 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
54" The purpose of the future effective date is to inform persons of a statute's provisions before it
becomes effective so that they may take steps to protect their rights and discharge their obligations. If a
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islative history which Congress clarified in passing the Simplification Act. In
light of Congress's attempt to clarify its intent in the Truth in Lending Act, the
Seventh Circuit should have at least addressed that issue.
The Seventh Circuit held in 'illanueva the de minimis defense unavailable to
lenders whose violation of the Truth in Lending Act was de minimis. In strictly
interpreting the statute, the court failed to recognize a recent legislative pro-
nouncement aimed at limiting abusive actions against lenders for technical viola-
tions such as those present in Villanueva. This case presented the appellate courts
with their first opportunity to reevaluate, in light of the new legislation, the strict
approach to the Act. Courts faced with future technical violations of the Act
should reexamine the legislative intent underlying the Act and adopt a liberal
approach in suits against lenders who make essentially harmless mistakes.
Ophelia S Camifia
Securities Law-MISLEADING PROXY STATEMENTS-OUTSIDE ACCOUNTANTS
CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER RULE 14a-9 ONLY UPON A SHOWING OF SCIEN-
TER-Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980).
The culpability standard in a shareholder's action under section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)1 and rule 14a-92 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has remained unclear since 1964 when the
Supreme Court of the United States, inJ Case Co. v. Borak,3 established a pri-
vate right of action for violations of these provisions. 4 Section 14(a) makes it
statute takes immediate effect, it is often impossible for all persons affected by it to discover its existence or
to comply with its terms, and thus it results in hardship and unfairness. Likewise, as the complexity of
statutes increases it becomes necessary to provide a future effective date to allow the government time to
establish machinery for the enforcement of statutes. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CON-
STRUcTioN § 33.07 (4th ed. 1973).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursu-
ant to section 12 of this title.
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9a (1979). This rule, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to authority granted
under section 14(a), is intended to prevent false or misleading statements in proxy solicitations. The rule
provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement,
form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any state-
ment which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary
in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any
statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same
meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
3 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4 Id. at 431. Although 14(a) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, the
Court in Borak implied a private right of action to serve the broad remedial purpose of affording protection
to investors. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1979) (private action a necessary
supplement to Commission's enforcement activities). See generaly Note, P3r"vate Enforcement of the Federal
Ay Rules: Remedial Alternatives, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 286 (1973).
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unlawful to issue proxy materials in violation of rules and regulations promul-
gated by the SEC. Rule 14a-9, implementing section 14(a), forbids proxy solici-
tations which contain false or misleading statements, or omissions, of material
fact. What Borak and subsequent cases left unanswered is whether liability under
these provisions requires proof of scienter or merely negligence. In Adams v. Stan-
dard Knitting MiLrS ,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that outside accountants are liable for false or misleading proxy statements in a
civil action for damages under rule 14a-9 only upon a showing of scienter.
In April 1970, Chadbourn, Inc. (Chadbourn), a North Carolina hosiery
manufacturer, completed a merger with Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. (Stan-
dard), a small publicly held textile manufacturer. Standard's shareholders had
agreed to the merger after receiving a proxy statement describing the proposed
merger plan, including a recommendation by Standard's management favoring
the merger and financial statements of Chadbourn prepared by Chadbourn's ac-
countants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co. (Peat, Marwick).
Approximately a year after the merger, Chadbourn's sales of hosiery plum-
meted unexpectedly and Chadbourn suffered heavy losses. It was later unable to
pay dividends on or redeem the preferred stock held by former Standard share-
holders as was expected under the merger agreement. In October 1972, the
shareholders brought suit against, inter alia, Peat, Marwick, alleging that the
proxy materials issued in order to gain shareholder approval of the merger had
contained false or misleading statements. 6 The district court, finding that Peat,
Marwick had acted willfully and with intent to deceive, imposed liability under
rules lOb-5 and 14a-9 in the amount of $3.4 million, plus prejudgment interest
and attorneys fees of $1.2 million.7 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Peat,
5 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980).
6 In addition to Peat, Marwick, the shareholders brojight suit against Chadbourn, Standard, their
management, and their lawyers. However, these defendants entered into a settlement agreement with the
plaintiffs, leaving Peat, Marwick as the sole defendant at trial.
The action was brught pursuant to sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC rules lOb-5 and
14a-9. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person. . . (b) to use or employ in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 10(b), and
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The allegedly false or misleading statements concerned certain restrictions which would affect payment
of dividends on Chadbourn's stock. Several months prior to the merger, Chadbourn had taken out a $6
million bank loan and borrowed another $12.5 million in exchange for a debenture issue. The two debt
agreements contained various restrictions on retained earnings that would affect the payment of dividends
or redemption of preferred shares issued to Standard's shareholders. These restrictions were incorrectly
described in the proxy statements as applying to "common stock" rather than to "capital stock of any
class." Accordingly, the proxy materials conveyed the erroneous impression that the debt agreement re-
strictions did not apply to Chadbourn preferred stock. 623 F.2d at 426.
7 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). The error in the financial statements was
called to Peat, Marwick's attention by a Chadbourn lawyer several weeks before the merger vote occurred.
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Marwick had been guilty solely of negligence and that negligence alone was in-
sufficient to create liability under either lOb-5 or 14a-9.
Writing for the court, Judge Merritt 8 quickly discarded rule 1Ob-5 as a basis
for liability, citing the Supreme Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder9
that liability under rule lOb-5 requires "intentional misconduct" in a private ac-
tion for damages.' 0 The court similarly held that negligence alone would not
support liability under rule 14a-9 due to (1) policy considerations governing lia-
bility of accountants, and (2) section 14(a)'s legislative history. The court insisted
that the standard of culpability is "not simply a question of statutory interpreta-
tion,""1 and expressed concern about the magnitude of accountants' potential
liability for relatively minor mistakes should a negligence standard be adopted.' 2
Seeking to place some limits upon the shareholder's cause of action, the court
concluded that the standard of culpability should be the more exacting one of
scienter.
The court's examination of the proxy provisions ' 3 legislative history led it to
conclude that the sort of proxy abuse which Congress sought to correct by enact-
ing section 14(a) involved wrongs which "required some degree of knowledge, i.e.
scienter."' 4 The court found no evidence that Congress specifically desired to
protect shareholders from the negligence of accountants. To further support its
interpretation of congressional intent, the court referred to section 14(e),' 5 per-
taining to tender offers. The court reasoned that since 14(e) requires scienter, a
"strong policy reason" exists for a like standard in a section 14(a) action. Tender
offers and proxy solicitations are two alternate methods of achieving the same
result--corporate control-and similar standards of liability should, therefore,
govern both.
To the extent the Sixth Circuit premised its holding upon its reading of
congressional intent, its reasoning contains two related flaws. First, the court
reached its conclusion without reference to the actual language of the statute.
Second, the court gave greater weight to the legislative history of the proxy provi-
sions, as a guide to congressional intent, than is merited.
No effort was made by Peat, Marwick to call the error to the attention of Standard shareholders or offi-
cials. 623 F.2d at 427-28.
8 Judge Merritt was joined by Judge Engel. Judge Weick filed a separate dissenting opinion, main-
taining that Peat, Marwick's conduct was sufficient to establish scienter.
9 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
10 Id. at 201. This rule was later expanded in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), where the Court
held that scienter was a requisite element in a SEC injunctive action. In sweeping language, the Court
declared that "scienter is an element of a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, regardless of the iden-
tity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought." Id. at 1952.
11 623 F.2d at 428.
12 The court noted that the accountant is not in privity with the shareholders and, unlike the corpo-
rate issuer, does not directly benefit from the proxy vote. The court also observed that 14a-9 does not
require proof of actual investor reliance, but substitutes the less exacting standard of materiality for reli-
ance. Id. at 428-9.
13 The proxy provisions include section 14(a) through 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
14 623 F.2d 422, 430 (1980). The court used the term "scienter" as it was used in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), to refer to a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud." Id. at 193 n.12.
15 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender, offer. . ..
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To the extent the court premised its holding upon the policy against expos-
ing outside accountants to excessive liability, it failed to take adequate account of
the equally important policy of protecting investors from inadequately prepared
or misleading proxy materials. Since the latter policy is endorsed by the federal
statutory scheme, the Sixth Circuit has struck the balance between the two in an
overly restrictive fashion.
Rule 14a-9 imposes a duty of disclosure when shareholders are solicited for
their proxies or for their authorization of specific corporate action. The rule im-
plements Congress's desire to substitute "a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor,"' 6 and to place upon those in control of informa-
tion the responsibility for misrepresentation. Accordingly, courts have readily
identified the main purpose of section 14(a) as informed corporate suffrage, 17
requiring that shareholders be fully and fairly informed when their consent is
solicited and creating liability when such disclosure has not occurred. To achieve
this purpose, Congress delegated very broad powers to the SEC. The only stan-
dards provided in the enabling legislation are those inherent in such terms as
"public interest" and "protection of investors."' 18 Thus, the express terms of sec-
tion 14(a), as of many other sections of the Securities Acts, shed little light on the
question of standards of culpability. 19 However, a substantial body of interpre-
tive case law and commentary has developed concerning the approach to be used
for determining the culpability standard required by particular Securities Act
provisions. 20
The starting point is Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder,2 t which dealt with the culpa-
bility standard for section 10(b). The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst affirmed
the general principle that the "[a]scertainment of congressional intent with re-
spect to the standard of liability created by a particular section [of the Securities
Acts] . . . [must] rest primarily on the language of that section."'22 Examining
the language of 10(b), the Court found the presence of such words as "manipula-
tive," "device," and "contrivance" to be unmistakable evidence that Congress
intended scienter as the requisite element for triggering liability under rule 10b-
5.23 Indeed, the Court found the language to be such a clear manifestation of
congressional intent that it suggested "further inquiry may be unnecessary."
'24
16 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., Ist Sess. 1-5 (1933); Securities Act: Heari'g on S.875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1933).
Manuel Cohen, former Chairman of the SEC, has written: "The primary underlying concept of the
proxy rule. . . is that of disclosure. While the proxy regulation contains procedural rules of one kind or
another, these are designed to make effective the basic requirements and to permit freer communications
among security holders." Cohen, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 20 FED. B.J. 91, 98 (1960). See generally
Comment, IWy Solicitations: The Need for Erpanded Disclosure Requirements, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 1100 (1977).
17 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1934). Accord, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). See note I supra.
19 Section 14(a) does no more than make it unlawful to violate such rules as the SEC may prescribe
for the protection of investors. SEC rule 14a-9 is equally silent as to any culpability standard, merely
establishing a qualitative standard for proxy materials.
20 Friedman & Hertz, Developments in the '33 and '34 Acts. Disclosure and Reporting, 9 INST. SEC. REG.
381-424 (1978); Note, Development of Scienter Under 10b-5, 9 INST. Sac. REG. 327-40 (1978).
21 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
22 Id. at 200.
23 Id. at 199.
24 Id. at 201. Nonetheless, the Court did proceed to examine the legislative history of the 1934 Act
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Ultimately, the Court held that Congress intended to proscribe only willful con-
duct under rule lOb-5.
The Court's approach in Ernst &Ernst is important when construing section
14(a) because the 193325 and 1934 Acts are interrelated components of the fed-
eral regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities. 26 As the Court stated
in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. ,27 "the interdependence of the various sections of
the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the lan-
guage Congress has chosen .... "28 Accordingly, just as the presence of such
terms as "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" in section 10(b) was held
in Ernst & Ernst to denote a scienter requirement, the absence of such terms in
other Securities Act provisions has been held to indicate that Congress intended
something less than a scienter requirement.
For example, in Aaron v. SEC2 9 the Supreme Court set forth the culpability
requirements of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.30 Focusing on the operative lan-
guage chosen by Congress, the Court distinguished each subparagraph of 17(a),
holding that Congress clearly intended a scienter requirement under subpara-
graph (1), which contained such terms as "employ," "device," "scheme," and
"defraud," but not under subparagraphs (2) or (3), which contained no such
language. 3 1 The Court refused to adopt a uniform culpability requirement for
the three subparagraphs, holding that "the language of the subsection is simply
not amenable to such an interpretation. '32
A number of courts interpreting section 14(a) have also viewed the language
of the provision as the most accurate expression of congressional intent. Here,
too, a comparison of the language of 10(b) with that of 14(a) has led courts to
conclude that 14(a) does not require scienter. Thus, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc. ,33 the Second Circuit observed that the SEC's rulemaking authority under
section 10(b) extended only to regulation of "manipulative or deceptive devices,"
while its authority under section 14(a) was "broad, extending to all proxy regula-
tion 'necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors' and not limited by words connoting fraud or deception. '34 The court
and concluded that the history supported its conclusion that section 10(b), and the scope of authority
granted to the SEC thereunder, did not extend to liability for negligent conduct alone. Id at 214. See also
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1979).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
26 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stroes, 421 U.S. 723, 727-30 (1975).
27 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
28 Id at 466.
29 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
30 15 U.S.C. § 77a (a) (1976). Section 17(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
31 446 U.S. at 696-97.
32 446 U.S. at 697. Both litigants urged the Court to adopt a uniform culpability requirement for the
three subparagraphs of 17(a), which the Court declined to do. The Court also cited previous cases in
which it had emphasized the distinctions among the three subparagraphs of 17(a). See United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 (1979).
33 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modtlfd and aj'd, 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
34 478 F.2d at 1299.
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concluded that scienter was unnecessary for liability under rule 14a-9.35 Simi-
larly, the Third Circuit's holding in Could v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. ,36
that negligence is the appropriate standard under 14(a), is also based on the lan-
guage of that section. Indeed, the court in ould observed that all the courts
which had discussed the question favored applying a negligence standard for lia-
bility under 14(a).3 7 Such a standard has met with approval by commentators. 38
Although none of the cases cited above dealt with the precise issue of liabil-
ity of accountants, they illustrate that the Sixth Circuit's sweeping statement that
Congress "contemplated that 14(a) would be applied only against the knowing or
reckless wrongdoing of outsiders," 39 is not in accord with the conclusions reached
by other courts. Yet the court's conclusion is not as surprising as its failure to
consider adequately the statutory language and reconcile 14(a)'s language with
that of other sections. This failure is especially puzzling in view of the court's
apparent willingness to scrutinize the statutory language when construing section
14(e),40 pertaining to tender offers. Observing that in 14(e) Congress uses such
terms as "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative," the court stated: "This
language indicates, in light of Ernst & Ernst, that 14(e) requires scienter. Al-
though Ernst &Ernst was decided several years after the enactment of 14(e), we
are bound by its holding that Congress intends scienter when it uses the above
quoted language."' 4 1 It is paradoxical that the court found the presence of such
language dispositive when construing 14(e), yet appeared unconcerned by its ab-
sence in 14(a).
Although the court did not look to the statutory language in determining
that Congress intended section 14(a) to require proof of scienter, it did rely heav-
ily upon the legislative history of 14(a). The portions of the floor debates and the
Fletcher Report 42 cited by the court concededly support the view that Congress,
when it considered the proxy provisions, was primarily concerned with those who
35 The court's holding, however, was applicable only to inside corporate directors and was qualified
by the court: "Although this does not mean that scienter should never be required in an action under rule
14a-9. . . it would be inappropriate to require plaintiffs to prove it in the circumstances of this case." 478
F.2d at 1300. This dictum was noted by the court in Adams, 623 F.2d at 428.
36 356 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
37 535 F.2d 761, 777 (1976). See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210 n.28 (observing
that lower courts have held scienter to be unnecessary). For cases holding persons other than directors to
be liable for negligence, see Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afdin
pertintlpart, 416 F.2d 1189, 1192 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (financial consultants).
38 See Note, Stingent Duty of Care on Board Nominees Under 11(a), 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 468 (1979); Note,
Negligence Rather Than Scienter is the Testfor Liability Under 14(a), 23 EMORY L.J. 567 (1974); Note, Proper
Standard of Faultfor Directors Re. Proxy Solicitations, 34 OHIO L.J. 670 (1973).
39 623 F.2d at 430.
40 Id. at 431. For the text of section 14(e), see note 14supra.
41 Id. at 431. Although the court in Adams, citing no authorities, assumed that 14(e) requires scienter,
at least one federal court has held that negligence alone is sufficient for liability under 14(e). See SEC v.
Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1978). For a discussion of 14(e) and congressional purpose, see Note, A
Negligence Standardfor Material Misstatements and Omissios in Tender Offers Under 14() ofe Securities Exchange
Act of1934, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733-56 (1974).
42 623 F.2d at 429-30. The "Fletcher Report" is the common designation for the Senate Report on
the 1934 Act. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 75, 77 (1934): "It is contemplated that the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of
their proxies, on the one hand, by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away
from honest and conscientious corporation officials; and, on the other hand, by unscrupulous corporate
officials seeking to retain control of the management by concealing and distorting facts." The court
pointed to the words "promiscuous," "concealing," and "distorting" as evidence that Congress was prima-
rily concerned with intentional misconduct.
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solicited proxies with actual intent to deceive. However, the mere fact that Con-
gress was concerned with intentional abuses of the solicitation process does not
clearly establish that Congress was not also concerned with the possibility of neg-
ligent wrongdoing, particularly since the grant of authority to the SEC under
14(a) to oversee proxy solicitations was made in such broad terms.4 3
The court's conclusion that Congress intended to impose a scienter require-
ment for 14(a) essentially derives from the observation that "nowhere, not in the
committee reports nor in the House or Senate debates, does it appear that Con-
gress desired to protect the investor against negligence of accountants. .. 44
This hardly resolves the question. For example, section 14(a) does not by its
terms create an express private remedy for damages, and there is no indication
"in the committee reports [or] in the House or Senate debates" that Congress
ever contemplated such a remedy. Yet the existence of a private cause of action
is well established.45 The legislative history of section 14(a) does not, as the court
holds, mandate a scienter requirement for imposition of liability. The history is
simply silent on the issue and therefore inconclusive. Perhaps for this reason, the
federal courts have not accorded the legislative history much deference in their
search for the proper standard of culpability, viewing it as insufficient, without
more, to settle the question.4 6
The court in Adanzs, however, did not rest solely on its reading of congres-
sional intent. It expressed the concern that to hold outside accountants liable to
shareholders for negligence is to go too far. This concern reflects the long-stand-
ing reluctance of courts to extend accountants' liability "in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."' 47 It is not clear,
however, that this concern should dominate cases involving accountants' prepa-
ration of proxy materials. Not only has concern for the untutored, ordinary in-
vestor risen in the last decade,48 but the securities statutes have an avowed
purpose. of full disclosure and investor protection. 49 Numerous legal commenta-
tors have advocated an expansion of accountants' liability to users of financial
statements, 50 and courts have begun to find liability in circumstances where it
43 See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (1973).
44 623 F.2d at 430.
45 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (creating private right of action, and exhorting
courts "to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose");
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
46 See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 356 F. Supp. 853, 860 (1972), vacated and
remandedon othergrounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The legislative history ... provides no significant
assistance in helping us to determine the applicable standard of culpability').
47 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y 170, 174, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931). On the
liability of accountants to third parties, see generally Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to
ThAirdParties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975); Gormley, Accountants' ProfessionalLiability-A Ten Year Review, 29
Bus. Law 1205 (1974).
48 See, e.g., Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities -aws--ome Observations, 68
Nw U.L. REV. 1 (1973); Note, Accountants, Financial Disclosure, and Investors' Remedies, 18 N.Y.L.F. 681
(1973).
49 See note 15 supra.
50 See, e.g., Bradley, Auditors'Liability and the Needfor Accounting Uniformity, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
898 (1965); Wyatt, Auditors' Respionsibilities, 12 ST. Louis L.J. 331 (1968); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A
Modem Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 56 (1968); Comment, Accountants'
Liabilities to Third parties Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND & COM L. REv. 137(1967). For articles on accountants' liability that do not accept its expansion as desirable, see Note, Overac-
countable Aecountants? 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71 (1974); Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability-How
Far Do We Go? 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 191 (1967).
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would have been unthinkable in earlier decades. 5 1 Such liability has had two
purposes: improved disclosure of financial information to investors52 and restitu-
tion to investors injured by misleading financial statements. 53 The need for dis-
closure and restitution is particularly great in securities transactions since, as one
court observed, false and misleading statements about securities "can be instru-
ments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."'54
And when misinformation causes loss, it little comforts a shareholder to know
that he has been hurt by negligent mistake rather than by fraudulent design.
Moreover, liability under 14(a) for negligent misconduct does not subject
accountants to potential liability to an unlimited class of plaintiffs. In Adams, the
shareholders were a readily ascertainable group whose reliance on the proxy
materials was foreseen by the defendant accounting firm, thus placing a natural
limit upon those to whom the firm could be said to have owed a duty. Although
the court was concerned about exposing the accounting firm in Adams to undue
risk, the firm had charged 125 percent of its usual fee for services precisely be-
cause "SEC work does require a higher degree of risk."155
In short, a court's concern about over-liability of accountants should be
weighed against a federal statutory scheme seeking to protect shareholders from
deceptive or inadequately prepared financial statements. When proxy materials
are prepared and certified by accountants with the knowledge that specific share-
holders will rely upon them, there is nothing unreasonable about imposing a
duty of care and of full and fair disclosure.
As one of the latest cases considering the standard of culpability required by
section 14(a), the Sixth Circuit's decision in Adams contains deficiencies which
seriously diminish its precedential value. The court's failure to consider carefully
the statutory language is difficult to reconcile with the many decisions which
have found such reference essential, if not dispositive. Furthermore, the court
relies excessively on the scant and equivocal legislative history of 14(a) as a guide
to congressional intent. Finally, the court's interest in protecting outside ac-
countants from excessive liability does not outweigh the countervailing interest of
protecting shareholders from misleading proxy materials.
Although Adams establishes scienter as the culpability standard under 14(a)
for accountants within the Sixth Circuit,56 it provides little guidance to those in
51 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (suit brought under § 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964)); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(public accountant's duty is not only to immediate client, but to all who may be expected to rely). The
SEC's long held position has been best expressed in Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670
(1957); "The responsibility of a public accountant is not only to the client who pays his fee, but also to
investors, creditors and others who may rely on the financial statements he certifies."
52 See note 49 supra.
53 See, e.g., Note, Accountants' Liabiliies for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1437, 1468 (1967).
54 United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cer4 denied, Howard v. United States, 377
U.S. 953 (1964).
55 623 F.2d at 439.
56 The Sixth Circuit's holding might be reversed on one of three grounds. First, the Supreme Court
could rule that the district court's factual determinaitons were not "clearly erroneous" and that the Sixth
Circuit exceeded its authority on review when it reversed the finding of scienter and substituted its own
finding that Peat, Marwick acted only negligently. See dissent by Judge Weick, 623 F.2d at 436-46
("[M]ajority has usurped the fact finding functions of Judge Boldt.")
Second, the Court could hold that the Sixth Circuit erred in applying the term "scienter" too restric-
tively. In Adams, even if the original error in the proxy materials had occured through negligence, Peat,
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other circuits who are concerned with third-party liability in the preparation of
proxy statements. The expansion of accountants' liability generally, and the will-
ingness of other jurisdictions to interpret the reach of 14(a) more generously than
the Sixth Circuit, suggest that Adams cannot be expected to ease the pressure on
outside accountants to avoid professional negligence.
-Bi'an G. Waliser
Marwick became aware of the error several weeks before the merger vote occured, transforming mere
negligence into a knowing misrepresentation or scienter. See note 7 supra; 623 F.2d at 438-46 (Weick, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, the Court could reverse on the ground that liability under- 14(a) may be predicated upon
negligence.
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